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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the implementation of neighbourhood policing by studying two 
case study neighbourhoods within the Thames Valley Police. The study focusses on 
the Neighbourhood Action Group (NAG) which exists in each neighbourhood. It 
comprises police, partner organizations (such as the local council, schools, businesses 
etc. ) and some residents. The group puts the problem-solving role of the 
neighbourhood policing agenda into practice. The NAG attempts to take on board 
local concerns and prioritize the resolution or amelioration of these problems in their 
neighbourhood. In so doing the group must navigate a set of concepts which are riven 
with subjectivity and open to wide-ranging interpretation. 
The thesis looked at one NAG (Neighbourhood B) from before its initial 
implementation up until it established itself and began working on its priority 
problems. The research also observed a more established NAG (Neighbourhood A) 
which had been working on its priority problems for some time. In this way it was 
possible to follow the process in its entirety, including the consultation process, the 
formation of the NAG, initial problem-solving approaches and the problems faced by 
the group as it grapples with longer term problems. 
In looking at the NAG the thesis uses a `nodal governance of security' approach. This 
locates the NAG as one `node' linked into a larger network of security providers and 
governors. The group, in bringing together a selection of interested parties to work on 
the provision of security to a neighbourhood. 
Using this `nodal governance' analysis, the thesis sets out a number of recurring 
difficulties which the NAGs face when trying to operate as a group of partner 
organizations. It further used the approach to look at how difficult the problem- 
solving process is for NAGs operating as `nodes'. NAGs are still in their infancy, but 
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it is clear that there are many problems, as well as much potential, ahead for them in 
implementing the neighbourhood policing agenda. 
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Introduction 
Since the research described in this thesis began, neighbourhood policing teams have 
been put in place in every neighbourhood in England and Wales. Every member of 
the public in the jurisdiction should theoretically be able to find out who their 
neighbourhood officer is and contact them directly with the non-emergency problems 
that affect them and impact on their quality of life. The problems may be criminal 
activity, or anti-social behaviour, or anything else with which the police 
constabularies tend to deal with as the social service of last resort. A vaguely 
inquisitive person, prepared to go to their local police station will have no problems 
finding out the name of their local neighbourhood officer, and perhaps even getting to 
know them, and discussing their problems with them. If they are really motivated, 
they may be able to join a Neighbourhood Action Group (NAG) and raise their 
concerns there with the police and other agencies who are trying to work holistically 
to solve the problems of most concern to that neighbourhood's residents and other 
members of the public who frequent the area. Policing has begun to concern itself 
with the micro as well as the macro problems of social control. In so doing it has 
begun to work locally to provide a police service for the local people which deals with 
their concerns. It is attempting to provide a service that is `what people want'. 
This approach to policing looks superficially appealing, because it seems to bring us 
back to an era when policing was local, police constables were known to everyone 
and were able to sort out the problems of the area with a little bit of local knowledge 
and some pragmatic small"p political maneuvering within their beat. The `bobby on 
the beat' is thus an iconic component of the national notion of policing in England 
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and perhaps even a deeply engrained statement of an England to which many people 
aspire or feel nostalgically about (Loader, 1997). If that experience of policing ever in 
fact existed, and it is not certain that it did, it is exceptionally difficult to sec how it 
could possibly work in the late-modern pluralist globalized free-market democracy 
that England has become since the so-called `consenus' era of British policing in the 
1950s (McLaughlin, 2007: 81-83). 
Policing at its heart is not exactly like any other public service. Nor indeed is it 
precisely like, or subject to the same economic forms of accountability which 
characterize private profit-driven enterprises (McLaughlin and Murji, 1997). Policing, 
as discussed in the first chapter of this work, is a complex component of social 
ordering, within which one (historically recent) development has been the uniformed 
policing provided by constituent authorities of the nation state. This form of policing 
model effectively reserves the legal use of physical force to one body of trained state 
agents (Bittner, 1990). In return for a communal agreement not to use force (except 
when absolutely necessary, and thus legally, such as in self defence), the nation state's 
body of state agents will apply such force when necessary in order to provide security 
for those who arc deemed to be due the state's protection. This social contract not to 
use force against fellow subjects in return for the protection of the nation-state is 
central to the philosopy of Hobbes who posited that man had learnt from bitter 
experience the necessity for government and communal agreement to be protected by 
the state or `Leviathan' (Kelly, 1992: 212-213). Since the foundation of the `New 
Police' in 1829, they have been the central providers of that security, by resorting to, 
or threatening (however subtly) to, use force on civilians. 
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Yet almost all those upon whom the police are committing violent acts, do not 
consent to those actions. In many cases they do not even consider the police to have a 
legitimate role in resolving the dispute which has ended in their arrest (Cameron, 
1981; Morash and Robinson, 2002; Bowling and Phillips, 2003; Waddington, 2007). 
Policing, on this analysis, is thus a business which is inherently messy and one in 
which some party to any dispute is likely to be unhappy with the outcome. The 
situation cannot always remain `win-win'. In order to get around the discomfort a 
society faces in admitting the difficulties inherent in the existence of body of people 
who are legitimately allowed resolve disputes using violence, there have developed a 
number of complex circumlocutions to diffuse this unpleasant reality. These `myths of 
policing' include notions of `constabulary independence', the citizen's power of arrest 
because the police constable is not an insidious agent of state control, but merely a 
citizen in uniform and the idea that the constable is a servant of the law and not the 
state. According to Klockars (1988) community policing is just another such 
circumlocution. How can community policing ever really provide all the answers and 
make every member of the community happy? The simple answer is, it cannot. 
Somebody will always be `othered' and this is part of the process of forming and 
solidifying the identity of the community itself. 
However, it is clear from these discussions that the implementation of a policing 
strategy such as community policing (which is the basic premise upon which 
neighbourhood policing is based) involves working in a complex social environment, 
with numerous exceptionally subjective notions. These highly subjective notions 
include the very concepts of `community' and `policing' themselves. Defining what it 
is the police are trying to do with neighbourhood policing is a tricky and political 
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operation, and one which is muddied by the uncertainty of the basic conceptual tenets 
upon which the operation is based. Similarly, as discussed in chapter 2, measuring the 
outcome of neighbourhood policing operations is not straightforward. Even if it could 
be simply measured in terms of reducing crime, the ongoing criminological task of 
`quantifying' the `amount' of `crime' is beset with major epistemological difficulties 
(Maguire, 2007). The project of introducing neighbourhood policing is variously 
described as having many objectives (chapter 1). It should increase consultation 
within a neighbourhood in order to define and tailor the policing response to the 
demands of that neighbourhood. This will help reduce individual fear of crime within 
the neighbourhood and provide reassurance to members of the public. In so doing, it 
will increase the democratic accountability of the police and thus increase the 
legitimacy of the police. This increased legitimacy will make it easier for the police to 
function in neighbourhoods that have been harder to reach out to. Increasing the out 
reach capability of the police will increase the amount of intelligence that they can 
garner from such `hard to reach' groups and perhaps help prevent terrorism. Thus 
local level success and connections can have an impact on the security of the entire 
nation. 
It is clear that this is a large set of objectives for one policing strategy to have. 
Measuring the success of a strategy with such a large number of possible options for 
success (and an equally large number of options for failure) is thus a complicated 
affair. Some options may be in direct conflict with each other. For example, in a 
neighbourhood with traditionally poor relations with the police, increasing preventive 
patrols and stop and searches might reduce the reported amount of crime, yet 
completely erode relations between the police and local members of the public. In 
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other circumstances, the damage to police credibility by fighting small scale anti- 
social behaviour could be too much to accept if it were to completely destroy any 
chance of getting useful intelligence for the purposes of fighting larger scale criminal 
activity. Struggling to balance the aims and objectives of neighbourhood policing may 
sometimes feel more like an ongoing political negotiation towards a mutually least 
disagreeable, though ultimately unattainable, settlement, than like a carefully 
implemented social policy. This experience is borne out by the observations made in 
this research. 
The Thames Valley Police (TVP) co-funded the present research into the problems of 
measuring outcomes in neighbourhood policing. The research began in 2005 when the 
policy of neighbourhood policing was in its infancy in the force and around England 
and Wales. The project was allowed virtually unfettered access to the force and the 
process of rolling out neighbourhood policing across the constabulary. The issues that 
arise from these unusual circumstances (police funding academic research in such a 
fashion) are discussed further in chapter 3, which also goes into more details of how 
the research was conducted. The research was primarily an ethnography of the roll- 
out of neighbourhood policing which observed a large number of NAGs in four 
separate neighbourhoods, though focussing mostly on two case study 
neighbourhoods, known as Neighbourhoods A and B. 
Neighbourhood Action Groups (NAGs) are non-statutory bodies formed in each of 
the neighbourhoods in the BCU that was studied. Each NAG is attended by the 
neighbourhood police officer for the neighbourhood, any PCSOs who are assigned to 
the neighbourhood and a set of stakeholders who may have an interest in the co- 
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production of community safety within the neighbourhood. There is no prescribed 
formula of who must attend a NAG for it to be an effective or operational NAG. Each 
member of the NAG is expected to sign the constitution of the NAG and agree to 
abide by its principals. The constitution is not strictly prescribed and can be altered to 
suit the needs of any particular neighbourhood. 
NAGs meet monthly to work on problem-solving the priority problems of their 
neighbourhood. They work within the problem-solving structures set out by the TVP 
such as the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) and the Scanning, Analysis, Response, 
Assessment (SARA) techniques. How the NAGs operate is the subject of the 
ethnographic research presented here. That they are not consistently constituted and 
work in different ways in different neighbourhoods is the subject of discussion in the 
following chapters. 
Alongside this ethnography of NAGs, a number of TVP and partner agency training 
days along with a number of intelligence briefings were also observed. In order to try 
and broaden the research and to understand the perspectives of NAG participants, a 
number of interviews were conducted with key participants, such as NAG chairs, 
police managers, and agency representatives. The data collected are set out and 
discussed in chapters 4 to 7. The choice of NAGs as a central research focus was 
made because the NAG is a relatively new development and is central to a number of 
the aims of neighbourhood policing. 
A NAG is an opportunity for some local residents to work alongside other local stake 
holders and local government agencies as well as the police to try and solve problems 
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which are specific to their areas. The NAG, according to the police themselves is the 
problem-solving entity within neighbourhood policing (and this is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 7). It is also a central location for the interaction of numerous 
agencies concerned with providing social and other services to members of the public 
within a neighbourhood. The NAG is not only a problem-solving group, but also a 
location for partnership and collaboration and this partnership is central to attaining 
success in almost any of the possible areas in which neighbourhood policing hopes to 
have an impact. The NAG is thus central to the collaborative approach of 
neighbourhood policing, the very essence of what it is that makes neighbourhood 
policing different. If neighbourhood policing is to be more than `old policing wine in 
new policing bottles' it is going to have to mark out that difference by utilizing 
effective collaboration and problem-solving to tailor bespoke interventions for 
problems as they are perceived by local `publics'. Understanding the NAG is thus 
central to understanding neighbourhood policing. 
In a world that is moving swiftly away from a centralized nation-state focussed form 
of `policing' towards a more diversified and fragmented collection of approaches to 
policing, there is some degree of uncertainty as to the future role of the state police. It 
is within this `plural policing' that any new policing strategy will have to operate 
(Jones and Newburn, 2006b). Operating in the pluralized policing environment is 
beginning to be considered by some theorists as a form of `security network' 
(Crawford, 2006a; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Policing in this model is one form of 
providing, or attempting to provide, security. Policing is no longer the start and end of 
security provision as it would be in the era of the Ilobbesian Leviathan. Within these 
networks there are numerous `nodes' of security governance. This vast market place 
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of security provision has been increasing in size and diversity for many years 
(Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Shearing, 1992), to the point where there are now 
many voices in the discourse of security provision. Each of these nodes or voices 
interacts with one another in various degrees of harmony and discord. Some nodes 
will have agendas which they see as being of great public importance (for example 
agencies concerning themselves with so-called national security), while others will 
simply be trying to increase their own sense of security (such as a neighbourhood 
watch group) or indeed trying to make a profit (for example a private security 
company). Each node works within a framework of security provision which affects 
how effective it can be. This work looks at the NAG as a node of security governance 
and discusses some of the forces and issues that arise from its place within that 
network of security governance. 
In order for a NAG to begin the process of problem-solving, it must first define what 
its priority problems are to be. This takes place through a process of consultation 
which was observed in the case study of Neighbourhood B (chapter 4), which decided 
to focus mainly on anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood. However, this process 
of definition (as discussed in chapter 7) faces twin challenges which this research has 
identified as the problems of political definition and the problems of administrative 
definition. The problem of political definition is in essence the problem of consulting 
with the `community' or the `public' to find out which problems it is that they would 
like the NAG to solve. The problem of administrative definition focuses on the 
practical or hands-on definition of the problem which a NAG or other node of security 
governance will use to approach the construction of a suitable intervention in order to 
try to solve the problem. Thus in the case of Neighbourhood B, the problem was 
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politically defined as `anti-social behaviour' through the use of public meetings and 
other forms of consultations such as questionnaires. However the practicalities of 
creating an administrative definition of what anti-social behaviour actually is for the 
purposes of trying to solve it, proved to be more controversial. The research produced 
evidence of substantial disagreement between NAG attendees about how to define 
anti-social behaviour and this naturally had an impact on what the NAG could attempt 
to do about it. Anti-social behaviour was also the focus of the two main problems 
focussed on by the NAG in the second case study area, Neighbourhood A (chapter 5). 
The NAG in that neighbourhood chose to work on the problems of anti-social 
behaviour associated with garages which had been built at the same time, but separate 
from, the council housing stock in the neighbourhood. While this comes under the 
banner of anti-social behaviour, it is an unusual example of problem-solving and is 
certainly unique amont the NAGs in the same Basic Command Unit (BCU). 
While the biggest issue for problem-solving may be deciding and precisely 
pinpointing the problem itself, this research also identified five other main types of 
problem faced by NAGs in constructing effective interventions to try and solve 
problems. The first are the `teething' problems which are often associated with the 
early stages of a new policy initiative. For example, Neighbourhood A was a pilot 
neighbourhood for the roll out of the neighbourhood policing in the BCU and this 
appeared to help it get started more easily as there was more police and agency time 
to spend on it and more at stake in its success. In comparison, Neighbourhood B, 
which started out as a NAG much later, had substantial difficulties getting going. For 
example there were difficulties getting some potential stakeholders, particularly the 
private housing agency to attend. `Teething' problems lead neatly into timeframe 
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problems because in the early stages of a NAG's development there is often an 
urgency to demonstrate results. This goes beyond merely the `teething' phase 
however. The more difficult problems that require the long term implementation of 
interventions are naturally slow to demonstrate results. This delay requires a 
confidence that something will come of the NAG's work but can lead to a parallel 
desire to achieve `quick wins' over smaller projects, to maintain the public perception 
that a NAG is doing something and that it is in some way useful to its public. 
Measuring these results however, is an exceptionally difficult thing to do. Partially for 
the reasons just mentioned, that success is so clearly in the eye of the beholder, but 
also because there are difficult methodological problems with trying to measure 
success. Every NAG faces problems of evaluation which, notwithstanding the best 
efforts of police managers in attempting to formalize methods of evaluation, 
successfully finding out if your intervention is working is a difficult, and potentially 
politically fraught operation. 
While the NAGs studied in this research are relatively new, as indeed is the very 
concept of a NAG, it is clearly the intention of central government and senior police 
management that neighbourhood policing and the NAG are here to stay and will 
become part of the `greater police family'. This raises the problem of sustainability. 
Keeping NAGs going takes a certain amount of skill and drive which may not be 
present in each local area's representatives or other NAG members. This is 
compounded by the problem of ownership, where due to the infrequency of individual 
NAG meetings and the plurality of similar meetings many partnership agencies have 
to attend, there can be difficulties in getting NAG members to actually ensure that the 
commitments they make are followed through. There was observed a sense of 
`voluntarism' to the work of many of the attendees, and when this foundered, progress 
towards the NAG's objectives also slowed down. Sustaining a functioning NAG 
which can operate as an effective node of governance is a challenging operation. 
This challenge is perhaps most difficult because the NAG operates as a forum for the 
interaction of partnership agencies, not all of whom have the same work habits or 
motivations, but all of whom have to collaborate within the `node' in order to try to 
reduce crime or solve one of the NAG's other priority problems. Chapter 6 looks at 
the ways in which this partnership has operated in the case study neighbourhoods and 
discusses this in light of the literature on the co-production of community safety by 
agencies working in partnership. For the police in particular, this type of partnership 
working can cause a tension between the local demands and their centrally mandated 
targets which may not be directly related to the NAG's priority problems. Other 
agencies may suffer from problems in that their main objectives will be something 
which is not directly related to issues traditionally associated with the project of 
`policing'. Housing agencies, for example do not necessarily consider themselves an 
important battalion in the `war on crime'. Some are motivated by the desire simply to 
provide the best possible housing to clients, those in the private sector will be driven 
by the desire to turn a profit. Not all agencies have the reduction of crime, fear of 
crime or anti-social behaviour as their primary motivation. This can lead to the other 
key problem associated with partnership working, the risk of criminalizing social 
policy and `youth'. In obliging agencies to work together on the question of crime or 
anti-social behaviour there is a very real risk that this can alter their focus away from 
other social policy goals such as poverty reduction or increased standards of 
education. If the discourse of social policy shifts in such a way as to see social policy 
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failings (or to be more optimistic, social policy `challenges') solely in the light of 
their criminogenic effect, there is a temptation not to consider these challenges as 
ends which in themselves are worthy of consideration. This sort of vision of the 
criminogenic qualities of social policy issues can be seen in this research in the 
discourse about `youth' and the many problems that they cause in the case study 
neighbourhoods. Although the problems are largely of anti-social behaviour rather 
than crime per se, the fact that the group of people who are being created as the 
`other' are the nebulous class of people known as `youths' and `young people'. While 
it is clear that there are many problems facing young people in contemporary society, 
it seems that trying to deal with these challenges using the blunt tool of the criminal 
justice system and other nodes of security governance, tends in the direction of 
framing the problems of contemporary adolescence as a `problem of crime'. 
This research has looked at the development of a `new' technique of policing at the 
earliest stages of its development and describes the problems that it has encountered 
as it has tried to `bed in' as a programme that is here to stay. There has not been much 
academic research on this new format of policing, which is experiencing sustained 
attention from government and politicians and it is fair to say that, as yet, there has 
been no academic study of the NAG and its work as a problem-solver or as a co- 
producer of community safety. In so doing, this research has attempted to describe the 
role of the NAG within its neighbourhood specifically and within neighbourhood 
policing more generally, as a node connected up to a broad network of security 
governance. Neighbourhood policing draws not just upon the established strategies of 
`community policing' but also tries to merge it with problem-oriented policing and 
intelligence-led policing to provide a bespoke policing service to each neighbourhood 
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in England and Wales. How much it can achieve will be influenced by the success of 
NAGs up and down the jurisdiction as NAGs are the central point where all three of 
these strategies meet. It may even be said that without the NAG, neighbourhood 
policing is just policing. 
14 
Chapter 1 
What is Neighbourhood Policing and Where Has It Come From? 
Neighbourhood policing did not simply `appear' on the streets of Britain in 2004 as a 
discrete and isolated policy initiative to resolve the issues of crime and social order in 
the nation's neighbourhoods. It is the result of much complex history and 
development in the process of `policing' and long term efforts to produce social order 
or control. This chapter looks at some of the notions upon which it is based such as 
`policing', community', `neighbourhood' and `community policing'. It is argued here 
that these notions are slippery to define and as a result can leave those working with 
them a lot of discretion as to what they mean and how to apply them. Throughout 
almost all work on neighbourhood policing, practitioners (and indeed academics) 
must use these terms as best they can and this can lead to conceptual instability in the 
application of the policy processes of neighbourhood policing. 
Within those policy processes there are specific strategies, the two most prominent of 
which are problem-oriented policing (POP) and intelligence-led policing (ILP). These 
distinct approaches are brought together in neighbourhood policing and for that 
reason the theory behind these strategies is discussed here as it is important for 
understanding the empirical data which is discussed in later chapters. flow these 
approaches are applied can lead to substantial claims for their success as was the case 
with the reduction in recorded crime in New York City in the 1990s. This story, 
which claims to be one of a victory for a pro-actively applied community policing 
approach is therefore of relevance to the police manager in Britain. Not least because 
of the common practice of transferring policing policies from the US to the UK. It is 
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argued that the `New York story' is one, not of `community policing' as it is 
commonly understood, but of `zero-tolerance policing', a heavy-handed approach to 
policing both minor and more serious crimes in the city. It is relevant to 
neighbourhood policing firstly because it tries to palm itself off as a form of 
`community policing' (ie Commissioner Bratton seeks to use the term community to 
give his tactics a more `feel-good' appeal) and because its claims of success may not 
be as breathtaking as they initially appear. Not everyone who says they are doing 
community policing is, nor should everyone who claims to be `beating crime' be 
believed. 
Finally, the chapter ends by discussing the proliferation of private policing that has 
taken place in the UK (and other post-industrial democracies) in the latter part of the 
Twentieth Century. It is within this mixed economy of policing that neighbourhood 
policing must set out its stall. Many of those who will benefit from neighbourhood 
policing will also be able to access other forms of security provision and it is a 
constant challenge for the public police to remain relevant and egalitarian in how they 
provide their policing service. 
`Policing' 
`Policing' and `the police' are broad and imprecise terms which cover a variety of 
meanings. `Policing' at its broadest conception covers all actions conducted in order 
to bring people in line with some perceived normal way of behaving. Such actions can 
be by almost anybody. From police officer to parent, professor to peer, every form of 
social behaviour has some sort of norms which are `policed' in some fashion by 
somebody. 
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`Policing' was taking place long before the foundation of the Metropolitan Police (the 
`Met') in London in 1829. Although the creation of the Met is often taken as a starting 
point for modern policing it is fair to say that in fact the Met amounted merely to a 
formalization of policing techniques that had been going on in England for years, such 
as the work of night watchmen and entrepreneurial thief-takers. The Met are often 
described as the `new police' in the sense that they were a paid, organized, group of 
pro-active crime fighters. Yet the constables and watchmen of the eighteenth century 
also fit into these categories. The Met's novelty appears to be something of a myth. 
Styles goes so far as to say that `in many ways the most striking distinguishing feature 
of the "new" police is that they were presented and perceived as something new' 
(1987: 19). 
Prior to 1829 however, the British Empire was employing overt police forces to 
maintain control over its colonies as well as over Ireland. The colonial dimension is 
often forgotten when discussing the development of the `new police'. It has been 
argued that this is because: 
Ethnocentricity, inadequate comparative knowledge of policing, and a- 
historicism are the hallmarks of the Anglo-American sociology of the 
police. ... The failure to consider the wider contours of the emergence of 
the professional police has been near-total. ' (Brogdcn, 1987: 4) 
The demand for a government run police force did not materialise from nowhere. It 
can be seen as part of a reaction to growing concerns about the `dangerous classes' of 
17 
urban poor drawn together in the rapidly expanding cities (Silver, 1967; Graham and 
Clarke, 1996). For some, these `dangerous classes' were seen almost as threatening as 
the colonial subjects of the empire. Robert Peel, the architect of the Met, drew heavily 
on his experience as Chief Secretary of Ireland where he had established the Peace 
Preservation Force in 1814 (Emsley, 2001: 20). 
The development of policing and police forces depends on the social and political 
climate of the time and location in which it operates. As an inherently political 
institution, a police force has to represent some sort of settlement or, failing an 
agreement on how policing should take place, it becomes an enforced settlement. The 
Peace Preservation Force, created by Peel when he was Chief Secretary for Ireland 
may have provided some inspiration for the creation of the Met but the Irish and 
English policing experiences were divergent. The contemporary debates about the 
foundation of the Met were laden with worries about, and concerns to prevent, the 
formation of a centralized police force like that in France. Meanwhile, the Irish force 
itself morphed into the `gendarmerie-style Royal Irish Constabulary' (Emsley, 2001: 
20). While the London force became a model for `policing by consent', the Irish force 
became a paradigm colonial police force. Right up to its conversion to the control of 
the Irish Free State (McNiffe, 1997), it was used to train officers for duties across the 
Empire (Brewer, 1990; Herlihy, 1997). 
While the colonial policing model may have enforced law down on to the subservient 
colonial subject, the Met was to be a model for policing one's own. In many ways the 
most interesting thing about the formation of the Met is not the question of how new 
or groundbreaking the force actually was, but the debate that took place surrounding 
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its formation. Unlike in Ireland (or indeed Palestine or India) where the colonists 
imposed policing, the Met was created by a democracy (albeit a partial democracy) as 
an organization that would police `itself, or at least police the streets in which those 
forming 'itself' ould themselves use. To fill the streets of London with a corps of 
men paid to enforce order required a number of provisos to be in place. At the end of 
the debate, upon the Met's foundation, England had created for itself a number of 
`myths of the police'. These carry through to this day, although their often threadbare 
form makes some of them seem anachronistic. 
The `myths of policing' are in effect a form of denial. They help society sugar-coat 
the fact that the existence of a body whose central role is the maintenance of order 
(Ericson, 1982) through the threat or use of force (Bittner, 1990), can be seen as an 
embarassment to our society. The police are, to use Reiner's term, a `regrettable 
necessity'; 
This has always been the status of the police in even the most pacific and 
law-abiding countries. For the most part, the fashionablele languages of 
managerialism, community and consumerism overlook the fact that 
policing is not about the delivery of an uncontentious service like any 
other. Their business is the messy and intractable one of regulating social 
conflict. (Reiner, 2000a: 215) 
To cover over these uncomfortable facts, there are the myths. The myths include the 
idea that the police officer is merely a citizen in uniform who is only patrolling the 
streets with the same power to arrest someone (ie to use force) as any other citizen. 
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This myth prevails to this day. Although police officers' powers of arrest have 
increased relative to those of the citizen (Hooper and Ormerod, 2007: 1172-1181), the 
possibility of citizen's arrest remains (Fairweather, 2005: 108). This was considered a 
method of displaying the fact that the new police constable was no more violent than 
a normal citizen. There is not so much a finite list of myths as there are cultural 
understandings of the police and their actions. Some of the myths are straightforward 
and relatively obvious, the police constable would be in a blue uniform not a green 
uniform as this would demonstrate that he was different to the army, who had been 
used to brutally put down civil unrest in the past; the City of London maintained its 
own constabulary in order to assert its traditional independence from the rest of the 
metropolis, a myth of territorial control and power which is now largely anachronistic 
as the City of London Police work so closely with the Met. When the constabularies 
were rolled out to the provinces, this control question became an issue again. 
Accountability and control of police forces continue to be thorny issues to this day 
(and are discussed further below), but one way of assuaging fears of a centralized 
police force was to have smaller local constabularies. One of the great worries about 
developing a central police force was that very centralization. This, it was feared 
would lead to a French style `gendarmerie' which could be most easily controlled by 
the ruling powers. The localized constabulary model was constructed in response to 
these fears (Emsley, 2001). These constabularies have merged together over the years, 
now totalling only forty-three (Mawby, 2003). Even this level of diverse centres of 
policing now seems somewhat old-fashioned as the trend towards national 
centralization of control continues (Newburn, 2007; Neyroud, 2007). 
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Perhaps the most famous myth of policing is that of `constabulary independence', an 
idea that the police owe their allegiance not to the government but to the law and 
would apply it as best they could, regardless of the interests of the government or 
other powerful entities. This myth is plainly ridiculous, despite the appealing idea of a 
body with such power acting in a judicious and carefully balanced manner, free from 
political influence. There may be degrees of independence, but it is clear that the 
police are under the control of central government to a large extent. One need only 
consider the vast numbers of instructions, audits and fund-dependent targets that 
emanate from central government to make the idea of constabulary independence 
difficult to believe in. (Savage et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 2001). The myth was 
seriously tested during the miners' strike of the early 1980's when the Thatcher 
Government put serious pressure on Chief Constables to police the strike forcefully. 
Reiner also notes some other characteristics of the `new police' which assisted in their 
struggles for legitimacy after their foundation and into the Twentieth Century. These 
notions have been the subject of much contestation, but they are undoubtedly part of 
how the police in Britain are conceptualized. They include the notions that the police 
are a bureaucratic organization (rather than an assortment of `entrepreneurial thief- 
takers'), are beholden to the rule of law, adopt a strategy of minimal force, are not 
involved in partisan politics and provide a service for the public (2000a: 51-58). 
The myths of policing also apply to individual tactics of policing such as community 
policing. As discussed below, Klockars has argued that community policing is merely 
a new rhetorical device which `is best understood as the latest in a fairly long tradition 
of circumlocutions whose purpose it is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate police 
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distribution of nonnegotiably coercive force' (Klockars, 1988). On this analysis, the 
myths of policing continue to apply to contemporary policing tactics, including 
community policing. 
Eras, Cycles and Waves of Policing 
The history of policing does not stand still. For the moment, it seems that community 
policing is to be the order of the day in England and Wales. This focus on one form or 
style of policing will no doubt change as the police move on to another style or 
strategy. This section looks at some of the ways policing can be conceived of as 
changing over time. 
Policing and the police are constantly evolving. Where the process of community 
policing fits into that evolution is sometimes hard to tell. efforts to predict the future 
of the police and policing are regularly made by criminologists and other 
commentators, but most admit they are on shaky foundations attempting to presage 
the policing response to social change that may be regional, national, global or 
`merely' local (Newburn, 2003). It may in fact merely be a step in a cyclical process 
rather than a true sea-change. This section will briefly look at three possible ways to 
describe or analyse the changes in policing, as eras, as cycles and as waves. None is 
necessarily perfect but each sheds its own light on how policing changes and where 
community policing fits into it. 
Eras 
Kelling and Moore (1988) describe the evolution of police styles in the United States 
from the foundation of formal policing in that jurisdiction. They classify the 
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development as having three distinct stages, or eras; the political era, from the 
foundation of policing until the end of the 1900s, the reform era, up until the end of 
the 1970s, and the community problem-solving era from then until the present day. To 
summarize broadly; in the political era the police were appointed by local politicians 
and were not as distinct from the political process as their British counterparts. As a 
result they became an extension of the powers of political office. It was against this 
background and the corruption that resulted from it that the philosophies of the reform 
era began to emerge. 
The reform era was all about professionalizing the police force. In time it began to 
take advantage of all available technological advances to become speedy responders 
to the immediate demands of citizens. Police were, or at least saw themselves as, 
simply reactive professionals who responded to the needs of citizens as problems 
arose. They were not controlled by the politicians who appointed them but were 
professionals in their own right. 
The professional era developed problems of its own however. In trying to be efficient 
crime fighters, police officers and managers became caught up in measuring their 
success in terms of response times and other bureaucratic measures. As a result, they 
spent more time in cars, less time on the beat and citizens began to see, meet and talk 
to police officers less regularly. They may have responded faster than ever, but they 
were only there when there was a crisis, and one that was serious enough to inspire 
somebody to call the police. A cop in a car may have been on the same side of the 
street as you, but to law abiding citizens and criminals alike, police officers were in an 
air-conditioned world of their own. 
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It is from this background of detachment that the police began to realise they were 
losing their legitimacy. The reform era was beginning to lose its connection with the 
people it was policing. In both the United States and Britain, police forces were 
increasingly policing minority communities in a style designed by those in the 
majority and executed by officers from a majority background. As social change 
moved quickly from the peak of `consensus policing' in the 1950's, the police were 
slow to change to keep up. The very source of their legitimacy, their connection to the 
people they policed had been eroded, if not lost completely. In the early 1980's, riots 
in Brixton and other urban centres demonstrated that the police had lost touch with 
those they policed and altered public perceptions of the police (Bowling and Foster, 
2002; Waddington, 2007). Community policing, as a police strategy, seeks to rebuild 
the legitimacy that the police had lost as a result of their drift from the community 
(Tilley, 2003). 
This delineation of eras is clearly imperfect. It is perhaps difficult to sustain when 
applied across the wide variety of cities and indeed social worlds in which police 
forces operate in the United States. It is perhaps even harder to relate it to England 
and Wales. As discussed above, there was a large national debate about the formation 
of the Metropolitan Police. There was also a considerable resentment of the police 
among the working classes as they saw the police as a tool of the upper and middle 
classes to control them (Robinson and Scaglion, 1987; Reiner, 2000a). 
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Cycles 
Zedner (2006) argues that the creation of the `new police' in 1829 did not in fact mark 
the beginning of a seachange in policing techniques. She argues that any later claims, 
up to the present day, of great changes need to be treated sceptically. 
According to the Met there is a cycle to policing which rotates between the two poles 
of enforcement focused policing and community focussed policing. This `policing 
cycle' can be described as the process of moving from one pole to another and back in 
response to perceived over-emphasis on either crime fighting or neighbourhood 
connection. For example, after priority crime (crime to which traditional response 
policing techniques are applied, such as assault, burglary etc) falls following a period 
of strong enforcement efforts. there is then a call for greater visibility and for the 
police to tackle lower level crime. At this point they are driven to take up a 
community focus. The cycle continues as this is welcomed and applauded. However a 
community focus causes resources to be focussed on community at the expense of 
priority crimes. While detection rates fall in priority crimes, media criticisms mount 
on the police's performance, they promise to correct failings and due to this political 
criticism, often during election campaigns, the police are brought back to an 
enforcement focus (Metropolitan Police, 2005: 4). 
If this cycle were to continue indefinitely, then inevitably the current wave of 
neighbourhood policing would come to an end. However, it may be a macro 
indication of how successful the neighbourhood policing initiative has been if it has 
taken longer for the cycle to return to an emphasis on response policing. If, as is often 
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argued by police managers, neighbourhood policing is here to stay, then the cycle 
would be broken, or the divergence of the poles reduced substantially. 
Waves 
Another way of looking at these changes is to consider each `new' policing phase as 
not a distinct period, which can be neatly delineated from the previous period, but as a 
`wave' of policing. In the same way that a wave at sea builds behind the wave in front 
before breaking on the shore, a wave of policing is linked inextricably to the wave in 
front of it, and even after it has crashed and dissipated, it has influenced the wave 
behind. As Wood and Shearing put it: 
Some waves emerge as an extension of ideas introduced through other 
waves, while other waves emerge as a consequence of resistance to 
established ways of thinking. Through an analysis of waves in the realm of 
public policing we aim to enhance our understanding of how public 
policing has been and is being re-imagined, as well as the conditions that 
have allowed for these imaginings to come into and out of view (2007: 
35). 
This analogy allows the changes which take place in approaches to policing to be 
viewed as a more fluid process. Unlike Kelling and Moore's `eras' approach (above), 
the waves of policing analysis allows for each new approach to be considered in light 
of how it relates to the last and next waves, along with how to relates to waves that 
may still be active in the present. Wood and Shearing (ibid: chapter 2) identify a 
number of waves of policing which have developed and influenced one another: 
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9 Policing as community-based 
" Policing as solving problems 
9 The influence of neo-liberalism 
9 Policing as restorative justice 
9 Policing as fixing broken windows 
9 Policing as intelligence work 
" Policing as reassurance 
Although there is insufficient space to discuss each of these waves in depth here, 
many of the core themes of the waves are discussed in the first two chapters of this 
work. This is because they are influential to the operation of neighbourhood policing. 
This influence, from many different waves of policing is indicative of the fact that 
while neighbourhood policing may be seen to be a `new departure', it is clear that it is 
heavily influenced by other waves of policing practice. In locating the place of 
neighbourhood policing as a new development, it is suggested that a `waves-bascd' 
analysis is the most useful. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the concept of the `wave', unlike the 
`era', does not create a finite historical period within which all policing acted as one 
simple style. Such construction of historical eras is often forced and artificial (Arnold, 
2000). The `waves-based' analysis allows for the new approaches to policing to be 
conceptualized as developing a sort of momentum, gathering their political power and 
support slowly and then sweeping over the previous wave at varying degrees of speed, 
depending on the numerous factors involved. Neighbourhood policing did not just 
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appear from nowhere, it became possible as a response to previous considerations and 
finally, after careful planning reached the streets. When could one say that such an era 
began? Would it not be better to consider it a policing `wave' which gathered force 
and swept into prominence? It is for these reasons that it is submitted that the 'waves- 
based' approach is the most useful for understanding neighbourhood policing. 
What Are `Community' and `Neighbourhood' in a Policing Context? 
`Community' and `neighbourhood' are two words that are used by scholars and 
practitioners in the field of policing. The terms however are ambiguous and difficult 
to define, but these ambiguities are important to discuss because they lie at the heart 
of the symbolism and meaning of `community policing'. 
Community 
The word `community' is ubiquitous. A Google search of the term produces 1.32 
billion hits. With so many people using it, one would hope that it would be an easy 
term to define, that somewhere among these billions of users there would be a 
consensus. Notions of `community' however, are inherently difficult to define. On the 
face of it, a `community' is a straightforward entity, we all live in one and think we 
can describe what that is. The phrase is invoked repeatedly in social policy 
discussions for numerous purposes. However when efforts are made to try and tic 
down what exactly a community is, it becomes virtually impossible to come up with a 
definition that fits all or even most of the uses of the term. 
It is perhaps because it is so nebulous that it is so popular. Because we think we know 
what a community is, we think we aspire to being part of one. `Community' invokes a 
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sense of well being and unity, a sense of togetherness and commonality among a 
group of people. A community can be an end in itself or a means to achieve some 
other policy goal such as crime reduction (Lacey and Zedner, 1995: 303). Wrapped up 
in notions of community is a cohesiveness and unitary identity that is perhaps lacking 
in the late-modern metropolis. Yet the myth that community was something abundant 
in pre-industrial times is perhaps coloured by nostalgic yearnings. 
Contrary to popular myth, the inhabitants of England before the Industrial 
Revolution did not live in idyllic village settlements. The early modern 
small town or village was as likely to be riven by problems, albeit of a 
different nature, as any modern city. Legal records, criminal and civil 
alike, contain ample evidence of social tensions and interpersonal malice. 
Indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century most English villages, 
although capable of showing community spirit on occasion, were often so 
socially stratified as to make it possible to speak of a number of 
`communities' within their boundaries. (Sharpe, 1996: 126) 
Community is a concept which presents positive images of harmony, solidarity 
cooperation and friendliness. Nobody could be against it. It is for this reason that 
community, as a discourse, is appealing. It suggests to us something that we think we 
had in the past, something we think we liked and we think we would like it again to 
help solve our problems. While it was complex and disparate in the premodern 
village, it is perhaps more complicated in the late-modern city. Despite these 
problems with understanding what `community' is, it is clear that notions of 
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community are becoming more and more important in the provision of social services 
(including policing): 
Community has become an increasingly significant focus of governance 
arrangements in the UK, reflected in the decentralisation of public services 
and the increasing expectations of participation, consultation and 
involvement of communities and neighbourhoods. There is significant 
overlap between governmental and popular orientations, since community 
exists as the site of potent popular identifications and desires - for 
attachment, belonging, order and security, at least. It remains a profoundly 
unstable term - conceptually, socially and governmentally. (Clarke el al., 
2007: 141) 
This governmental instability is a challenge for any organization using community as 
a focus for providing its services. The conceptual instability can also be clearly 
viewed when we try to identify what community means to us. If we ask ourselves 
`what is the community to which I belong? ' we are likely to produce very subjective 
answers. Some might say family, others their friends from school, university or work, 
others prefer to form communities by race, nationality, religion or other hobby. There 
are local communities, homeless communities, Muslim communities, Irish 
communities, online communities, travelling communities, business communities, 
immigrant communities and an almost endless list of other groupings that could be 
considered a community. The common theme appears to be that they are in some way 
tied by a common bond; a'commonality' of some form. 
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Geography does not seem to be the most important part of that bond. In today's world 
of cheap flights and global communication, a community can be international without 
much difficulty. Similarly, while a community can have a widely disparate group of 
members, an individual can be a member of a disparate group of communities. A 
community is a loose reference to some sort of group that subjectively defines itself or 
is perhaps defined by an outsider or agency. It could be defined by inclusion or 
exclusion. The term sets out no criteria for membership nor constitution for 
administration, a community can literally be any group of people, or even virtual 
people. 
Policy debates on criminal justice constantly refer to community or communities as if 
they are tangible things that can be worked on, with, or for. Something from which 
opinions can be obtained and whose sensitivities can be guaged and assuaged. Within 
these references is an implicit assumption that a community can be defined or divined. 
References to the community, however fuzzily that community is delineated, are 
considered to carry an extra weight, as if a policy with some reference to `community' 
brings with it an inherent mandate. As Lacey and Zcdncr put it: 
The existence of communities is assumed without their contours ever 
being delineated. Equally importantly, community has an inevitably (but 
not invariably) ideological loading: it evokes a cluster of values - 
solidarity, reciprocity, mutuality, connection, care, sharing. Significantly, 
political discourses of community are generally characterized by a 
slippage between ideological and institutional reference points; and the 
slippage significantly affects the meaning of these discourses. In other 
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words, the assertion of a practice as `community-based' not only implies a 
particular institutional framework, but also carries with it a certain 
normative force. (1995: 302) 
It is to this normative force that community policing aspires. By connecting policing 
to the community, there is the possibility of democratizing and legitimizing the 
process of policing. Klockars (1988) has argued that this is merely a method of 
painting over the inherently unpleasant facets of policing by appealing to notions of 
community. Nonexistent and uninterested communities make perfect partners for 
policing because `while they lend their moral and political authority as communities 
to what police do in their name, they have no interest in and do not object to anything 
that might be done. ' By this rationale community policing is another example of one 
of the `myths of policing'. 
By stating that communities are involved in policing, the police or policy maker is co- 
opting the `community' into the provision of security. The community now becomes 
responsible for its own security. This process of `responsibilization' is an implicit 
admission that the state has failed in its efforts to provide security for its citizens. It is 
an inherent admission of the limitations of state-centred policing. This process is an 
example of the achievements of the nco-liberal policy maker in co-opting the citizen 
to be in fact an individual responsible for their own security. Citizens and 
communities are given the autonomy to act as consumers (in this case consumers of 
security) and in so doing become responsible for their own security or lack thereof. 
Conjuring up notions of community as co-producers of security creates communities 
as self-regulating entities. Community as a discourse could in fact be hiding a sinister 
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move towards individualism. As Clarke argues; `The movement from expansive or 
welfarist liberalism to advanced or neo-libcralism is characterized by this shift 
towards the production of self-regulating subjects' (2005: 452). 
Neighbourhood 
If communities are so intangible, perhaps policing can be better anchored to some sort 
of geographical entity, a `beat', a `neighbourhood' or even a `force area'. Geography 
is after all easy to define and easy to pin down. This may be the case in theory, but in 
practice `neighbourhoods' can be tricky to decide on for similar reasons to 
communities. 
Neighbourhoods bring a similarly complex set of subjective feelings to those inspired 
by the term `community'. Galster describes the problem of conceptualizing 
`neighbourhood' in terms that show how it too has been glanced over; `Urban social 
scientists have treated "neighbourhood" in much the same way as courts of law have 
treated pornography: as a term that is hard to define precisely, but everyone knows it 
when they see it. ' (2001: 2111). While it may be possible to agree that there is a 
spatial dimension to `neighbourhood', there are also experiential components which 
make it difficult to clearly mark out discrete areas as neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood 
is subjectively defined by those who utilize or consume it. The qualities or 
components of a neighbourhood are constantly changing and the factors that define it 
can be altered by the very act of using them. Neighbourhood is a collection of 
complex characteristics, but the unifying fact about the characteristics of 
neighbourhood is that they are spatially based. So while a community can contain 
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households in Calcutta, Cairo or Copenhagan, a neighbourhood is strictly rooted in a 
specific location. 
Government agencies concede, albeit implicitly, that the definition of 
`neighbourhood' is not an easy one to tie down and as a result defers to local `police, 
partners and citizens' (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2005; 2006: 18) to decide 
what community or neighbourhood units it is best to use when organizing 
neighbourhood policing (Home Office, 2001,2005b). Defining neighbourhoods for 
policing purposes is a difficult process which will be dictated as much by operational 
and resource implications as by questions of where exactly a neighbourhood or 
community starts and ends. 
Risks of Defining a Community 
Defining `community' or `neighbourhood' for policing also risks defining who is 
outside these groups, which can be a dangerous prospect for the police. It risks 
defining for whom the police work. The description of who the police work for has to 
be as inclusive as possible and many words that we might use contain difficult 
symbolic meanings which while attempting to appear inclusive, in fact define a 
specific group of people with reasonably precise characteristics. The word `citizen' is 
a good example. `Citizen', with its attachment to the idea of the `good citizen' or the 
`law abiding citizen', would seem to provide the perfect group of people to target the 
services of the state's security governance apparatus. The citizen is the `public' figure 
who `forms the other face of the private figure of the consumer' (Clarke et al., 2007: 
3). Citizen however is also a technical term describing someone who is a national of a 
country, which in a country as diverse as England would leave many people outside 
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the group, including British subjects, Commonwealth and EU nationals as well as the 
all too often villified `illegal immigrant', all of whom call upon the police and 
experience their actions and have to be treated with the same humanity and standard 
of service, regardless of the type of experience they have of the police, or the view the 
police have of them. Therefore, for the purposes of this work the state police will be 
described as providing a service to the broadest possible church of potential 
stakeholders. These are the police's `public' a group larger than any number of 
communities, devoid of a requirement of residence or immigration status and 
encompassing all those who consume police services as victim, suspect, witness, 
partner, colleague or in any other capacity. 
What is Community Policing and What Does it Mean to 'Us'? 
When one takes concepts as imprecise as `community' and `policing' and put them 
together, it may be expected that the result will be a doubling of the confusion. 
However for many practitioners and academics the concept of community policing is 
relatively straightforward, provided one settles on the idea that a community is 
definable (or divinable) and accept that the policing is some function of the nation 
state conducted by a body of state employees. When these positions have been 
established it is an easy step to understand community policing as connecting the 
police to the community. Bratton (1998: 15) descibes it thus: 
[C]ommunity policing is defined by three Ps: Partnership, Problem- 
Solving, Prevention. Remember in the 1970s and 1980s the police said `If 
you give us additional personnel, equipment and resources we'll take care 
of your problems and control crime. ' This didn't happen because there was 
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no partnership with the community to jointly identify these problems. By 
working in partnership with the community, other institutions of 
government and the criminal justice system, police can have a significant 
impact on crime and disorder. This is the basic premise behind community 
policing and, when properly applied, it is tougher on crime than anything 
else we've ever tried. 
As discussed above, community policing has to be seen in the context of being in 
some way a response to the previous reactive/professional approaches to policing. 
Community policing thus attempts to deal with how people `want' to be policed. It is 
all about tailored service provision rather than about reducing the amount of crime, if 
such an amount can ever be discovered or understood (see the discussion in chapter 
2). Community policing can be seen as a tool for reducing crime by gaining more 
information from the community and by empowering that community. In theory at 
least, it is more concerned about making sure that people feel less at risk from crime 
than reducing the actual risk people face of being victimized. Using this 
understanding, it takes subjective perceptions of crime as its target. The community 
policeman is not so much a `crime-fighter' as a `fear-of-crime-fighter'. 
This is part of community policing's inherent criticism of the previous reactive style 
of policing. If the first criticism is that reactive policing cost the police much of its 
legitimacy, the second is the implicit acceptance that policing does not have a huge 
effect on crime levels, as we can currently quantify them (Bayley, 1994). The reform, 
or professional, era or wave hoped to reduce crime by increasing responsiveness and 
possibly visibility. The police thus would reduce fear of crime by reducing crime 
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itself. However, if it is accepted that the police cannot have a huge impact on crime 
levels, then perhaps their resources arc better spent increasing the legitimacy of their 
work in the community, and reassuring those who fear crime in situations where there 
is no great risk of victimization. 
The appeal of community policing is great. It appears to return the police to the 
mythical time of consensual policing. Community policing is popular, as Skogan and 
Hartnet (1998) point out; 
[B]ecause it is seen as American as apple pie. Community policing is 
characterized by `Officer O'Leary' strolling down the avenue, holding 
an apple in one hand and twirling a nightstick in the other, shooing 
away pesky street urchins as he warmly greets passersby. It's the 
quintessential night watchman or constable who lives in the 
community he serves. 
In short, community policing promiscs to bring us back to a `good old days of 
policing'. However, those good old days were probably not as good as we think they 
were, especially for minority groups. As Williams and Murphy (1990) point out, the 
history of policing for African-Americans is far from `apple pie'. 
The British similarly hold a rose-tinted historical image of the police. The `bobby on 
the beat' is a national icon. As Loader puts it; `In perhaps no other country ... has the 
lowly "village bobby" become so central to the national iconography. And nowhere 
else has the ordinary beat officer come to be constructed as archetypal national figure 
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in quite the way he has in England. ' For Loader, the bobby is central to the English 
self perception and external"rcpresentation of itself. This affection for the bobby is 
evidenced most clearly in the affection shown to the fictional PC Dixon who appeared 
in an Ealing Studios production The Blue Lamp in 1954. Dixon was rc-incarnated for 
a TV series spanning 400 episodes called Dixon of Dock Green from 1956-1974. The 
collective memory of this character is intertwined with the memory of `a land pre- 
Commonwealth immigration where "Englishness" was apparently uncomplicated and 
uncontested' (1997: 15). 
The image of Dixon permeates the understanding of, and yearning for the `Golden 
Era' of policing. But Dixon and a golden era of policing may have something in 
common with the bewildering chicken and egg. Which came first? Did the 
reminiscences of the era create Dixon, or did Dixon's appearance create the nostalgia? 
McLaughlin (2005), in unpacking the process by which PC Dixon was portrayed by 
Ealing Studios' marketing machine, raises the possibility that the dream of a bygone 
past epitomized by Dixon was a theatrical construction, an `Ealingization', rather than 
a reflection of a historical reality. Prior to 1939 the bobby was culturally portrayed as 
a buffoon. After the war, a number of coincidences contrived to create the atmosphere 
that made possible Dixon and his legacy in the collective consciousness. The studios 
needed to keep attendances at the same level as they had been during the war by 
attempting to tap into the national identity and ensuring films kept their `traditional' 
wartime feel. When Ealing Studios began making The Blue Lamp the country was in 
the grips of post-war austerity (rations, red-tape and reconstruction) and a perceived 
`crime-wave'. The studios had been making propaganda films during the war, being 
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under the control of the Ministry of Information, and the script itself was altered by 
the British Board of Film Classification to ensure that the PC and not the `spiv' was 
the hero. The film was well received by the Metropolitan Police and it was well on its 
way to becoming part of the national consciousness, a position cemented in 1952 
when the BBC began its serialization. Indeed it became so iconic that officers formed 
a guard of honour at the funeral of Jack Warner, the actor who played Dixon. In sum; 
[T]he deep cultural and interpretive work of Ealing Studios and the BBC 
produced, in the form of PC George Dixon, the authoritative black and 
white image of the `bobby on the beat' that provided the cultural 
parameters within which post-war English policing would be understood 
and debated. (McLaughlin, 2005: 26) 
So it may be that the `bobby on the beat' with his connections in and commitment to 
the community, which is central to the aspirations of community policing, may be a 
piece of propaganda the country has spun itself. 
In its promise to bring back the good old days, community policing is showing just 
how vague and inexact it is in both its definitions and its aspirations. It is a broad 
church with many adherents who are policing their communities in many different 
ways. It has even been applied to harsh policing techniques that appear to be 
completely anathema to the reconnection with community and the increase in 
legitimacy sought by most community policing programmes. William Bratton (1998) 
used the phrase to describe the type of policing that he introduced along with Rudolph 
Giuliani in New York City in the 1990's (the example of New York is discussed 
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further below). However most academics classify that form of policing as problem 
solving (Moore, 1992; Wcisburd et al., 2003), or even `zero tolerance' policing 
(Dixon, 1999). 
One of the reasons that the concept of community policing is so vague is because of 
the difficulties of defining who the `community' receiving the policing service are 
(again, holding constant the assumption that such a definition can have any meaning). 
In defining who the community is, a police force is necessarily defining who it is not, 
who the outsider is. In defining who a community is, a police force is deciding what 
social order it aspires to maintain and reproduce (Ericson, 1982). In cultures where 
there is a wide divergence between what different ethnic or religious groups consider 
to be the preferred order, defining a community can be very political and divisive 
(Finnane, 1994; Patten Commission, 1999). In one sense, this brings us to a paradox 
inherent in the concept of community policing. As the police are constantly engaged 
in fixing conflict, the idea that they can somehow please everyone is, obviously, 
impossible. In the `fixing' of any conflict the police will render at least one party to 
the conflict `policed' and one party `fixed'. The order preferred by one party will be 
maintained. Reiner (2000a: 10) quotes Waddington who says, "`community policing" 
is an oxymoron, for if the police could serve the whole community there would be 
little point in having a police at all'. 
In Britain community policing in its current incarnation is called `neighbourhood 
policing'. In order to try and provide some clarity, this work will use the term 
`community policing' to refer to the overall theoretical concept, and `neighbourhood 
policing' to refer to the current British policy to which this research relates. 
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Problem-Oriented and Intelligence-Led Policing 
Problem-oriented policing (POP) and intelligence-lcd policing (ILP) are two styles or 
approaches to policing that have developed in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. 
They are often considered as distinct forms of policing. This can indeed be helpful, 
however, there are both problem-oriented and intelligence-lcd policing strategies used 
in modem neighbourhood policing. For this reason it is important to briefly sct out 
some to the background and issues around both forms of policing as their role in the 
neighbourhood policing process will be a recurring theme in this work. 
Problem-Oriented policing 
Problem-oriented policing, also sometimes called problem-solving policing, 
originated in the work of Herman Goldstein (1979) in the United States in the 1970s. 
Goldstein was working during the so-called `professional era' of policing where 
response times were prioritized and officers' movements were regimented and 
managed so as to be most effective. However, it became apparent that the police's 
time was being spent returning to similar incidents repeatedly and the root causes of 
those problems were not being addressed by this `fire brigade' style of policing. The 
police had become obsessed with how they worked rather than what their impact was. 
This is what Goldstein called the "`means over ends" syndrome'. The logic of POP is 
that if police officers spend some time working on particular problems and work 
towards resolving them, police time will be better spent than if they have to continue 
responding rapidly to each incident for a potentially infinite period of time. 
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This logic sets POP out as incorporating `an explicit conception of the nature and role 
of modem policing' (Tilley, 2003: 317). POP attempts to achieve goals such as 
creating and maintaining a feeling of security in a community, identifying problems, 
resolving conflict and controlling conduct which threatens life and property. It does 
this by working on specific, closely defined problems. POP is ineffective if the 
problem is as imprecise as `crime' or `anti-social behaviour'. For a problem to be 
usefully considered it must be easily defined and understood. Although POP 
originated in the US, it has been incorporated into policing in the UK since as far back 
as 1982 (Leigh et al., 1996: 4). 
POP has developed over the years to involve the use of certain tools. The two most 
significant are the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) and the process called SARA or 
Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment. The PAT is applied to a problem by 
identifying the perpetrator(s), victim(s) and location(s) in which specific problems 
occur. If one of these components of the problem is removed, then the problem should 
disappear, or alter in some way. This appears to use a routine activities approach 
which posits that crime is caused when a suitable offender and a suitable target cross 
paths in the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Fclson, 1979). Thus, removing 
one of the corners from the triangle should eliminate the existence of the problem. 
SARA on the other hand is more of a description of how one goes about the process 
of problem-solving. It seems remarkably simple to merely scan for problems, analyse 
the problems you find, respond to them and assess the outcome. however for it to be 
successful, the problem-solver needs to be precise in their methodology when 
scanning, strict in their definition of the problem when analyzing, careful and 
practical in their response and realistic and objective in their assessment. This is not a 
simple process. Indeed if it were conducted properly it would be substantially distant 
from the work a response officer would normally expect to do on a day-to-day basis. 
POP is a promising development. Solving the problems before police have to respond 
to them has a great appeal to it. It appeals because it appears to favour brains over 
brawn and can be evidence-based in its approach to problems and solution. This 
somewhat utopian approach begs the question; can problems actually be solved? 
Indeed, can a problem even be defined with sufficient accuracy to allow a useful PAT 
to be constructed for it? These are not easy questions to answer, and obviously the 
answer will vary from problem to problem. The definition of policing `problems' 
however, like the definition of crimes themselves, is a political act and it is at this 
point that the skills and connections of certain groups can be mobilized to portray one 
party to a dispute as the `problem' when this might not be so clear cut. Good 
`analysis' after the `scanning' has been completed may be able to take on board the 
interests of both parties to a dispute before deciding on its `response'. Nevertheless, 
the greatest difficulty for POP may be deciding what exactly the problem to be solved 
is. Problem-solving's biggest problem is the problem itself. 
Intelligence-Led Policing 
If the police cannot respond to every call and deal with every offence because of the 
simple enormity of the volume of crime, then at some point resources will need to be 
targeted. ILP posits that these resources should be targeted based on intelligence that 
the police have gathered and analysed. It is a homegrown UK process that hopes to 
ensure that the business of policing is done cleverly and efficiently. It has been 
stimulated by the Audit Commission with its accountant's eye for numerical 
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effectiveness and productivity (Tilley, 2003: 321). The idea behind ILP was inspired 
by, inter alia, the restrictions placed on traditional forms of evidence gathering, such 
as confessions, by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; an increase in the 
technological capacity for surveillance, data analysis and storage; and a belief that the 
majority of crime is committed by a small persistent group of offenders operating in 
loose networks whose activities could be disrupted if policing were targetted 
appropriately (Maguire and John, 2006: 70). If POP uses a rational choice theory to 
disrupt criminal activity, ILP hopes to convict the pool of criminals and incapacitate 
them from future crime. ILP is forward looking, not reactive. In a sense, ILP 
epitomises risk analysis, prediction and reduction. 
The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is the central component of ILP in the UK. It 
has been rolled out in all forty-three forces in England and Wales and is being 
implemented in Scotland (Tilley, 2008: 383). It operates on interconnnecting levels 
which analyse and interpret information about suspects and crimes. The work of the 
NIM is complicated by the plurality of the provision of policing services in the UK 
(and potentially internationally) and thus the large numbers of potential sources of 
intelligence, not to mention the politics of working together and sharing what could be 
hard-won information. In a sense the NIM is as much about managing partnership as 
it is about actually applying intelligence to policing (Sheptycki, 2004: 312). There are 
three levels to the NIM: level I covers local crimes; level 2 involves sharing 
information about crimes which cross jurisdictional borders, (ie between 
constabularies) where one force's work on the intelligence data would be 
geographically circumscribed; level 3 works on serious, organized crime at national 
level or above (Tilley, 2008: 384). 
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There is also a `Tasking and Co-ordination Group' which holds regular `tactical' 
meetings to set the agenda for intelligence collection and use. The intelligence upon 
which ILP works is divided into four typcs of `intelligence product'. Each `product' 
has a particular use and some interventions may require the use of more than one type 
of product. In Tilley's words; 
Strategic assessments provide a longer-term picture of trends possibly with 
forecasts for the future and are used to inform priorities and resource 
allocation. Tactical assessments are short term ... Target profiles 
describe 
offenders and their associates to inform operations against them. Problem 
profiles identify emerging series of offences or offenders. (Tilley, 2003: 
322, emphasis as in original. ) 
What becomes intelligence for the purposes of use as an `intelligence product' can be 
wide ranging and could include covert surveillance intelligence as well as information 
from informants and other contacts. 
These methods raise some interesting ethical questions about ILP and `intelligence' 
itself. Most obviously, there are strong civil libertarian arguments that the right to 
respect for private life is seriously curtailed by police surveillance, which technology 
appears to make more and more invasive all the time. Further human rights arguments 
arise if such `intelligence' becomes evidence at trial, which cannot be properly tested 
or cross-examined. The potential for abuse is massive (Ashby, 2005; Tafada, 2007). 
Similarly, evidence that comes from informants within the criminal fraternity is 
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dangerous due to its unreliability and may be proffered for motives entirely 
inconsistent with police goals. The use of informants brings police into ever closer 
company with those who one might expect to be the targets of their work, increasing 
the risk of corruption. This is particularly true of crimes of `vice' where there is no 
victim in the traditional sense, such as drug use (Dom el al., 1992). To obtain 
information police officers must enter the world of the `deviant other' and pretend to 
belong, or befriend someone who knows what is going on. In so doing there can often 
be some class of a price to be paid. There is a classic problem for those using 
information from a `grass', whether in court or merely to inform tactical police 
resource allocation. They (the `grass') need an incentive to give the information in the 
first place and that incentive, if it is at all attractive, gives them a reason to lie. Such 
incentives to lie are encapsulated by the `prisoner's dilemma' where police interrogate 
two co-suspects and attempt to induce each to blame the other (Poundstone, 1993). 
Any deals struck with the body of people who arc supposed to be the subject of 
policing are destined to provide information that is at the best suspicious. 
While POP, ILP and neighbourhood policing are distinct approaches to policing, they 
are not mutually exclusive. Here they have been discussed as if they are perfectly 
distinct simply to expose the differences between them. It is important to consider 
though that they intersect substantially in the operation of plural policing. POP tries to 
solve problems, ILP draws information from sources cultivated by neighbourhood 
policing. ILP initiatives may be targctted at specific problems, thus possibly 
ameliorating them. In sum, they all work simultaneously regardless of what they are 
called. 
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New York City - `Zero Tolerance', Its `Success' and the Debate It Inspired 
When talking about policing it is hard to ignore the `New York story' of the 1990s. 
Crime in New York dropped substantially during the period when Republican Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani appointed William Bratton to the post of Commissioner of the New 
York Police Department (NYPD). This was particularly true of the murder rate which 
fell substantially during Bratton's tenure. The policing model was built on an attitude 
of `zero tolerance' towards so-called `quality of life' crimes, the small crimes that sent 
out the message that crime was tolerated. The classic example given by 
Commissioner Bratton is that of the `squeegee-merchant', the person who wipes the 
windows of cars stopped in traffic and expects money in return, perhaps in an 
intimidatory way. Bratton's first action on arriving at the NYPD was to clamp down 
on them (Bratton and Knobler, 1998). The theory being that if a city clamps down on 
the small crime, the bigger crime will begin to reduce too. 
This `New York story' is important in the current research for two reasons. Firstly it is 
based on the famous `broken windows' theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982) which 
has had huge currency in criminological theory and debate and has been argued to be 
the reason why `zero tolerance' policing worked. Indeed Kelling worked closely with 
Bratton on his policing strategies. The success of this policing model was sold as a 
perfect example of the potential of good old fashioned policing, particularly by 
Bratton himself (Bratton, 1998). Secondly, this example of success was a fascinating 
inspiration to other police and criminal justice professionals around the world and 
inspired numerous visits to New York to see how it worked, and spawned similar 
`zero tolerance' policies across the globe (Weisburd el at, 2003). This impact has 
included some solidarity with the `zero tolerance' agenda in the UK with the then 
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Home Secretary Jack Straw saying that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was to be `a 
zero tolerance strategy' (Bowling, 1999). The rhetoric of `zero tolerance' has 
resonated far beyond New York City. 
Alongside the aggressive policing of misdemeanours, Bratton introduced some new 
management techniques. The most famous of these being his use of what was called 
Compstat, a computer data system which was able to retrieve crime data and map it 
across the city. Parallel to the IT facilities, he decentralized control of local 
neighbourhoods to the precinct commanders (previously, much crime fighting was 
conducted by specialized units within the NYPD) and grilled them each week on what 
they were doing about hot-spots in their precincts. This devolution of power increased 
morale in the force as did the continuing decline of homicide numbers. 
The fairytale in New York needs to be unpicked somewhat however. There are 
difficult questions of causation which need to be considered when analysing Bratton's 
success. Kelling and Bratton (1998) have argued that they should be credited entirely 
with the success in New York because they had been methodical. They had taken a 
theory ('broken windows'), pre-tested it in the New York subway system (when 
Bratton was head of the Transit Police Department before he worked at the NYPD) 
and they applied this theory to the city. Crime fell. That is why `[a]side from the lack 
of any competing explanations' they believed that policing was the central reason for 
the fall in crime in New York. The problem with that argument, is that it ignores the 
fact that there were many competing explanations, not least being the question of 
what actually caused the drop in crime. 
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Crime in New York, particularly homicide, and more particularly homicide using 
guns, was dropping substantially from an all time high in 1991. This drop was 
occurring and continuing while Bratton was in office from 1994-1996. Bratton was 
`probably in the right job at the right time' (Bowling, 1999). His appointment 
coincided with a large number of events, entirely outside of his control, that are likely 
to have had a huge impact on the homicide (and general crime) rates in New York. 
These include the shrinking of the crack cocaine market in the city, the fact that the 
previous mayor, David Dinkins, had put in place the funding and training for 7,000 
new police officers to go on the beat during Bratton's tenure, community driven crime 
prevention techniques that had been instituted in response to the social deprivation of 
the neoliberal policies of the 1980's and the fact that the economy was rapidly 
improving and unemployment was dropping substantially. For Bratton to claim 
responsibility for the crime drop, he must show that these factors had no impact on the 
crime rates in New York and that the only thing that made a difference was his police 
management techniques and his aggressive 'order-maintenance policing' (OMP). 
Rosenfeld, Fornango and Rengifo (2007) conducted a study of the impact of OMP on 
precinct level crime rates in New York. While they found some `statistically 
significant but small' effects of OMP on crime-reduction, they concluded `that the 
impact of aggressive order enforcement on the reduction in homicide and robbery 
rates in New York City during the 1990s was modest at best. ' Claims about the 
successes of the NYPD's zero tolerance campaign arc not supported by independent 
research. 
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What is perhaps most interesting about these claims is their impact on policy beyond 
New York and the language used to describe the techniques applied. While supporters 
are keen to justify tough policing and thus the label `zero tolerance', others wish to 
distance themselves from the phrase, loaded as it is with discourses of intolerance. 
This discourse inculcates a culture of police `toughness' that increased the number of 
complaints of police misconduct in New York and even reached the point where an 
officer announced, `This is Giuliani time', while sexually assaulting and beating a 
woman (Dixon, 1999). Bratton (1998) himself is quick to distance himself from the 
concept of `zero tolerance' saying that it `smacks of overzealousness' and that `it is 
not a credible policy'. He claims that `zero-tolerance' as a concept evolved in 
discussions about New York rather than coming from its policy makers and that in 
fact OMP is not a `zero-tolerance' approach. OMP, he claims can improve `the 
quality of urban life' but he concedes it is dangerous. The conclusions to be drawn 
from the `New York story' may continue to be debated for years, but it is certain that 
the slipperiest of concepts such as `quality of life' and `community policing' will be at 
the centre of the discussions. 
Private Policing 
There is a growing reliance on the private security industry to fill the gap between 
what the state can provide in terms of policing resources, and what Morgan and 
Newbum (1997) have described as the British public's almost insatiable demand for 
policing services. This is beginning to cause issues regarding the supply of broader 
policing services to many sectors of society. The police cannot be everywhere at once 
and so some people, groups and businesses hire their own security services. These can 
be in the form of `bouncers' (Hobbs el al., 2003; 1lobbs et al., 2007), airport security 
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staff, guard-dog handlers on building sites, night watchmen, concierges and so on. 
These are examples merely of human private policing, the employment of private 
security officers (PSOs) to protect private interests. The breadth of electronic and 
mechanical `policing' techniques is as large again (Marx, 1988; Hudson, 1997; South, 
1997 [2002]). This trend towards private provision of `policing' services is a 
demonstration that those with the resources to do so are prepared to spend money and 
time protecting themselves from the risks of modern society rather than rely on the 
protection of centralized agencies such as the state police. 
Reiner (1992) argues that this privatization of policing is part of a response to the 
changes that are involved in moving to a post-modern world. Mass private-property 
such as office blocks, university campuses, shopping malls (Shearing and Stenning, 
1983) and theme parks (Shearing and Stenning, 1985 [1996]) are protected from the 
`deviance' of the `other', not by using police officers on the beat, but by building in 
social control mechanisms including lighting and cameras as well as keeping 
customer service staff constantly applying, and monitoring compliance with, rules and 
regulations, so called `architectural regulation' (Jones, 2007b: 171). The police officer 
is oftentimes not welcome on the private property (despite its quasi-public character) 
as it might reduce the commercial experience of consumers (Button, 2007: 49). This 
leaves the police officer outside the walls of the quasi-public spaces in which so much 
of modern commercial and social activity takes place. The police officer, as Klockars 
(1985) noted many years ago, continues patrolling little but the street, its users and 
inhabitants; that is to say, all that is not private. What is different now, is that many of 
the activities of the street have moved inside the mass-private domains where the 
police officer is not so welcome. 
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The numbers of people who are involved in the provision of private security services 
has long been difficult to calculate (Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 198; Johnston, 
2007: 27). Button (2007) cites research which suggests that there could be more than 
330,000 people employed in the private security industry in the UK. Given the size of 
the sector it is somewhat surprising how little research has been done in the area. 
PSOs are a growing part of the policing process and their behaviour is perhaps 
underestimated in its effect. Button's research found that PSOs are often paid poorly, 
have little education and, not surprisingly are mostly keen to move on to another job, 
for example as a police constable. Many were also badly trained, some had not even 
received the basic training as they were needed immediately in active service in order 
to satisfy the demands of a `recruitment crisis'. The PSOs themselves generally felt 
that training was inadequate and that the companies didn't invest enough in the 
training process. 
Although PSOs do not have the same powers as police officers, as citizens they have a 
substantial toolkit of which to avail (Button, 2007: Chapter 3). These include the 
`universal' powers available to us all as citizens, including the power of citizen's 
arrest and the right of freedom of expression to ask someone to refrain from particular 
behaviour. In this regard, a PSO is merely a person in uniform, or a citizen paid to be 
in attendance. Along with universal tools, Button describes `select tools' that derive 
from the fact that the PSO is an agent of a powerful individual or corporation and can 
use the powers that body has accrued in private law (for example employment law, 
contract law, the law of property) to enable them to make demands on people within 
their social control net. From these private arrangements PSOs can derive the right to 
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search (from employment contracts) and the right to remove someone from premises 
(as a person who refuses to leave a premises when asked to do so instantly becomes a 
trespasser who can be removed using reasonable force). These universal and select 
tools are used by PSOs in a massive number of venues around the country and form 
the basis of the PSO's role. 
Private security provision also raises questions regarding the problems of potentially 
creating a `policing apartheid'. Will those with resources, or control over resources, 
be able to provide bespoke policing and security services for their own needs, whereas 
those who are most at risk of victimization (the poor and the marginalized) will have 
least access to those services? Centralized policing, for all its faults, aspires to be 
available to all. At its heart the police mission is to protect the human rights of 
everyone in their jurisdiction (Patten Commission, 1999), be they suspect, convict, 
resident, tourist or colleague. How well the police acquit themselves in this regard is 
another question entirely, but as an aspiration, it is a laudable one. Police are 
supposed to be a democratic centralized solution to crime and security to which we 
are all able to have something approaching equal access. The pluralization of policing 
can be seen to be an undermining of these democratic ideals by allowing some to buy 
more security than others (Jones et al., 1996). Perhaps the biggest test of 
neighbourhood policing is how well it will be able to bridge the `security divide' that 
is slowly beginning to appear as a result of this pluralization of policing (Jones and 
Newburn, 2006a). 
The important contrast between the state police officer and the PSO is that the police 
officer is employed to balance the human rights of all, whereas the PSO is employed 
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to act in their employer's interest. Given that the vast majority of PSOs arc employed 
by private companies it is easy to see that the PSO's impact on profit-maximization is 
the most important priority for the employer. While companies want their customers 
to feel safe in their shopping mall, at some point, increasing the number of PSOs in 
the mall will not reduce loss of goods through shoplifting sufficiently to justify the 
cost of a further deployment of officers and similarly, there must come a point when 
having too many PSOs will not make consumers feel any safer, or may in fact make 
them feel less safe. While these two points may not coincide, what is interesting from 
this theoretical perspective is that at some point, the company will have enough PSOs. 
This is in stark contrast with the public police who arc almost incapable of providing 
enough `bobbies on the beat'. Politicians do not tend to prescribe what the optimum 
number of police officers is, or suggest that there could be a diminishing marginal 
return on increased officer numbers. Though in the private security industry this 
decision is taken routinely. This is probably because the economic pain of paying for 
the policing service is abstracted from the person calling for `more bobbies on the 
beat' whereas the economic pain is directly apparent to the corporation paying for 
provision of PSOs. This is consistent with the experience of prison provision in the 
US where there was a consistent political mandate for increasing prison places but the 
borrowing requirements were constantly defeated in elections (McDonald, 1994: 32; 
Mehigan and Rowe, 2007: 359). It seems that when it comes to the provision of 
security services, there can often be difficulties justifying to ourselves at the point of 
payment that the service is in fact worth it. 
As the provision of policing services increases in volume and type, the police are 
forced to respond. The form that the response should take is not obvious however. 
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Should the police provide a regulatory or licensing function and supervise the private 
providers by making sure their staff are trained and licensed? Should the police 
simply enter the marketplace as `just another provider' of policing services, albeit 
ones with greater powers than their competitors? If such a market driven process were 
to be applied, could those in marginalized areas be given subsidies towards deciding 
what type of policing provision they wanted, a sort of voucher scheme to help provide 
policing services to all? In such a model the state police could be left in the uneasy 
position of being both industry regulators and a competitor within the industry 
(Crawford, 2006b: 153; Clarke et al., 2007). 
Community or neighbourhood policing projects raise governance issues of their own 
as neighbourhoods decide to employ wardens, or work with businesses who have their 
own security provision. The texture of security provision for neighbourhoods, as well 
as for mass private property, is changing with the greater availability of private 
policing. This question of how to regulate a plural policing structure is addressed to 
some extent in the next chapter's discussion of the `governance of security' (Johnston, 
2007). 
Conclusion 
The practitioner applying the techniques of neighbourhood policing is operating in a 
fluid and constantly changing environment. They must work with terms and concepts 
which are at best unstable and in so doing attempt to apply a collection of policing 
strategies (such as POP and ILP) to the priority problems of their neighbourhood. 
These techniques are not administered in a vacuum, and the police are not the only 
players who are working on providing `security' and `policing' to the public. 
55 
Neighbourhood policing is merely one form of `policing' which the public police 
engage in. Within the greater sphere of security provision, it is one of countless forms 
which are used by different sections of society. The neighbourhood officer is only one 
small component in a large (and growing) web of security providers. It is to this 
complex web that the next chapter turns. It will look at the `governance of security' 
and how neighbourhood policing might best be viewed as one `node' in an elaborate 
web of security governance. In such a web the project of neighbourhood policing 
must work hard to meet the many demands that are made of it and use, as best as 
possible the conceptual and quantitative tools that arc available in order to remain a 
relevant provider of security for the public. 
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Chapter 2 
How Can Neighbourhood Policing Be Contextualized and Analysed? 
The silent explosion in private security provision discussed at the end of the last 
chapter is indicative of the large, convoluted and evolving security marketplace in 
which neighbourhood policing operates. This `plural policing' environment is one in 
which the role of the public police in providing security for their nation's public has 
been seriously eroded by private competition, or at least private provision. This 
chapter looks at the new modalities of security governance and what they mean for 
how we conceive of security. The criminal justice system it is argued, is not the best 
way to provide security to the public. Although the process of adjudicating publicly 
on allegations of criminal activity is a fair way of administering punishment, it is hard 
to see how this provides the public with a heightened level of security. For this reason 
neighbourhood policing can be viewed as an effort by the public police to increase the 
security of the publics in the neighbourhoods in which they operate. 
Each of these security providers interact with each other creating a web of interacting 
security arrangements. This chapter argues that it is useful to consider each of these 
providers as `nodes' of security governance connected in an interwoven web of nodes, 
each attempting to influence the security provision environment for its own ends. It is 
further posited that neighbourhood policing and each neighbourhood partnership can 
be understood theoretically as one node using its connections and influences to try to 
resolve the problems of security provision in its neighbourhood. 
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A substantial amount of pressure is placed on the resolution of these security 
provision problems. Neighbourhood policing is expected to increase the 
accountability and legitimacy of the police as well as increase the levels of 
reassurance of the public, while at the same time gathering intelligence for managing 
effective policing and reducing crime. These are substantial challenges for a set of 
nodes of security governance. Challenges that are not made easier by the difficulties 
in measuring the success of interventions. Crime itself is notoriously difficult to 
quantify and as such, the `amount' of crime may not be the best way to measure the 
success of neighbourhood policing. Thus it is important to consider the more nebulous 
concepts against which neighbourhood policing may be judged such as `fear of crime' 
and 'anti social behaviour'. Finally the chapter discusses the approach to achieving 
these new policy goals. Reassurance Policing, a forerunner of neighbourhood 
policing, and its theoretical underpinnings are discussed along with a brief description 
of some of the partnerships between the police and other agencies that work on trying 
to reduce crime and disorder. The breadth of the topics discussed means that their 
treatment is necessarily brief, but all the issues relate to the process of neighbourhood 
policing in this research. 
The Governance of Security 
Security v Justice 
Although we often expect or assume that security and justice can both be provided by 
an efficient criminal justice system, they are two substantially different things. Talk of 
deterrence (Wilson, 1975 [1996]) and rehabilitation (Dunbar and Langdon, 1998 
[2002]) allow us to justify the imposition of penalties on those deemed to have 
breached society's norms because deterrence and rehabilitation make society more 
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secure. Alongside this security society attempts to administer penalties in a fair and 
just manner. It is for this reason that democratic societies have developed `due 
process', a set of procedural hurdles that the state must pass before it can inflict 
punishment on someone (Starmer et al., 2001; Fairweather, 2005). Subject to some 
practical exceptions, court cases must be conducted in public and run in established 
and predictable fashion according to rules set down in law; police conduct must be 
almost impeccable in collecting evidence; suspects are considered innocent until 
proven guilty; and sentences are imposed with as much consistency and fairness as 
possible. There is not space in this discussion to review the many critiques of this 
`system' for meting out justice (Beccaria, 1764 [1996]; Kropotkin, 1898 [1996]; 
Stanko, 1985 [2002]; Hulsman, 1986 [1996]; Smart, 1995; Muncie, 1999 [2002]; 
Belloni and Hodgson, 2000 [2002]; Creaton, 2003) but suffice it to say, there is a 
developed system of establishing liability and imposing proportionate punishment. A 
system of which the police have long been the `gatekeepers'. From this gatekeeper 
role, the police can use their discretion to proceed with prosecutions with the intention 
of detering crime and punishing offenders. The division of labour between the 
investigator, prosecuting lawyers, defence lawyers and judge allows for transparency, 
a robust interrogation of the case against the defendant and the supervision of those in 
positions of power by other actors in the process. From this very fleeting discussion, 
covering historical developments from Magna Carta to the present day, it is only 
intended to point out that in the UK there is a measured approach to the imposition of 
punishment upon those who are found to have committed criminal acts. This 
measured approach, for all its flaws, is what is considered `criminal justice' in the UK 
and most anglophonic countries. 
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However, it would appear from the constant rise in crime from the end of the second 
world war until the mid 1990s that this process was not in fact making us particularly 
safe when it comes to criminal victimization. As discussed above, the police do not 
have a huge effect on crime rates and sentencing appears to have little or no impact on 
crime. When sentencing policies were reviewed in the 1970s the only justification that 
could be maintained for imprisonment was considered to be retribution as the others 
(deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation) were considered to be ineffective or 
unrealistic (von Hirsch, 1976 [1996]). Yet throughout the post war period, constant 
change has been occuring at a pace unseen in human history. It seems that almost 
every graph of human behaviour be it carbon emissions (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007), international trade (Stiglitz, 2002), volunteering, giving blood 
and other forms of social capital (Putnam, 2000), as well as homicide rates (Eisner, 
2001), population and economic growth (Fogel, 2005) show steep and substantial 
changes since the end of the Second World War (Baumann, 1997). These social 
changes have led some commentators to argue that a fundamental epoch-making 
change has occurred in the last sixty years. Those stating the case at its highest call 
this `postmodernism', an era that is a complete break from the previous `modern' era 
(Hunt, 1991 [1996]). Others, more circumspectly and not wishing to proclaim their 
own period of history to be the most significant moment in what may be in fact a 
larger period of change, consider it to be an extension of the modern era and thus call 
it `late-modernity' (Garland, 2002). 
Whichever is true, it is hard to deny that we are in a period of great social change. 
What is important here, is that with change comes uncertainty. Gone arc the 
permanent and pensionable jobs of a generation ago, consigned to history along with 
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the unskilled manual labour opportunities that kept the traditional working class 
family working. The traditional `breadwinner' role assumed by many unskilled males 
has also been substantially undermined as industrial and agricultural jobs have been 
eroded by foreign competition and technology (Clare, 2001). The economy in most 
western democracies has become a streamlined world in which everyone must 
compete. Couple this with the ever present `threats' of climate-change, bird-flu (or 
other imminent pandemic), terrorism, new-terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and small arms, immigration, sexually transmitted diseases, road accidents, 
pollution and global credit markets, and it is easy to conclude that the world is a risky 
place (Beck, 1992). We are all surrounded by these `threats' to `human security' 
(Kaldor, 2006). 
Everybody in contemporary society, apart perhaps from a very few, wish to be safe 
from these risks and in many cases they are. However, they also wish to feel that they 
are safe from these risks. And who have we turned to in the past when there has been 
a `threat'? The police, the nation's twenty-four-hour-social-service, has been called 
upon to deal with the threat of outsiders and to provide protection. It is to them that 
we turn to deal with what Bittner (1990) termed `something-that-ought-not-to-be- 
happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now! ' For good or 
bad, society has turned to the police throughout its history to deal with almost all of 
its crises. The question today is, `can they continue to provide protection against these 
post/late-modem risks? ' or more pertinently, `should they? ' Indeed this further raises 
the question `did the police ever really provide such security? ' It is clear that any such 
security provision was at best uneven. 
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There is an almost insatiable demand for `security' and it is qualitatively different 
from any demand for `justice'. If justice is the careful application of rules and 
procedures to individual cases to determine appropriate punishment, security is 
something different. Security is a protection of individuals, families and society from 
the risks of contemporary society. Security and justice are easy to mistake for each 
other or to merge into one task. Indeed it was only in May 2007 that the I come Office 
was split to separate its security roles (policing, immigration etc) from its `justice' 
roles (courts, prisons, probation, legal aid etc. ) In terms of security from crime, the 
criminal justice system is charged with providing both justice and security. However, 
it is more realistic to consider both operating in separate planes and with different 
agendas. To use two crude examples; a just and fair sentence to a recidivist shoplifter 
may not provide security for future victims, while imprisoning someone indefinitely 
for alleged terrorist offences may provide security but is far from falling within any 
credible notion of justice. Justice and security can be in direct tension with one 
another. 
This tension provides us with an important question; how do we as a society provide 
the security we so desire, yet at the same time prevent or at least impair the potential 
for the unequal distribution of security provision, or worse still, the provision of 
security at the expense of certain groups in society? In essence; `how do we govern 
security? ' 
`Policing' or the `Governance of Security? 
The provision of security is no longer something that can solely be the responsibility 
of the police. As discussed in the previous chapter, the current movement towards the 
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responsibilization of the citizen and the consumption of private security services are 
examples of the pluralization of that responsibility. The broad concept of `policing' 
belongs even less to the police now than it has at any time in the history of the `new 
police. Policing is now all about managing the risks of modern life and controlling our 
sense of security. It is for this reason that Shearing argues that `policing' should be 
reconceptualized as the `governance of security' (Shearing, 2007: 250). Security 
governance he argues, has moved away from the control of the nation state to a 
diverse polycentric body of organizations and individuals. This descriptive approach 
has come to be known as a `nodal governance' approach. Security is constructed and 
controlled by a plurality of nodes each acting within their own sphere of influence and 
interacting to a greater or lesser extent with other nodes that effect them. 
Security governance has come to be divided into two different categories. The 
auspices are those who legitimize the security provision, for example the state as a 
regulator of PSOs, and the provider or the body that actually does the work in order to 
provide the security on the ground. The latter is the rower, the former the cox who 
steers, motivates and encourages the rower/provider in its work (Crawford, 2006a). In 
a nodal governance analysis, any one node can steer or row, or both. Which leads us 
to the obvious next question; `what is a node? ' 
The definition of a node is almost deliberately broad in order to prevent the exclusion 
of institutions and groupings who have an influence on the governance of security, 
thus they are described as `sites of knowledge, capacity and resources that function as 
governance auspices or providers' (Wood and Shearing, 2007: 27). These nodes need 
not necessarily be formal organizations such as the police or probation service but 
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could include much less formal but undoubtedly influential groupings such as street 
gangs or trade associations. 
In a world where the provision of `policing' services are becoming ever more diverse, 
it is clear that there is a need for a reappraisal of the `Hobbesian Leviathan' view of 
top-down security governance provided by a centralized nation state. While the 
nation-state may have based its own legitimacy on the provision of internal (and 
indeed external) security for its composite individuals, that role has now been 
somewhat overtaken. Nodal governance may provide us with a tool for understanding 
and re-describing what is taking place in policing and in the case of this research may 
provide us with a tool for analysing the interactions of multiple parties to the process 
of neighbourhood policing. 
The Many Things That Neighbourhood Policing is Supposed to Do 
There are high expectations for neighbourhood policing. As a policing policy that is 
centrally driven, it strives to change the police by reconnecting them with the 
community and building on these links to make them a more successful provider of 
security governance than anyone else. This can be seen to allow them a competitive 
advantage in a market environment (see discussion on private policing above) or an 
effort to increase the actual or perceived security of their public. Neighbourhood 
policing, by connecting with people and working on their priority concerns should 
increase the accountability and legitimacy of the police. In so doing it will reassure 
the public about their security. This co-production of security will also have positive 
benefits in terms of helping to gather information which can successfully be turned 
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into intelligence and assist strategic decision-making, allowing for more successful 
use of resources in tackling crime. 
An example of just how much is expected of neighbourhood policing can be seen in 
ther research of Millie and Herrington on the National Reassurance Policing 
Programme (NRPP), a pilot scheme that was the forerunner of neighbourhood 
policing. After reviewing the policy material and interviewing practioners on the 
programme, they found that there was a total of ten distinct aims of the NRPP as 
understood by policy-makers and practitioners: 
" To reduce fear of crime 
0 To increase public confidence in the police 
9 To increase community efficacy 
0 To improve intelligence gathering 
" To reduce crime 
" To reduce anti-social behaviour 
0 To provide structure to community policing 
9 To improve the local environment - both physical and social 
" To provide legitimacy to local policing decisions 
0 To facilitate consensus policing (2005: 53) 
It is clear that there are high expectations for neighbourhood policing and it is 
important to discuss some of these themes because they do not all neatly dove-tail 
together to form a unitary direction for neighbourhood policing. In fact some, such as 
legitimacy and crime fighting, can be in direct conflict at times. 
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Accountability 
Making the police accountable to their public has long been a complicated problem. 
As the repository of legitimate force in society, the control of the police is of great 
importance and has great potential for misuse. For this reason it is essential that police 
power be carefully supervised, but supervision risks merging into control and there is 
a very real risk of ceding greater and greater powers to the police and drifting towards 
a `law and order society' controlled by the majority (Hall, 1980 [1996]). The police 
after all owe a duty to all the public they serve regardless of how unpalatable some 
sections of that public find other sections, for example `terrorists' (Netanyahu, 2001; 
Stuntz, 2002; Gearty, 2006; Hassett, 2006; Innes and Thiel, 2008), drug users (Brook 
and Stringer, 2005), ethnic minorities (Keith, 1993 [1996]; Bowling and Phillips, 
2003), or football hooligans (Waddington, 2007: 131). These issues raise a difficult 
balancing act for those managing questions of police accountablitly. How do you steer 
a course between the Scylla of unfettered police discretion and the Charybdis of an 
internal army? 
This question has been approached in England and Wales by using a tri-partite system 
whereby the police role is controlled by the Chief Constable, a Local Policing 
Authority (LPA) and the Home Office. The system has been fraught with difficulties, 
most famously during the miners' strike of the early 1980s. The Thatcher 
Government, having recently won an election on a radical new `law and order' 
manifesto (Downes and Morgan, 2002) and faced with strong unions, used the local 
police forces, along with reinforcements from outside the constabularies, to assist in 
breaking the strike and controlling civil unrest. This was notwithstanding the fact that 
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the vast majority of people living in the constabulary areas in which the conflict was 
taking place supported the striking miners. The Chief Constables and the Government 
fell back on the myth of constabulary independence to argue that they were merely 
enforcing the law and maintaining order, that there was no political interference and 
they remained objective, but this was manifestly untrue. Reiner describes personal 
communications with at least one Chief Constable admitting that they were under 
extreme pressure from central government to control the miners regardless of how 
they would prefer to police it themselves (Reiner, 2000b: 223). Many of the LPAs 
were controlled by the opposition Labour Party and argued that they should be the 
ones to control policing in their area. The ensuing power struggle between the three 
corners of the accountability triangle exposed just how difficult it is to maintain 
transparent police accountability in difficult political times (Smith, 2007b). 
For years to come the effects of the miners' strike reverberated. Never in the recent 
history of the state police in England has force been used in such a blatant and 
political fashion as during that time, in almost exactly the fashion feared by those who 
had argued against its establishment in the Nineteenth Century. When political protest 
is so blatantly put down at the behest of political leaders and without any clear lines of 
accountability, respect for the police can be seriously eroded. The cosy notions of the 
police officer as a friend of the people policed is seriously undermined by such 
bypassing of public opinion. A similar challenge to long held trust in the police 
occurred in New Zealand in the early 1980s when a similarly neo-liberal government 
used police to crush protests against a tour by the internationally embargoed South 
African rugby team. The often violent treatment of the protesters showed in clear 
view the potential for misuse of the police for political gain (Cameron, 1981). 
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The balancing act of accountability is essential to the process of neighbourhood 
policing. Connecting the neighbourhood police officer to other stakeholders in their 
neighbourhood may, it is hoped, bring with it a form of accountability. By meeting 
their officers regularly and hearing feedback on the progression of objectives, 
stakeholders should be able to define the objectives for their area, know their 
community beat officer and expect work to be done on these objectives. While the 
struggle for a satisfactory method of holding the police accountable continues at the 
national and transnational level (Sheptycki, 2007), neighbourhood policing and the 
partnerships within which it works should, in theory, provide some broader 
consultative input into the process of resolving local problems, although even this 
may be wishful thinking. 
Legitimacy 
According to Mawby, `[i]n the policing context, legitimacy is the rightful exercise 
of authority or the rightful use of power' (2008). This is clearly a complex area, 
where the `rightfulness' may come from different sources, such as legal authority 
or a more nebulous notion of `consent'. It is towards the latter that neighbourhood 
policing would appear to be most likely to contribute, by connecting the 
neighbourhood police officer to local stakeholders, it may be possible to increase 
the sense of legitimacy which underpin policing interventions in the 
neighbourhood. 
A police service that is seen to be operating legitimately will find its work a lot more 
straightforward and arguably, more effective. Tyler (2006) argues that people obey 
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the law, not because they feel it is fair or they fear apprehension but because they 
believe the procedures which are invoked to enforce it are fair. Thus it can be 
counterproductive to use heavy handed policing techniques because it may undermine 
respect for the law which it is supposed to protect. Kane (2005), in a study of New 
York precinct data across twenty-one years found that in disadvantaged areas 
indicators of compromised police legitimacy (such as misconduct and over-policing) 
predicted increases in violent crime. Procedural fairness, in reality and appearance is 
essential to the police being able to remain effective. 
This is borne out clearly by the history of escalating tensions between police and 
black or minority ethnic (BME) groups. Stop and search policies which repeatedly 
targeted BME people and caused significant unrest (Henry, 2007b). Indeed it was 
these types of excessive policing tactics that led to the Brixton riots of 1981, a seminal 
moment in English policing that exposed the overt racism of the police and lead to a 
substantial judicial enquiry (Scarman, 1981; Hall, 1999 [2002]). Neighbourhood 
policing is part of an effort to revert this trend by working with communities to solve 
problems in partnership, and in the process engage in the slow process of building 
mutual trust. Whether this can be done may depend on the experiences in individual 
neighbourhoods, but it will be a long road with some communities who have long 
been at odds with the police. When it comes to police legitimacy the process of 
creation is infinitely more arduous than that of destruction. As Goldsmith says, `trust 
arrives on foot and departs on horseback' (2005: 445). 
When discussing the problems of police legitimacy and accountability that arose out 
of the Scarman report it is worth considering the development of police-community 
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consultation committees. In the wake of the Scarman Report police constabularies 
began to create police-community consultation committees (PCCCs). Police 
legitimacy and accountability were at a low ebb in the wake of the Scarman Report 
(1981). The final report had a number of suggestions for approaches to clawing back 
some of this lost ground. In essence the report was striving to return to a form of 
`policing by consent' and move on from the disappointingly confrontational `law and 
order' techniques that culminated in `Operation Swamp' and ultimately the Brixton 
riots. Scarman's conclusions lead to what Reiner called a `fundamental re-orientation 
of police thinking' (1985: 127). The main conclusion of the report was that policing 
should not be about `law enforcement'. Instead the principle priority of policing 
should be `the maintenance of public tranquility'. 
Central to this approach was the notion of `community policing' and police 
accountability. Scarman grappled with the classic problems of accountability such as 
the tension between demands for political control of the police and the importance of 
independence from political interference to the police role. `The solution', according 
to Savage, `was to lie in a form of accountability dependent not on powers of 
direction or on regulatory powers and sanctions, but on consultation and co- 
operation' (1984: 56, italics as in orginal). The Police Act 1964 had provided police 
authorities with the power to establish committees or other means of community 
consultation, however it did not make it mandatory. This obligation on police 
authorities was one of the recommendations of the Scarman Report. Consulation and 
co-operation were, the report proposed, to become statutory duties to be discharged by 
Chief Constables and police authorities. As Savage puts it: 
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Between them they would be responsible for constructing and supervising 
consultative machinery and liaison committees at police divisional and 
sub-divisional levels, partly on the lines of existing schemes such as 
Community Liaison Branches and Police-Community Relations bodies. 
(Savage, 1984: 56) 
By the time the legislation which created that duty was brought into force, many 
police authorities had already established the mechanisms required to conduct this 
type of consultation. The legislation which finally created this duty was the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), a controversial act with a complex 
legislative history (Boateng, 1984; Henry, 2007a). Section 106 of the Act stipulates 
that `arrangements shall be made in each police area for obtaining the views of people 
in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their 
co-operation with the police in preventing crime'. Although consultation and co- 
operation are the ostensible legislative aim, a contemporary commentator noted that, 
`[a] cynic might be forgiven for believing this last objective is the real motivation' 
(Greaves, 1986: 79). 
This is where the issues arising from the formation of PCCCs begin to chime with the 
current incarnation of community policing. The parallels between the PCCC and the 
NAG are obvious. Both groups arc formed to try to `connect' the police to the 
community. In some way it is hoped that they will create a form of accountability 
which will help avoid the type of `downward spiral' of police-community relations 
experienced in the months running up to the Brixton riots. Some of the problems 
faced by the PCCCs were similar to the very problems faced by NAGS which are 
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described later in this research. For example the problem of getting key groups to 
attend consultation meetings appears to have been as much a problem in the 1980s as 
it is today: 
The Community-Police Liaison Group for Lambeth has been in existence 
for over a year. It has broad community representation, but there are one of 
two important local organisations which have not sought membership. The 
Group is slowly trying to come to grips with the mammoth task of helping 
to improve police-community relations. (Greaves, 1984: 72) 
However, while there are similarities between PCCCs and NAGs, there are 
substantial differences. NAGs are perhaps more pro-active in that they are 
mandated with a practical function beyond merely `consulting' or `listening to the 
community'. The NAG is charged with problem-solving, using the experience and 
powers of its constituent members to try and resolve the problems that have been 
divined through this consultation process. This was not the case with the PCCCs. 
PCCCs were often found to have provided useful feedback to police which can 
influence their choice of tactics, and some commentators have found this to have 
had a genuine impact on policing and the public perception of it. Clare, for 
example, describes the positive contribution of the PCCC to police-community 
relations in Brixton: `Policing of the area, despite a high crime rate, has been 
much more sensitive and careful - thanks in part, no doubt, to the vigorous, twice- 
monthly meetings of the new Community/Police Consultative Committee' (1984: 
53). 
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While PCCCs may not have had a developed problem-solving focus, as can be 
seen from section 106 of PACE, set out above, both the NAG and the PCCC had a 
role in providing intelligence on criminal activity in their local community. 
However it is the active problem-solving mandate which sets the NAG apart from 
the PCCC. 
Notwithstanding the clear parliamentary intention of section 106 that the PCCC 
should obtain the views of the public and obtain their co-operation, research found 
that much of the underlying politicking of police accountability remained the 
same. Savage and Wilson, for example, studied post-Scarman police community 
consultation arrangements in a constabulary in southern England (Savage and 
Wilson, 1987). They found that, contrary to what might be expected, the main 
areas of tension were not between police representatives and `the community', but 
between police authorities and the consultative committees. It appears that even 
with the consultative framework set in place, the struggle for accountability 
continues, albeit against a different legislative backdrop. Perhaps Bayley put it 
best when he said; `Accountability to a community does not depend on particular 
mechanisms but on the sprit activating the political system as a whole ... Political 
habits, not administrative structures arethe crucial ingredient in making 
accountability vital. ' (Bayley, 1983) 
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Providing Reassurance 
Reassurance policing, in its essence, is about convincing people that they are safer 
without increasing their safety. Although the idea came about during a period of 
falling crime rates, so some might argue that security was increasing. Thus, it could 
be held that while security was increasing so was fear of crime, and so efforts needed 
to be made to reassure people of their safety. 
The theory is simple; people want to see their police. They want to know that they are 
there, on the street, not in a car or an office. They need to see them to feel safe. 
Reassurance policing aims to reduce the number of `signal crimes', crimes which lead 
to a feeling of insecurity, such as graffitti and other signs of disorder, so as to make it 
seem that there is less to be scared about. Coupled with increased foot-patrols, 
reassurance policing has been found to reduce fear of crime. The success of 
reassurance policing techniques has been incorporated into neighbourhood policing's 
philosophy (Innes, 2005) with the emphasis on the importance of the patrol function 
being epitomised by the recruitment of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) 
to assist with the job of patrolling. These will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
Gathering Intelligence and Reducing Crime 
Along with improving local accountability, increasing legitimacy and providing 
reassurance, neighbourhood policing is also expected to assist in the gathering of 
intelligence to feed into intelligence led policing (! LP) (Tilley, 2003; Association of 
Chief Police Officers, 2006: section 4). The logic of this is that in gathering 
information to drive ILP, neighbourhood policing is directly contributing to crime 
fighting, even if it is not itself crime-fighting as it is traditionally understood. A 
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carefully constructed relationship with the community should provide a rich harvest 
of intelligence on issues ranging from graffitti to terrorism (home Office, 2005a). It 
is also argued that community policing could in fact help deal with hard to reach 
crimes such as domestic violence, by allowing police officers the chance to get to 
know a locality, its residents and families and so begin to develop the relationships 
needed to deal with it (Morash and Robinson, 2002). 
In sum, the expectations on neighbourhood policing are high. The results demanded 
of community policing are difficult to achieve and may indeed conflict with one 
another. In such an environment it is problematic to measure how good a job has been 
done. The balance to be struck between competing interests is an inherently political 
act and it seems that success on all fronts at all times is clearly impossible. A lot may 
be achieved, but inevitably neighbourhood policing, like policing itself, can never be 
a complete success. In other words, it must always be a partial failure. 
Problems of Quantifying Crime 
Central to managing these expectations which neighbourhood policing finds itself 
trying to deal with, is the idea of `crime' and how much of it there is. Despite the fact 
that the term `crime' is used so often in policy and popular debates to describe certain 
types of behaviour, the concept is difficult to define precisely (Lacey, 2002). The 
quantification of crime is perhaps equally challenging. Measuring `how much crime is 
out there' is difficult for many reasons. All the same methodological pitfalls apply to 
this problem as to any other attempts to describe the social world using quantitative 
techniques that are better suited to the natural sciences. Even within the natural 
sciences there is a spectrum of how suitable quantitative techniques are to each 
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individual science (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). The social world is complicated by 
unknown quantities such as human preferences and interactions. As a result it does 
not lend itself easily to quantification in the way that the world of mathematical 
physics does. 
The problems are legion. Two simple examples help explain why it is so difficult to 
compare crime data over time. First, what is defined as a crime changes over time as 
new laws are passed and old ones re-enforced. Secondly, there are so many methods 
of collecting and enumerating the data that many of the choices on what to include 
and exclude can be highly influential on the eventual outcome. Crime data can often 
tell us more about the institutional processes of the data-collecting organization than 
about any quantity of `real' crime (Maguire, 1997). 
Yet administrative criminologists and practitioners strive for a quantification of how 
much crime there is in order to seek to understand it better. There are three main ways 
to go about this quantification process; police complaints data, victim-survey data and 
self-report data. Each has its shortcomings, but using the three together can help iron 
out the disadvantages. Just as a cartographer uses different readings on the height of a 
mountain to help triangulate its altitude, a criminologist can use different 
methodologies to help get a better picture of the size of the `pile of crimes'. 
For many years police effectiveness was measured using official statistics or recorded 
crime. These are statistics compiled by the police themselves from complaints made 
by the public (Maguire, 2007). The police have always needed the public to inform 
them of criminal activity in order to combat it and so this seems like a logical way to 
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approach the quantification of crime. There are a number of problems however. 
People may or may not report crimes for different reasons. For instance when 
insurance companies began requiring that stolen property be reported to the police, 
the instance of complaints of theft increased, although it seems reasonable to assume 
that the number of actual thefts did not increase quite as dramatically. In the case of 
other crimes, particularly those with a stigma attached to them, such as sexual 
offences, it may take a shift in social mores before victims are comfortable making a 
complaint to the police. Victims may also be reluctant or disinclined to complain to 
the police if they see them as ineffective or illegitimate as some members of minority 
groups feel. Certain types of crimes are likely to be under-reported. Corporate crimes, 
for example are likely to appear in official statistics in only the most vague and 
meaningless way. Police complaints data has always made street crime appear much 
greater than corporate crime (Slapper and Tombs, 1999 [20021: 108) and crimes of the 
powerful remain difficult to evaluate as a result (Tombs, 2000). So-called `victimless' 
crimes such as drug dealing are less likely to be reported to police and are likely to 
appear in reduced form in the police complaints statistics. Interestingly, it is because 
of the lack of reported information on these activities that police officers have to be 
more pro-active about investigation and cultivating human sources. This is one of the 
most common areas in a force for police corruption to be discovered (Maguire, 2008: 
448). 
While police forces often measure themselves against their reported crime data, this 
may not be the best indicator of police effectiveness. Police may have an incentive to 
record a large amount of crimes in order to demonstrate how snowed under they are 
and thus argue for increased resources (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996 [2002]: 99). 
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Although, given the labyrinthine accounting and management techniques used by the 
Home Office in managing fund distribution and monitoring police effectiveness, this 
may be a little simplistic. On the other hand, an increase in the number of complaints 
may in fact be a good sign as it may represent increased confidence in the police and 
criminal justice system or a change in social mores allowing more open discussion of 
certain types of crimes. The Prisons Ombudsman, Stephen Shaw describes this 
incongruity thus: `is a rise in complaints a good thing? Yes, if it means that prisoners 
have confidence in the system and are enabled to use it. No, if it means that there has 
been an underlying downturn in conditions' (Shaw, 2004). The parallels with police 
complaint data are clear; increasing complaints can be good or bad news and may not 
mean simply an increase in crime, but may signal increasing confidence in the police 
or the criminal justice system. 
The crucial point about police complaints data is that it is very accurate about telling 
us one thing; how many crimes are reported to the police that the police have chosen 
to record. Police complaints data are perhaps a better indicator of bureacratic 
processes than a genuine barometer of the levels of criminal activity. Police compiled 
data are so difficult to use that Maguire argues that `the use of police-generated crime 
statistics to say virtually anything definite about crime - including its overall 
incidence, patterns, and trends - is a pursuit fraught with pitfalls' (Maguire, 
2002: 
348). 
A different approach to counting crimes is to conduct a victim survey. This means 
taking a sample of the population and asking them what crimes they have been the 
victim of in the last year (or other reporting period). Using this approach, if the survey 
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methodology is rigorous enough and the respondent feels anonymous enough, it 
should be possible to by-pass the problems of how the police and criminal justice 
system is perceived and get a more accurate picture of how much victimization has 
occurred. In Britain this work is conducted annually and compiled as the British 
Crime Survey (BCS), which was first conducted in 1982. When it was first conducted 
it found that the `dark figure of crime' was substantial and that the police complaints 
method of recording crime was underestimating the amount of criminal victimization, 
although it did find that this discrepancy was largely related to less serious crimes. 
However, care must be taken when comparing police data with BCS data as the latter 
provides a fuller picture for some types of offence but not for others. For example, 
sexual offences are reported to BCS surveyors so irregularly as to make the category 
an almost useless measure. Police complaint data and victim survey data are best 
considered complimentary rather than directly comparable forms of data (Maguire, 
2002: 348-358). 
The third form of quantification that can be used is the self report survey. This 
involves surveying a population and asking them how much crime they have 
committed. It is not commonly used in the UK and when it is used, it is most often 
used with small populations. A notable exception to this is the BCS which has begun 
to include a self-report component. This has tended to focus on certain sensitive topics 
such as drug use and the type of questions have changed considerably from survey to 
survey. However self report surveys may be a useful way of quantifying some hard to 
count crimes, including some victimless crimes (Junger-Tas and llacn Marshall, 
1985). 
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It is clear from this brief discussion that something as complicated and contestable as 
crime does not lend itself to easy statistical quantification. This has serious 
implications for police forces which, as seemingly ever-expanding organizational 
entities with growing workforces and great power, seek something against which to 
measure their own success. Unlike their counterparts in the corporate world, the 
police officer or Chief Constable do not have the simple goal of maximizing profits 
against which they can rate themselves. Other goals such as crime rates, fear of crime 
or levels of anti-social behaviour are needed instead. 
Discourses of `Anti-Social Behaviour' 
Like `community', `neighbourhood' and `policing', `anti-social behaviour' (ASB) is 
difficult to define. It encompasses a broad range of activities which cause offence to 
somebody. The official definition comes from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998: 
`Acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
one or more persons not of the same household as (the defendant). ' This is clearly a 
loose definition of any activity which is entirely dependant on the perceptions of one 
particular party. The party complaining does not have to prove very much, other than 
the fact that they have been caused harassment, alarm or distress. When asked about 
this problem with definition Hazel Blears, then Home Office minister, said that an act 
was anti-social behaviour whenever the victim thought it was (Liberty, 2007). Even 
those who invented the concept of anti-social behaviour do not really know what it is. 
While it may seem preferable to have a Government that acknowledges that many 
people feel harassed, alarmed and distressed, the problems start to accumulate once 
efforts are made to control, reduce or punish anti-social behaviour. Without a clear 
definition of the behaviour which is to be punished, there is a real risk of imposing 
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inconsistent and arbitrary punishments. Someone playing loud music in one house 
will be ignored, whereas someone two miles away can become the subject of police 
and local authority attention for playing the exact same music at precisely the same 
volume. The difference being that the latter person has less tolerant neighbours than 
the former. 
In order to control anti-social behaviour the 1998 Act created the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Order (ASBO). Since then the abbreviation ASBO has become part of the 
national consciousness. It can be found on clothing labels, in newspaper headlines and 
whole television series have been dedicated to somewhat voyeuristically documenting 
the lives of those who have received ASBOs. The irony of conducting a voyeuristic 
television show about people who have breached a code of behaviour which includes 
voyeurism (Home Office, 2004: 4) appears to have been lost. 
Anti-social behaviour is in essence a bespoke form of criminal law (Chakrabarti, 
2007). An ASBO itself is a civil order barring the recipient from continuing the 
proscribed anti-social behaviour. As a civil law order it need merely be proven on the 
balance of probabilities that the defendant was carrying out anti-social behaviour. The 
balance of probabilities means that one side's argument is more likely than the 
other's. When one side is a police officer and the defendant is a young person, it is 
clear where the benefit of the doubt will lie. The problem arises when the person 
subject to an ASBO breaches it. They are then criminally liable for such a breach, 
with a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment (Morgan and Newbum, 2007: 
1038). The `bespoke criminal law' point is simple; ASB legislation and practice 
allows a local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP), Community Safety 
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Partnership (CSP) or police force, perhaps at the behest of a vocal individual, to get 
an ASBO against someone else which is so specific to them that it has no relationship 
with any law the individual could have known prohibited the behaviour. If they 
breach the order, perhaps because it was set so onerously as to be impossible, they can 
go to jail. They are imprisoned for something that was not wrong before they did it, 
they did not know was wrong while they were doing it and was only wrong because 
they did it in that location and someone else felt it was wrong. In the process of 
sending them to prison they received none of the protections that have been built up 
over hundreds of years to protect the accused, because what they are imprisoned for is 
not actually criminal. If such a sentence provides any form of security for society, it is 
a perfect example of the achievement of security in the absence of justice. As 
discussed above, security and justice are distinct policy goals. 
Anti-social behaviour has a tendency to target weaker groups in society, particularly 
young people, the destitute and the powerless, the very groups that have long been 
described as `police property'. It hits hardest those people who conduct their private 
lives in public because privacy is a commodity that can only be enjoyed by those with 
at least a minimum of resources (Reiner, 1997). Thus homeless people are more likely 
to conduct street drinking than someone who owns their own home. On any given day 
both will likely be drinking within fifteen metres of where they sleep, but for the 
destitute this means being drunk in the public eye, while for the homeowner it is 
merely `relaxing'. Anti-social behaviour will often be the latter's description of the 
former's behaviour. 
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Young people are a continuous source of complaint about anti-social behaviour. 
Despite the fact that youth offending and youth justice have been heavily theorized 
for many years (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Becker, 1963; Muncie, 2004; Morgan and 
Newburn, 2007), kids hanging around on street corners continue to appear to be the 
greatest threat to the safety and security of many people around the country. Young 
people, particularly males, going through the process of adolescence are passing 
through perhaps one of the most difficult and important stages of the process of 
becoming socialized into the norms of society. That they have trouble doing so is 
nothing new. The problems of socialization are legion; education, housing, role- 
models, peers and family all play an important role. If even one goes wrong, 
socialization can become difficult. It is because of this complex socialization 
experience that most offenders are `adolescents and adults in their twenties' (Smith, 
2007a: 640). Farrington in his famous longitudinal study of North London young 
people found that there were certain risk factors which make it far more likely that a 
young person will end up committing crime. These included individual risk factors 
such as personality and temperament, family risk factors such as large family size, 
parental involvement in crime, child rearing methods or child abuse as well as school 
factors such as low intellectual attainment (Farrington, 2002: 664-679). These 
sociological factors are in place long before the young person begins hanging around 
on street corners. To attempt to fix them by using anti-social behaviour discourse is 
merely a case of shutting the proverbial stable door after the horse has bolted. As well 
as not helping to solve the problem, anti-social behaviour discourses run the risks of 
labelling young people and re-inforcing in them the idea that they arc in fact `bad', 
`yobs', or enforce other negative self conceptions. Symbolic interaction theory, or 
labelling theory (Vold et al., 2002: 210-211), often associated with Becker (1963) 
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posits that people who are labelled as delinquent will begin to live their lives to fulfil 
that role. This is aside from structural forces, such as a reduced jobs market for those 
with criminal records, which might restrict the opportunities of someone who has a 
conviction. Labelling theory works on the person's own understandings of who they 
are. By this rationale a young person given an ASBO for joyriding will act up into the 
role of `joyrider' and it will become a part of their identity which they actively 
pursue, rather than a once-off event that they grow out of. Labelling theory suggests 
that criminal careers can be created by the very people working to end them. 
ASB is a part of the pluralization of the governance of security. To use Cohen's 
analogy it allows us to thin the mesh and widen the net of the criminal justice system 
(1979). Its subjectivity, lack of procedural safeguards and targetting of the activities 
of the weakest members of society make the discourse of anti-social behaviour a 
worrying development in modern criminal justice policy. 
The Problem of Fear of Crime 
For almost the entire history of what we know as the police, the fighting of `crime' 
has been at the centre of their work. Despite the problems and debate attached to 
defining crime (Ashworth, 2006), and the arguments that it may be better to entirely 
abandon the concept of crime (Hulsman, 1986 [1996]) or replace it with discourses of 
`harm' (Tifft, 1995; Hillyard, 2005), crime as a concept has been something that the 
police have been happy to work on and the public seem happy to understand. Despite 
the problems of quantification of crime (discussed above), there is an acceptance in 
the choice of many managerialist `key performance indicators' (KPIs) that crime is 
something that is tangible, that can be worked on and that policing can effect. 
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There has been a slow realization however that the police do not have much of an 
effect on the amount of crime. Beginning with the Kansas City Preventive Patrol 
Experiment (KCPPE) (Kelling et aL, 1974) it began to become apparent that police 
patrol has little or no effect on reported crime levels. The KCPPE worked alongside 
the Kansas City Police Department to conduct an experimental re-deployment of 
officers across different areas of the city. The experiment separated fifteen beats into 
three groups of five randomly selected beats. In the `reactive' beats the officers were 
instructed only to respond to public calls for assistance. In the `control' beats there 
was the normal allocation of one preventive patrol car per beat. In the `preventive' 
beats routine patrol was increased by a factor of two to three and these beats also 
benefited from the patrol cars not in use in the `reactive' beats. Such experimental 
conditions are exceedingly rare in police research and the findings were influential in 
debates about the nature of policing. The researchers found that these experimental 
conditions had no significant impact on reported crime, fear of crime or satisfaction 
with the police. Increasing police numbers does not reduce crime, despite the common 
perception that it does, and the desire for more police officers that this perception 
creates: 
The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept secrets of 
modem life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not 
know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society's best defense against 
crime and continually argue that if they arc given more resources, 
especially personnel, they will be able to protect communities against 
crime. This is a myth. 
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What is the evidence for this heretical and disturbing assertion? First, 
repeated analysis has consistently failed to find any connection between 
the number of police officers and crime rates. Second, the primary 
strategies adopted by modem police have been shown to have little or no 
effect on crime. (Bayley, 1994: 3) 
If the police cannot affect the `objective' amount of crime, perhaps they can have an 
impact on subjective perceptions of crime, they could reduce how much the public 
fears crime. Ditton et al. give this potted history of the study of `fear of crime': 
There was no `fear' of crime in Britain until it was discovered in 1982. 
Crime surveyors liked it because whereas only about five interviewtes in 
100 could recall a crime victimization from the recall period (usually the 
previous year), 100 out of 100 could give usable data about their `fear' of 
crime. Politicians and policy makers liked it because it seemed more 
amenable to manipulation and reduction than crime itself. Rates of `fear' 
of crime, at one point, seemed about to become more important than rates 
of crime itself. People set about energetically trying to reduce the `fear' of 
crime. They failed. (2002: 144) 
Fear of crime promises a lot in terms of being a quantifiable indicator of successful 
policing that is divorced from the seemingly uncontrollable problem of crime. Yet this 
can cut both ways. When crime reduces, fear of crime may not necessarily follow. 
Crime in Britain has reduced substantially in the last ten years, both using official 
police records and the data provided by the British Crime Survey. Yet fear of crime 
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has remained high and confidence in the police is falling (Millie and Ilcrrington, 
2005: 42; Smith, 2007b). This incongruence between the actual crime rate and the 
public's perception of crime and their risk of victimization is something that has 
become a concern for the police and in 2001 the Inspectorate of Constabulary 
commissioned a thematic report on the issue and this identified a `reassurance gap' 
which the police have to work on using techniques such as increasing police patrol 
alongside greater accessibility of police services and familiarity with local police 
officers (Povey, 2001). 
However, it has been suggested that the `amount' of fear of crime may in fact be 
overstated. Yarwood, in research into crime concerns in rural parts of the West 
Mercia Constabulary, found that fear of crime was not as prevalent as was described 
in the media. Fear of crime can mean different things to different people. lie also 
found that in fact concerns regarding crime, when unpacked a little, could be as much 
anxieties about broader perceptions of changes in rural life than actual fear of criminal 
victimization (Yarwood, 2005: 69). Millie and Herrington (2005: 42) argue that fear 
of crime in the BCS has been decreasing since the mid-1990s and there is literature to 
support the position that fear of crime is in fact over-estimated. 
Part of the problem lies in the difficulty of measuring subjective feelings. Survey data 
are difficult to use at the best of times (Parr and Silva, 2005), but when dealing with 
something as subjective as how much one individual fears something that will most 
likely never happen to them, the possibilities for inconsistencies between research 
projects, and within individual projects themselves, is huge. Fear of crime surveys 
have been getting more sophisticated and complex as they become more common, but 
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even this constant refining of methodologies makes it difficult to analyse trends in 
levels of fear of crime. The classic fear of crime survey question, `how safe do you 
feel walking alone in this area after dark? ' is exceptionally subjective. Farrall and 
Ditton argue that this type of question provides very little useful information because 
it: 
[M]ay (or may not) ask about actual behaviour; its terms of reference may 
(or may not) mean different things to different respondents; it may (or may 
not) collect both (or either) emotional fears and risk assessments; it does not 
refer to crime and hence may (or may not) collect data relating to the fear of 
crime. As a quantitative measure of the fear of crime it leaves much to be 
desired. (1999: 56) 
As well as difficulties in getting specific data from fear of crime surveys because of 
the lack of precision in the questions, cultural and linguistic variations can make it 
difficult to compare fear of crime data between countries or regions (Pauwels and 
Pleysier, 2005). Fear of crime data is thus a very shaky indicator of successful 
policing and one that is open to massage and manipulation by many people who talk 
about it. 
Fear of crime measures appear to have no bearing on the relationship between the 
surveyed person's fear of crime and the actual risk of victimization they face. People 
feel safer driving large off road vehicles when in fact they are more likely to be 
involved in an accident while driving one (Lauer, 2005: 150). The fact is that far more 
people consider themselves to be at risk of victimization of any offence than actually 
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turn out to become victims, creating an inflated sense of fear that is out of proportion 
to the statistical risk (Chadee et al., 2007: 133). This inflation forces a conceptual 
distance between the police's traditionally conceived role of fighting crime and the 
new KPI of reducing fear of crime. Indeed fighting crime may itself be 
counterproductive to the process of fighting fear of crime if the trappings of crime 
fighting, such as large scale police presence, themselves induce fear. As Crawford 
puts it: 
Paradoxically, with police officer numbers at an all-time high and more 
civilian staff than ever, public insecurity and fear of crime remain 
stubbornly unaffected. In talking up law and order concerns, the 
government's successive campaigns against antisocial behaviour appear to 
have fanned public fears rather than reduced them. (2007: 899) 
Despite the methodological problems and the difficulties that arise when trying to use 
fear of crime as a performance indicator, research continues to attempt to use this 
subjective approach to evaluate the impact of crime on society. Dolan and Peasgood 
for example attempt to calculate the total costs of fear of crime and in so doing take a 
very broad definition of those costs as `all the tangible and intangible costs in 
anticipation of possible victimization' (2007: 123). Their approach included 
calculating the average loss of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) per capita as well 
as more tangible financial losses attached to the costs of private security provision and 
so forth. This is clearly a wide net for calculating costs and it is understandable that 
the final figure of £2,097.6 million is a considerable amount of money. It is 
approximately twenty percent of the cost of crime itself as previously calculated by 
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Dolan et al. (2005). Given the previous discussions about the subjective nature of the 
methodology for calculating fear of crime, to take such figures at face value might be 
a dangerous approach to public policy. however they arc interesting due to the 
prevalence of fear of crime discourse in policing policy in recent years, including the 
efforts to increase the reassurance component of the work of the police and the 
importance attached to efforts to reduce the fear of crime and increase reassurance 
(Home Office, 2005a) that are part of the aspirations of the neighbourhood policing 
programme. 
Signal Crimes and Reassurance Policing 
The Signal Crimes Perspective (SCP) was developed by Innes and Fielding (2002) as 
a way of looking at crimes or signs of disorder that have a symbolic impact on those 
who come into contact with them. Signal crimes have had a substantial impact on the 
development of reassurance policing, which was itself a precursor of neighbourhood 
policing and for that reason the two concepts arc discussed together in this section. 
Signal Crimes 
A `signal crime' has two central characteristics, it is a form of crime or disorder and 
when viewed by somebody it causes them to change their behaviour due to their 
interpretation of that crime or disorder. As Innes and Fielding (2002) put it, these 
`types of crime are important not just in terms of the harm done to the victim, but also 
in terms of what they signify and communicate to a wider audience'. Signal crimes 
therefore are as much about the interpretation of non-victims as they are about the 
harm done to actual victims. There are scales of signal crimes. High profile murders 
and indeed terrorist attacks, along with the media coverage they generate have an 
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important impact on how people conceptualize and navigate their social worlds. In 
this research however, it is more important to consider the `micro' signal crime. These 
are the small scale disorders such as graffiti, glass on the road after car break ins, run- 
down warehouses with smashed windows due to vandalism or still charred from 
months-old arson attacks. These, it is posited by proponents of the SCP, cause people 
to become nervous or even fearful in their environment. As a result they change the 
way they behave. This semiotic communicative process is at the heart of the SCP. 
Without communication, without an observer of the signal crime, it is merely a crime. 
Neither is it a signal crime if it is ignored or has no bearing on the behaviour of the 
observer. The elevation from mere disorder to signal crime occurs in the mind of the 
observer. 
This interpretation, begs the question; are signal crimes merely another way of 
appealing to Wilson and Kelling's (1982) `broken windows' thesis? This is the 
famous and hugely influential theory published in a non-academic journal, with no 
empirical backing which argued that where crime and disorder occur and do not 
receive an appropriate response, they will recur. The appeal of `broken windows' lay 
in its simplicity, what the authors themselves called its `folk-logic'. This simplicity 
allowed the theory to become an easily digestable foundation for stringent policing 
strategies such as `zero-tolerance' and `order-maintenance' policing, as was the case 
in New York City in the 1990s (see Chapter 1). l; iowever the lack of empirical 
evidence and the contested `success' of the New York story suggest that `broken 
windows' may not be a perfect prism through which to view the relationship between 
urban disorder and crime. 
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However empirical research does not support the simple causal mechanics of the 
`broken windows' thesis. Sampson and Raudcnbusch conducted two largcscalc 
studies into the effect of `collective efficacy' on crime and disorder in urban 
environments. They defined `collective efficacy' as `social cohesion among 
neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common 
good' (1997). Their studies looked at the relationship between collective efficacy and 
violent crime and found that they were correlated in the neighbourhood segments 
studied, having controlled for neighbourhood structural characteristics. They found in 
an earlier study that, `the combined measure of informal social control and cohesion 
and trust remained a robust predictor of lower rates of violence' (1997). While in the 
later study, they found that their research did not support a `broken windows' 
theoretical framework. The relationship between disorder and crime they argued was 
`spurious, except perhaps for burglary (1999). `Broken windows' sees disorder as 
having a positive causal relationship with crime, whereas Sampson and Raudcnbush 
argue that crime and disorder are both symptoms of the same set of circumstances; 
comparative structural disadvantage and lack of social cohesion. In short, disorder 
does not cause crime but arises for the same reasons. 
SCP similarly does not claim that disorder causes crime but that certain crimes and 
disorderly events or behaviours are `construed as "signal crimes" and "signal events" 
by individuals and communities' (Inngis and Fielding, 2002). These signal 
crimes/events are then interpreted as a form of `warning signal' of risk by its audience 
who then alter their behaviour. Certain crimes and disorders are causally linked to 
feelings of fear and the production of protective behaviour (Innes, 2004a). 
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However, like virtually all efforts at classifying actions as criminal or deviant, 
classifying signal crimes is a difficult and political process. Take for example graffitti, 
which is often given as an example of a signal crime (National Reassurance Policing 
Project, 2005: 13). There are divided views on whether it is actually criminal damage 
or an art form in its own right. Some academic commentators such as Snyder (2006) 
argue that it is a form of cultural expression which can lead to the development of 
subcultural economies and offer some artists a means of employment. Others such as 
Commissioner Bratton of the NYPD consider it another sign of urban disorder 
(Bratton, 1998). The debate is alive and well in the contemporary art world and is 
perhaps most famously elaborated in the debates ensuing about the career of the 
English graffiti artist Banksy who has held successful exhibitions in prestigious 
galleries but who began his career spray painting public walls, many of which have 
achieved a value far beyond their inherent worth as collected building materials due to 
his intervention (Guardian, 10 December 2007). Indeed when Banksy left a small 
stone with a graffittied picture of a neanderthal pushing a shopping trolley in the 
British Museum, the Museum decided to add it to their collection rather than consider 
it a violation of their exhibit space (Jones, 2007a). At the other end of the scale from 
Banksy of course is the simple vandalism which is perhaps at its worst when covering 
public service and safety information notices or other street signage. To some extent it 
presumably comes down to context. In some locations it may be art, in others it is 
clearly vandalism. Either way, the debate about whether graffiti is art or crime 
demonstrates that when it comes to defining signal crimes, like so many other aspects 
of the process of policing, almost everything is politically contestable and prolifically 
contested. 
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Graffitti, aside from its potential artistic merits, is symptomatic of the subjectivity of 
the SCP. Graffiti may be much less likely to be become a signal crime in 
neighbourhoods that are already very run down, where more serious crimes are likely 
to cause alarm, whereas in more orderly or secure neighbourhoods, graffitti would 
likely cause great alarm. 
While subjective decisions are constantly made by the police, signal crimes create a 
new potential layer of subjectivity with which those with the most influence can gain 
access to publicly provided policing services to assist them in dealing with their own 
anxieties about their own security, however fanciful they may be. How arc the police 
to respond to the same two pieces of graffitti in two different neighbourhoods? Is it a 
matter of attending to the one which causes the most alarm or applying resources to 
the area where the likelihood of victimization is more serious? 
Reassurance Policing 
Signal crimes are important for this research because they influenced the formation of 
the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP), a pilot policing programme 
based on the idea that while it may not be possible to make people any safer in terms 
of their risk of victimization, it may be possible to make them fccl safcr. This is 
another attempt to tackle fear of crime rather than crime itself. The type of policing 
we have come to know as neighbourhood policing started life as `reassurance 
policing' (Innes, 2005: 160). 
Reassurance has been a central principle of policing since its inclusion in the Police 
Reform Act 2002 and the National Policing Plan 2003-2006 (Millie and Herrington, 
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2005: 42). While crime may be falling, there is no parralcl fall in the fear of crime nor 
rise in its inverse, `reassurance'. Reassurance policing is thus part of wider move 
within public service provision whereby the provider attempts to give the public what 
they want, in this case a freedom from anxiety. 
There are numerous ways to define reassurance policing and the very elasticity of its 
definition is, Innes (2004b: 157) argues, an advantage: `It was precisely the lack of a 
tightly structured definition that allowed the idea to gain significant levels of support 
from different interest groups and thus helped to propel it "up" the political agenda. ' 
Ines goes on to give two definitions of reassurance policing. The first stemming from 
the `Thematic Inspection' report by the Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) which 
defines reassurance as an outcome that is derived from engaging certain policing 
activities in order to produce a sense of order and security (Povey, 2001). The second 
definition Innes proposes is that used by the NRPP whose objective is to provide 
enhanced `neighbourhood security'. Both definitions are driven by concepts of 
`security' with its future-oriented promises of risk reduction. 
In an effort to provide the latter type of reassurance, the NRPP set about increasing 
police foot patrols in pilot areas. This was with the aim of increasing `visibility, 
accessibility and familiarity' (VAF) as described by the I IMIC in their report. 
However, bearing in mind that the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) 
experiments found that it was not the increase in foot patrols that were effective, but 
the quality of the police-public interaction which made the difference (Skogan and 
Hartnett, 1998). It was this emphasis on the quality of the interface between the police 
and public that lead to NRPP to include SCP in its thinking. The I IMIC conception of 
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reassurance had argued that reassurance could be provided if VAF was in place, 
regardless of other signifiers of crime and disorder. For this reason SCP was 
appropriated into the NRPP's approach (Inncs, 2004b: 162). This, argues Innes (ibid: 
167), is an intelligent approach to increasing people's sense of security. 
Partnership, CDRPs and Crime and DisorderAct 1998 
One of the initial aims of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 was to reduce crime. The 
theory it seems was that this would take place by providing a body of guardians upon 
the streets who would be able to catch criminals and bring them to justice. This 
punishment, along with their presence on the streets should deter others. However, 
even this role has been challenged by historians of the police (Emsley, 2001). The 
police continue to have a role in society's efforts to prevent crime, but the notions of 
what `crime prevention' is have changed substantially over time. In much the same 
way that various `eras' (Kelling and Moore, 1988) or `waves' (Wood and Shearing, 
2007) of dominant and fashionable perspectives on policing have come and gone over 
time, notions of crime prevention have also changed. These phases have developed; 
[F]rom the unfocused and theoretically uninformed form that 
predominated from the 1950s, to the `crisis' of criminal justice in the mid- 
1970s; to the situational model that came to the fore from the mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s; to the more holistic and ideologically manipulable community 
safety and crime reduction model which has held sway from the late 1980s 
onwards. (Hughes, 2006a: 68) 
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These different phases, like the various historical phases of policing are not actually 
neatly distinct. There is a continuous application of ideas from different phases to 
work conducted in other eras. The important thing to note, for the purposes of this 
work, is that crime prevention is a concept that is changing and adapting all the time. 
This may be driven by new technologies or new types of crimes or by changes in the 
theories and philosophies that inspire politicians and policy-makers. 
There is now a growing consensus in the UK that the best form of crime prevention is 
one which takes an `inter-agency' approach and works on issues beyond simply crime 
itself but wider social problems. Inter-agency work is a step beyond the more familiar 
`multi-agency' partnerships in that the latter involves merely doing the same tasks in 
cooperation with others while the former demands a shift in working practices that 
goes towards more dovetailed work that could be considered collaborative or 
interdependent than merely cooperative (Crawford and Matassa, 2000: 104). 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was a significant piece of legislation in the area of 
crime prevention because it created specific statutory powers and duties for a range of 
agencies and local authorities. The Act places a duty on local councils and the police 
to work with a wide range of other agencies from the public, private, voluntary and 
community sectors to develop and implement strategies to reduce crime and disorder' 
(Crawford, 2007: 894). 376 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnernships (CDRPs) 
were established and are obliged to conduct a triennial audit of crime and disorder in 
their localities, consult the community and respond in an appropriately strategic 
manner (Home Office, 1998). CDRPs enjoyed an initial period of success and 
promise, but the work of partnership has been heavily criticised since. The strength of 
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the police agenda in the partnership has led other partners to be reluctant to fully 
engage with the process and the dream of `inter-agcncy' working may be a long way 
from becoming the reality. It seems that while it may be one thing to enact the 
framework for partnership, `the ability to co-ordinate the responsibilities and work of 
different administrative departments in such a fashion as a matter of routine appears 
to be much harder to engineer'. (Innes, 2005: 165) 
The problems facing partnership operations are particularly pertinent to this research 
and will be discussed further in later chapters. The work of local partnerships is 
central to neighbourhood policing. This work in its efforts to engage community and 
provide solutions to problems, be they of crime, fear of crime or antisocial behaviour 
is affected by all the theoretical and practical concerns raised in these first two 
chapters. It is this complexity of issues which relate to neighbourhood policing that 
make it such an interesting field of study but it also makes it difficult to research. The 
next chapter will discuss some of the issues around conducting research on 
neighbourhood policing. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has brought together a number of different approaches to contextualizing 
and analyzing neighbourhood policing. These strands may appear to be somewhat 
disparate however it is essential to have considered them in order to locate 
neighbourhood policing within an appropriate conceptual framework. It is argued 
throughout this thesis that a nodal governance of security perspective is a useful 
analytical tool when trying to understand the NAG operating as the central problem- 
solving group within the neighbourhood policing strategy. This strategy is faced with 
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a substantial amount of expectation in so far as it is expected to reduce Inter alla: 
crime, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, as well as to increase reassurance, 
legitimacy and accountability. Yet these concepts are slippery and hard to pin down. 
Each is surrounded with its own set of debates and in order to understand 
neighbourhood policing and the NAGs role within that, each of these notions has to 
be unpicked. Otherwise it is difficult to understand the forces, interconnections and 
dynamics which effect the NAG as a `node' of security governance. 
The next chapter looks at issues relating to how neighbourhood policing can be and 
has been researched. It also looks at how this research went about approaching the 
NAG and its role in neighbourhood policing. The later chapters will then develop on 
the themes set out above as they relate to the two case study neighbourhoods which 
were studied. 
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Chapter 3 
Doing Research on Neighbourhood Policing 
`The precise nature of all [research] difficulties and the strategies which 
might help overcome them, vary according to the characteristics of the 
researcher, and her relationship to the police. ' (Reiner, 2000b: 220) 
The previous chapters have laid out some of the debates which surround the 
sociological and political setting within which neighbourhood policing operates. Each 
of these debates has an impact on the research process when conducting any type of 
study of neighbourhood policing. Every problem of definition faced by the police in 
constructing neighbourhoods and communities, defining problems, developing 
connections with the `community' or gathering `intelligence' is a complicating factor 
for the researcher investigating neighbourhood policing. This chapter teases out some 
of those factors and tries to explain the impact they had on research decisions in the 
instant research. Virtually every research decision in the social sciences is the result of 
some set of forces or influences and understanding these is crucial to understanding 
the outcome of the research. 
Previous Research on Community Policing 
Before discussing research on community policing itself, it is worth discussing the 
historical development of police research that led up to the development of 
community policing and thus the research into it. Reiner (2000b) describes four 
historical phases of police research which have affected the style of research work 
that has been carried out on the police. Although police research in the UK began in 
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the 1960s and the advocacy of strategies of community policing did not appear until 
the 1970s, the earlier phases necessarily influenced the later work and help place the 
research on community policing into context. 
The earliest research on policing is usually credited to have been Banton's (1964) The 
Policeman in the Community, which is described by Reiner as `framed within a 
celebratory mode' and `clear exemplification of the consensus stage of police 
research' (2000b: 213). This consensus was severely challenged by the police 
research of the 1960s and 1970s in Britain. Substantial social changes (increased 
difference and reduced deference in British society, to paraphrase Reiner) created an 
environment that allowed academic (and indeed other forms of police research) to 
challenge the traditional notions about the police. Political protest and allegations of 
police corruption set the stage for the controversy phase of police research, a phase 
that largely produced research critical of police practices while much government 
conducted research was pointing out the limitations of policing in terms of reducing 
crime. This phase perhaps resonated with the `nothing works' atmosphere which was 
typical of much criminological research at the time (l; lughes, 2001: 271). The fourth 
phase of research is called the contradictory phase. This was ostensibly committed to 
`realism' and perhaps part of a movement away from `grand theory'. Two contrasting 
approaches appeared during this phase. The fields of research known as `left realism' 
on the one hand (Lea and Young, 1984), which contrasted sharply with the 
`administrative criminology' of policy makers in the UK and the `New Right' realism 
which was influential in the US at the time (Tierney, 2006: 234-235). Some of the 
work which was conducted during this contradictory phase is evidence of a shift away 
from more theoretical and critical works towards research with a broad policy impact. 
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As such, police research can possibly be seen to have become very evaluation 
oriented, seeking best practice and perhaps `value for money'. 
It was against this backdrop of searching for innovative strategies and creating best 
practice that, 
`Community policing' became a fashionable rubric around the world 
(Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Fielding, 1995). It offered to unite the earlier 
concerns with accountability and the new concern with effective policing: 
accountability was for good, effective policing, which could only be 
achieved through cultivating community consent (Reiner, 2000b: 215- 
216). 
This fashionable innovation in policing arose out of the evidence-lcd realization 
that old police tactics are ineffective in reducing crime. In order to fight rising 
crime, there was a need to create innovative responses. Community policing was 
one of those responses. The other main response advocated, forming perhaps a 
polar opposite to community policing, was the notion of aggressive patrol and 
crackdowns. The synthesis of both these techniques has led to what could be 
considered a spectrum of policing responses from community-oriented, to law and 
order oriented (Reiner, 2000a: 121). Since then the bulk of research into 
community policing has been in the nature of evaluating how successful (or not) 
any individual community policing initiative is. Some projects such as that 
conducted by Skogan and Hartnett (1998) worked with the police in devising and 
implementing the community policing initiative and then went on to evaluate it. 
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Other evaluation works have been ex post facto evaluations of initiatives which 
the police have conducted themselves and the researcher has attempted to evaluate 
afterwards (for example Smyth, 2002). 
Evaluation techniques are largely based on, or aspire to be as close as possible to, 
traditional positivist approaches to social science. These techniques often derived 
from the natural sciences (Parr and Silva, 2005) and as such aspire to an 
objectivity and thus significance which is associated with the epistemological 
techniques espoused by so-called `positivist' criminologists and social researchers 
(Bottoms, 2000: 26). This positivist outlook tends to favour experimental styles of 
assessing if a technique or intervention is successful or not. However this highly 
positivist approach to the search for authoritative sociological knowledge 
(Redman, 2005) may not be the best way to evaluate neighbourhood policing. 
What quantity would a researcher count to analyse if a neighbourhood had 
benefitted from neighbourhood policing? How would the causal relationship 
between the policing and the benefit be established? What are the problems a 
positivist must overcome in evaluating neighbourhood policing? What techniques 
would she use? 
In answering these questions a positivist evaluator must rely on the scientific 
techniques available to them. The random controlled test is thus the `holy-grail' or 
`gold-standard' of the positivist evaluator. This is perhaps exemplified in the 
University of Maryland overview of crime evaluation studies (Sherman et al., 
1998) which was conducted for the US Congress as a review of `what works' in 
crime prevention. Each type of intervention was evaluated based on the type of 
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study conducted on it. If it was evaluated by a random controlled test, the 
evaluation scored T. The lower scores were assigned based on research designs 
and threats to internal validity set out in what the authors rather grandly call the 
Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods (ibid: 21). The paper then goes on to set out 
which interventions do and do not work based on the level of `scientific' support 
they have garnered. Thus they categorize the interventions under four headings; 
`what works', `what doesn't work', `what's promising' and `what's unknown'. 
Tilley is exceptionally sceptical of this reliance on scientific evaluation, stating 
that `[t]he result is in my opinion dangerous nonsense' (2001: 87). This is because 
such evaluations forget (or ignore) the fact that an intervention's effectiveness is 
`dependent on circumstances'. The success of an intervention in Brixton does not 
mean it will automatically be a success in Hackney or Whitechapel. In order to 
understand the potential influence a success-story should have on future policy- 
making, it is essential to have a strong theoretical understanding of why the 
intervention was a success. Indeed it is this exact tailoring of the policing response 
to the local priorities in a manner best suited to a particular neighbourhood context 
that is at the heart of the theoretical reasoning behind why neighbourhood policing 
should be a success. To impose a centrally mandated intervention on a 
neighbourhood because it has been evaluated to be a success in other locations, 
may be to undermine the very advantages of responsiveness and flexibility which 
neighbourhood policing as an innovative policing strategy provides. 
Tilley goes on to point out that overviews of evaluation, such as the Maryland 
Scale of Scientific Method, regularly unearth inconsistent findings. These 
inconsistencies bedevil efforts to find out whether such measures do or do not 
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work. Because such studies do not try and tease out the reasons why an 
intervention works in one context but not another, they run the risk of finding that 
an intervention does not work at all because there are so many conflicting results. 
To put this statement in terms relating to neighbourhood policing, it seems likely 
that neighbourhood policing will not `work' in all neighbouroods for all the 
measures on which it can be analysed. It also seems likely that it may `work' for 
some measures in some contexts. So any evaluative research on neighbourhood 
policing has to try and explain not only if it `worked' but also what is the context 
in which it was applied, and how did that context affect the success or failure of 
the strategy. This type of analysis is made even more complex by the fact that, 
despite central governmental aspirations to control and manage force and BCU 
performances, there is no single `one size fits all' `cookie-cutter' approach to 
neighbourhood policing. Each NAG, police officer and partner brings a different 
perspective and set of skills to the problems of their neighbourhood. In 
neighbourhood policing evaluating why something works is probably harder than 
evaluating if it works. 
In response to this problem, Pawson and Tilley (1997) formulated an alternative 
type of evaluation that they called `realistic evaluation'. This is a development of 
what they had previously referred to as `scientific realist evaluation' (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1994: 300). In essence this is an approach to evaluation that looks at 
`understanding how programmes and policies bring about different effects in 
different places among different people' (Tilley, 2001: 91). The realistic evaluator 
is concerned with `what works for whom in what circumstances, and how? ' This 
is substantially different to the traditional evaluative researcher's question of 
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`what works' or even `what always works'. Realistic evaluation may be in a 
position to provide useful insights into neighbourhood policing and at least some 
of its reasoning and techniques have been applied to the instant research. 
Despite all the methodological questions and the epistemological uncertainty 
attached to evaluation in any area of social policy, the current New Labour 
administration in the UK favours an evidence-led approach to policy provision in 
the criminal justice system and other areas of social policy. This is a laudable 
approach to policy-making in many ways. Who could fault a government who 
only wanted to do things for its public that `worked' or were at least 'evidence- 
led'? However all evidence in social science (and perhaps even in some of the 
natural sciences, although that is something of a tangent (Hughes and Sharrock, 
1997)) is socially constructed (see chapter 2 for a review of some of the 
discussions of this idea in the context of official crime figures). Any data set 
appears at the end of a process of collection and, since all data on a topic cannot 
ever possibly be collected, any data set presented is automatically a selection. 
Thus `[p]olicy that is led by available evidence risks focusing on the easily 
measurable simply because it is easily measurable' (Tilley, 2001). As CDRPs are 
mandated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to evaluate their interventions, 
they `can be persuaded to try and assemble and warehouse more and more data in 
the belief that they will tell them what to do. But the data cannot and will not do 
so' (ibid: 84). This is not to say that evidence cannot inform research. It is a 
warning that data and evidence have to be treated very carefully when used in any 
area of social policy, criminology or police studies. 
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The Present Research 
This research took place over the course of approximately eighteen months. The 
central tenet of the research methodology was an ethnography of two NAGs (detailed 
in chapters 4 and 5) as they developed over the course of the research. The NAG at 
Neighbourhood A was established before the research began and so it was possible to 
attend the meetings over a longer period of time. The NAG at Neighbourhood B was 
established during the course of the research and so could not be studied for as long. I 
also attended NAG meetings in two other neighbourhoods, one in another city and 
one in another part of the BCU studied. Each meeting lasted one and a half hours and 
I was able to take contemporaneous notes throughout. I also stayed behind for some 
time and talked informally with participants about the process of problem-solving, 
neighbourhood policing and NAGs in general. In total I attended approximately 
twenty NAGs over the course of 18 months. This added up to almost forty hours of 
ethnographic fieldwork. 
Alongside these NAGs I also attended training days run by the Thames Valley Police 
and the Thames Valley Partnership. These were full length training days intended to 
provide those at the `coalface' of neighbourhood policing with the skills and 
background information required to implement the neighbourhood policing agenda. 
The former took place at the TVP headquarters in Kiddlington and was for police 
officers and PCSOs who were to be appointed to neighbourhood policing duties. The 
second training day was for partnership agencies. During both training days I was able 
to make contemporaneous notes, speak to officers and partners. I did not participate in 
workshops, although I did attend them and in the case of the partnership training day, 
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I was asked by the organizers to produce a summary of the workshop I attended on 
media relations and neighbourhood policing. 
The final ethnographic component of the research involved attending a morning of 
intelligence briefings at the main police station in the BCU. This comprised two 
meetings, one of community partners (called a Tasking and Co-ordination Group) 
who were attempting to co-ordinate their information into usable intelligence and a 
later Joint Tactics and Tasking Committee meeting. I was able to take 
contemporaneous notes and observe the proceedings, in a similar fashion to the NAGs 
I attended. Between this morning and the two training days, a further 20 hours of 
ethnographic fieldwork was added to the research. 
Alongside the ethnography I conducted a series of interviews and held a set of 
meetings with senior police officers within the TVP. I tape recorded interviews with 
eight people. Three were senior officers in the force who were charged with rolling 
out the neighbourhood policing process. Two further interviews were with 
representatives of the NPIA who were providing support to forces as they were rolling 
out neighbourhood policing in their areas. I conducted an interview with the first 
appointed chair of each NAG. Finally, I also conducted an interview with the safer 
neighbourhood coordinator who had responsibility for establishing NAGs in the 
thirty-two neighbourhoods within the BCU. As well as these semi-structured, 
recorded interviews, I met with senior officers in the force and discussed the issues of 
rolling out neighbourhood policing. I had extended meetings three times at the central 
police station and twice at the OU. 
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When the research was beginning I initially spent time considering the question of 
how to measure the effectiveness of neighbourhood policing. However it became 
apparent that this question was perhaps too broad and overlapped substantially with 
evaluative work the police themselves were doing. For theses reasons I began to 
consider the themes of policing theory such as problem-oriented policing and 
intelligence-led policing and how they worked in neighbourhood policing generally 
and within NAGs specifically. I also wanted to consider how much connection or 
engagement the process and the NAG had with the community. The discussions in the 
following chapters are the fruits of those inquiries and derive from these methods of 
researching the NAG and neighbourhood policing. 
When this study began in 2005 neighbourhood policing was a relatively new 
incarnation of the much more established notion of `community policing'. The 
concept was being initiated by central government as a new reform in how policing is 
to be delivered across England and Wales. This left open a lot of questions, such as 
how would neighbourhood policing be evaluated? How would the process fit in with 
the demands on the police for traditional response or 'fire-brigade' policing? Will the 
problem-solving process work as planned by middle-managers? The list of possible 
questions is endless. Choosing the right research question immediately at the start 
appeared almost impossible, so it seemed feasible to conduct two case studies of 
different neighbourhoods undergoing different stages in the roll-out of neighbourhood 
policing. This allowed for a picture of the process of initiating a major change in 
policing to be described. Furthermore the problems and successes could be critically 
analyzed and considered in a theoretical framework. The logical site for these case- 
studies were neighbourhoods as they had been defined by the police themselves. 
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Within each neighbourhood, the biggest and most obvious new development was the 
creation of Neighbourhood Action Groups (NAGs). These arc, according to the TVP: 
[V]olunteer working groups made up of representatives from the 
community. They will include residents, the police, local authority and 
other organizations, such as local businesses and schools. 
They are key to the success of neighbourhood policing as it is this group 
who will plan on behalf of the community and organize for tasks to be 
completed. In effect, they arc the `doers' accountable locally for 
responding to problems a community wants to tackle. (Thames Valley 
Police, 2006) 
Thus the NAG was to be the central location for working on the neighbourhood's 
priorities and attempting to work in partnership to solve them. It was decided that the 
best way to understand the complex relationships between the partners (including the 
police, local residents and other stakeholders) would be to conduct an ethnography of 
the NAGs in the case study areas. Coupling this with a selection of interviews of key 
NAG members and police officers in the local setting would allow for a greater 
perspective to be obtained than from attending the NAGs themselves. 
Choosing the case study neighbourhoods was not a simple task. The TVP had two 
pilot neighbourhoods that were up and running. These neighbourhoods were on two 
opposing ends of the `deprivation index' used by the police and as such had 
substantially different policing `requirements'. However both were considerably 
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further along the process of local consultation and problem-solving than the other 
neighbourhoods in the BCU. To study the two pilots would have been a logical 
approach. They are contrasting neighbourhoods upon which the template of 
neighbourhood policing was being imposed and perhaps the comparisons could be 
illuminating. However, there were two major problems with this. Firstly, both arc 
pilot areas. This means that both receive more attention than could reasonably be 
expected to be received by any one neighbourhood if all the neighbourhoods are to be 
operating at the same time. This would mean that the isolation of the ncighbourhoods 
in the time-scale of the roll-out might make their study almost completely non- 
transferrable. Secondly, as both pilot NAGs are further along in the process, a case 
study of both would not allow for any study of the earlier stages of the roll-out. For 
example, to start by studying two established NAGs it would be hard to gain an 
understanding of the methods used to define the problems and to initiate the NAGS. 
Similar difficulties would arise in trying to understand the problems of moving on the 
partnership work of co-producing community safety. To study two more established 
NAGs would ring somewhat hollow if it was not possible to understand the process 
by which the NAG's objectives and thus operative notions and preconceptions were 
derived. Coming into a NAG late does not allow the observer to explain what were 
the politics behind defining a problem. The definition of a problem has an impact in a 
locality in that efforts to resolve it will have an impact on how police and agency 
resources are used in that area. This means that the definition of problems in 
neighbourhood policing can become political (albeit perhaps political in the small `p' 
sense). To conduct a study of a new process of policing and ignore the methods which 
were used to determine what the main priorities of that process arc, seems somewhat 
short sighted. At the very least it accepts the process of determining priorities in an 
uncritical manner. 
It seemed that the best compromise was to look at one of the established pilot NAGs 
and a new NAG which was just starting out. This way it would be possible to observe 
the process of defining local problems from the very start in one neighbourhood 
(Neighbourhood B in this research), while the research in the other neighbourhood 
(Neighbourhood A) could observe the workings of a NAG that had established itself 
and was `getting on with the job'. Neighbourhood A is the older, more established 
NAG and meetings had been attended for some months before the consultation 
process for Neighbourhood B began. However, in this work, the ncighbourhoods arc 
described in the order that events within them would take place if the two 
neighbourhoods formed one unified `story'. So Neighbourhood B's story of 
consultation with the public and the establishment of the NAG is told before 
Neighbourhood A's story of working towards mitigating the problems that they have 
found to be of most concern to their public. The `story' of the NAGs in the Thames 
Valley is thus told in a time-line that is not in fact true (many of the events in 
Neighbourhood A took place before Neighbourhood B was up and running), but 
rather as it might happen in one NAG; consultation of publics, formation of NAG, 
brainstorming, problem-solving and partnership working. 
I attended NAGs in Neighbourhood A for a period stretching over approximately 
eighteen months and at Neighbourhood B for a period of approximately twelve 
months. I also visited two other NAGs, one in the second pilot within the BCU, which 
is briefly referred to in this text as Neighbourhood C, and one in another BCU in the 
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constabulary. This NAG was visited to get a sense of how the NAG process would 
apply outside the BCU in which the two case-study neighbourhoods were located. 
As well as studying NAGs, I attended a number of training days for officers who were 
being trained in the implementation of neighbourhood policing. I also attended a full 
day training session for partners in the Thames Valley run by the Thames Valley 
Partnership, where the TVP explained the process of neighbourhood policing and the 
central role of the NAG to their main potential partners. I also attended an intelligence 
briefing day (held fortnightly in the BCU) which comprised both the Joint Tactics and 
Tasking Committee meeting and the Tasking and Co-ordination Group, this was in 
order to see how the intelligence gathered at a local level feeds up into the greater 
intelligence structures used centrally by the police. 
In parallel with the ethnography of the case study NAGs, I conducted a number of 
interviews with key informants who it was felt would have a good insight into the 
local and national experience of rolling out and implementing neighbourhood 
policing. To this end I interviewed chairs of both case study NAGs, senior police 
officers in the TVP, a representative of the council in which the case study 
neighbourhoods are located, the coordinator of the community safety partnership for 
the area which includes the two neighbourhoods, and representatives from the 
National Policing Improvement Agency who have responsibility for supporting police 
forces in implementing neighbourhood policing. This is clearly not a huge amount of 
interviews. Indeed many criminal justice research projects interview hundreds of 
informants (see for example the study of juvenile delinquency in London conducted 
by Farrington, 2002). However the intention of conducting interviews was to 
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supplement the ethnographic data which was collected at NAGs and othcr police 
events with an investigation of the perspectives of key informants. 
Interviewees were chosen to try to get a view of the different perspectives at the table. 
Thus it was important to interview a chair from each case study neighbourhood. It 
was similarly important to look beyond the police themselves and speak to partner 
agencies and this was why the council representative was interviewed. Finally, it was 
considered essential to speak to the police managers at TVP, and the NPIA to find out 
how they perceived the neighbourhood policing process as they worked on it, at a 
force and national level. This research is an attempt to use those perspectives to assist 
in understanding the experiences observed as part of the ethnography. 
There is no attempt to create a quantitative description of how well the process is 
perceived among a broad group of people. The purpose of the interviews, which were 
digitally recorded with the interviewees' consent, was to conduct a detailed discussion 
of the roll-out process. The interviews were detailed and provided rich data which 
could be discussed at great depth and this discussion informs the bulk of the empirical 
analysis in chapters 6 and 7. 
As well as the formal interviews, I conducted numerous informal discussions with 
people who I met at NAGs, or at other points in my fieldwork. Some people wanted to 
say things `off the record' or completely anonymously and so did not wish to be 
interviewed in a formal, recorded setting. Others were happy to do recorded 
interviews, but were concerned about their anonymity being preserved. It is in order 
to respect this desire for privacy, which was an essential part of some participants' 
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consent to be interviewed, that the names of the I3CU, the case study ncighbourhoods 
and the key informants are all anonymizcd. 
After NAG meetings were finished there was a good opportunity for informal 
discussions with participants about how they felt the meetings were going and what 
their expectations were. These comments, which have never been directly quoted or 
attributed, were recorded in the field notes for the research and have helped inform 
the arguments in this work. 
Further data was provided by the TVP in the form of quantitative analysis conducted 
by their own internal statisticians. Although this work is mainly a qualitative 
ethnography, there are certain points in the text where statistics arc referred to. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the quantification of crime is a hotly contested area 
of research and it is not intended to re-visit those debates here. The police collect vast 
quantities of data and it informs their work significantly. This is part of a target 
culture which operates throughout the criminal justice system (McLaughlin and 
Muncie, 2000) and almost all areas of the public sector. Such dependence on 
quantifiable targets thus informs police perspectives and cannot be ignored, even by 
the researcher hoping to conduct an ethnographic research work. 
Internally collected police data are used in a number of ways in the context of 
neighbourhood policing. Such data informs Inter alia the deprivation index used by 
the police to help decide on which neighbourhoods arc to be classified as Priority, 
Enhanced or Capable neighbourhoods. This, along with other factors, affected how 
soon neighbourhood policing was to be rolled out to that neighbourhood. Reported 
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crime data can also be collected specifically for each neighbourhood and this further 
helps to classify neighbourhoods according to the levels of crime they are 
experiencing, or at least reporting. NAGs themselves were observed using such data 
themselves (see the discussions in chapters 4 and 5 below). As part of the research I 
spoke to the internal civilian staff at the TVP who compile the data on the case study 
neighbourhoods and was provided with any data that I asked for about the two 
neighbourhoods. The theme of quantification of crime, measuring progress and 
providing proof of success is referred to throughout the work and for that reason it is 
important to use (and be aware of the short-comings of) the data which is collected by 
the TVP themselves. 
The data collected was recorded in field notes for the ethnography component and the 
informal interviews. The formal interviews were recorded and transcribed, while 
something of a substantial file of data provided by the TVP statisticians was also 
collected. It is upon this body of recorded data that this research is based. 
Before moving on to discuss some of the problems encountered in the execution of 
this research it is worth briefly trying to place the research within one of the 
categories of police research that theorists have tried to define. Brown (1996) argued 
that there were four types of police researcher, based on a two by two matrix of 
whether the researcher was an insider (ic a police officer) and whether the researcher 
had approached their research from inside or outside the police organization. 
Although, within the police appears to include central government as well as the force 
itself. This matrix produces four possible types of police researcher; inside insiders, 
outside insiders, inside outsiders and outside outsiders. Each of them will have a 
116 
different experience of researching the police because of the relationship that they 
have with the policing establishment and the people they are studying due to their 
status as insiders and their institutional background. 
Inside insiders are typically police officers conducting research either for themselves 
(eg for a degree) or for the force or other governmental institution. They typically 
have much reduced problems of obtaining formal access due to their position as 
officers. However, it must be remembered that the process of negotiating access is 
constantly evolving. Inside insiders often still experience problems building trust at 
this stage of negotiating (and perhaps constantly renegotiating) `secondary access'. 
This may be because, for example, they are often senior officers who are treated 
suspiciously by those they are studying. Outside insiders on the other hand are former 
police officers who, upon retirement or resignation, go on to publish academic works 
on their experiences. Acting as covert participant observers during their time in the 
force they use that experience as the data upon which to base their analysis. 
Obviously, being located in the force already, formal access is not a problem. 
Secondary access is then dependent on the researcher's role in the force and their 
bonds of trust with their colleagues and perhaps the perspectives on the force they 
already hold. The outside insider can turn out research that could allow her to be 
described as anything from `spy to propagandist' (Reiner, 2000b: 221). Inside 
outsiders are those who work within the force or other government agency, but are 
not officers. They are perhaps similar to inside insiders in that they enjoy good formal 
access but may have difficulty building the trust relationships required for secondary 
access. This may be perhaps because officers know that their findings may have more 
immediate policy impacts than those found by complete outsiders. This final category 
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of outside outsider is the one into which most academic research falls. It may fall at 
the hurdle of having its formal access removed or completely denied and may suffer 
from difficulties in building trust and renegotiating secondary access. IIowcver the 
outside outsider may be able to gain the trust of police officers who would be adverse 
to speaking with insiders or who think that academic research doesn't really matter 
anyway. 
Fitting the current research into Brown's typology is not a perfect science. As 
discussed below, this project was partially funded by the police and as such formal 
access was relatively straightforward. In that sense it feels like the category of inside 
outsider may be the best location for the research. However, in terms of building 
relationships within the research environment, it is posited that many of those who 
were subject to the research were unconcerned about the outsider/insider divide or 
considered me to be an independent academic researcher (which I am, in all but 
funding, see below). As is often the case with the typology based on the two by two 
matrix, all examples do not fit neatly into the schema. In this case, there are perhaps 
aspects of both the inside outsider and outside outsider which apply to this research. 
Problems Arising from the Present Research 
No criminological research occurs exactly as planned. There are too many potential 
complicating factors which affect the way in which the research takes place. Every 
decision to research or observe one event has an opportunity cost. In deciding to look 
at one aspect of neighbourhood policing, time and work load means that some other 
aspect of it is not researched, or at least not researched as thoroughly. Nobody has 
attempted to tell the holistic story of neighbourhood policing, and to do so would be 
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virtually impossible. The process of deciding on what was to be the subject of this 
research has taken place partially as a result of conscious intellectual investigation, 
but also due to the experiences on the ground. In that sense the research is closer in 
character to a `response-to-a-constantly-changing-and-developing-environment', than 
to a carefully thought out social scientific experiment. The process was shaped by 
some of the problems discussed below, such as access and the need to strike a balance 
between being too participatory and too distant. 
Problems ofAccess 
Many researchers studying criminal justice go through difficult initial problems 
gaining access (Baldwin, 2000: 237; Davies, 2000: 86-88; Martin, 2000: 222-223; 
Rawlinson, 2000: 353). In many ways, the traditional problems of access that many 
criminal justice researchers experience was circumvented somewhat in this research 
because of the fact that the project was co-funded by the TVP. The ethical 
implications of such police funding of research are discussed below, however, in the 
context of gaining access to the process of neighbourhood policing, the fact that the 
research was funded by the police (and ergo something the police were at least 
somewhat interested in) made the process of gaining access a lot more 
straightforward. The TVP and the Open University (OU) collaborated to fund the 
study for which this research was conducted. The research was to be about the then 
relatively new, area of neighbourhood policing and the initial working title of the 
research was `Measuring Outcomes in Citizen-focussed Local Policing'. As with any 
working title and like many nascent research projects, the name and the focus of the 
research has changed as the terrain in which the project functions is better understood. 
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The high turnover of police staff was something that initially appeared to be a likely 
problem for access. One example being when the very officer mentioned, who helped 
initiate the project, was moved to headquarters, he introduced me to his replacement 
and briefed him of the existence of the project and the new officer gave the same 
assurances that he would ensure that any access required would be provided. 
Although no formal use was ever made of his offer, it was very useful when meeting 
officers to establish contacts to be able to say that Officer X was in fact aware of the 
work and that it was co-funded by the TVP. In a sense it made officers at case, that I 
was `one of them' and indeed this was alluded to by an officer who was very helpful 
in providing contacts in other agencies to assist in gaining access. 
While I was able to gain what felt like largely unfettered access to the research field, 
it is also important to consider that access does not end once the `field' or `group' has 
been penetrated, it must constantly be renegotiated and reconsidered (Hughes, 2000: 
239-242), regardless of how little things are changing. Looking back over Brown's 
(1996 discussed above) inside-outside, insider-outsider matrix, it is clear that this 
secondary access, and how it is constructed, is one of the most significant difference 
between the four categories. This was something that is particularly interesting in the 
context of research on neighbourhood policing. As the high turnover of police officers 
continues, the researcher may need to `re-negotiate' their access to a neighbourhood. 
This may be as simple as saying `I've been here since the last officer was here, nice to 
meet you' and carrying on. Or it may be more complicated. In one NAG, a 
neighbourhood officer was quite wary of allowing me to attend the meetings because 
he was worried that it would increase his personal workload. Once it was made clear 
that I would only be observing and would have negligible impact on his day-to-day 
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work life he was happy for me to attend. With every new neighbourhood police 
officer, comes a renewal of the need to build trust and at the very least re-state, if not 
completely re-negotiate, the access. 
Such re-negotiation involves re-building trust with individual officers. In many cases 
with NAGs the other agency staff were more consistently present at the meetings and 
so very little needed to be done to build further trust with them. With police officers, 
who were changing relatively regularly, there was a need to be re-building the trust, 
almost from the start. However, I did have some advantages in that I was co-funded 
by the police, had the senior officer's approval and I also benefited from the fact that I 
fitted in to the NAG meetings already to some extent. So maintaining ongoing access 
to the meetings was a relatively straightforward process. 
In the planning phase of the research I had to decide on which neighbourhoods I was 
going to study and how I was going to study them. So I arranged a meeting with the 
appropriate officer who was organizing the roll-out of neighbourhood policing in the 
BCU to discuss where they were and how it was best to study them. At this meeting I 
also met the coordinator of the local community safety partnership who turned out to 
be an essential point of access to the NAGs. She was able to assume this so-called 
`gatekeeper' role because she was effectively running the BCU's process of initiating 
NAGs. She was helpful, efficient and professional and this made the access process 
very straightforward. Between the coordinator and the police officer I was provided 
with statistics and informal information about the progress of each of the NAGs and 
this allowed me to chose the two neighbourhoods for the case study. The coordinator 
had a huge amount of control over how the NAGs were operated and it was through 
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her that I was able to find out when and where they were taking place and to be 
introduced to the appropriate officers and chairs. If she had been remotely obstructive 
or difficult, access to the NAGs studied would have been substantially more 
troublesome. 
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General Problems with Ethnographies of the Police 
Perhaps the greatest problem of the ethnographic method is maintaining a balance 
between the participant and the observer. On the one hand the ethnographer is 
attempting to become as involved as possible in the research, to understand the 
perspective of the subjects as fully as possible and to use that understanding to draw 
out as rich a qualitative data set as possible. Yet, the ethnographer is also trying to 
bring a critical eye to the project. There is nothing to be gained if a researcher merely 
becomes a member of the group researched, subsumes their perspectives and then 
describes their positions. The ethnographer in that scenario has merely become a 
member of the group that is being studied and no longer sustains that academic 
distance. So, while it is useful to become a participant to try and understand the 
experience of the group's members, the researcher needs to maintain a critical 
distance in order to locate that experience within a wider framework, whether that 
framework is theoretical, cultural, political, geographical, social or ecological. 
The risks of going too far in one direction or the other arc relatively obvious. If a 
researcher becomes to close to their subject, they run the risk of `going native'. This is 
a notion that harks back to ethnography's roots in Nineteenth Century anthropology, 
which focused to a large part on the study of foreign cultures. `Going native' in that 
sense is clearly a statement that an anthropologist has lost their academic distance and 
has become clearly entwined in the fabric of the local society, perhaps formally by 
marriage, or simply through becoming a regular member of the community due to the 
length of time that the researcher stays with the group being studied. Although `going 
native' is usually more of a statement about how the academic's external perspective 
has been eroded, rather than the length of time they've spent in the field per sc. In the 
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context of policing, `going native' is a risk because it could be quite easy to become 
completely partial to the attitudes of those whom the researcher meets in the field, 
simply due to a prolonged period of exposure to their experiences, or through a lack 
of academic rigour in analyzing data that is produced (and the notion of data here is 
taken as being a very broad brush sense of the word, including everything police 
officers and other research subjects are observed saying or doing in the course of the 
research). If a police researcher has `gone native', there is every chance that their 
work will merely produce a replication of the `party line' or a restatement of 
administrative policy or simply the singular perspective of the research subject the 
researcher has had the most exposure to (Westmarland, 2001 a: 9). 
On the other hand, if too rigorous an objectivity is maintained, there is the opposite 
risk of not gaining any data that allows for any insight into the subject's perspectives. 
For example, an academically distant observer may never understand why a subject is 
acting in a particular way or why a particular event is perceived by a group to be of 
significance. Such research will tend towards being too speculative if it tries to 
describe personal motivations without understanding the individual lived experience, 
or even too quantitative if it merely counts the regularity of an occurrence. In the 
context of ethnographies of policing, this sort of distance can undermine the quality of 
the data collected. Perhaps by police officers not wanting to be observed or by being 
wary of engaging with researchers, it can be possible for a researcher to become 
distant from the subject of the research and become removed into a primarily 
theoretical perspective on their research. 
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This balance between the subjective participant and the objective observer is at the 
heart of the creative tension in any ethnography and it was certainly present in the 
instant research. Taking the NAG as the central focus of the study has some 
advantages in reducing the problems caused by the participant-observer tension. 
Attending NAG meetings allows the researcher to formally state who they arc, thus 
ensuring that everybody present knows they are the subject of research. It also allows 
the researcher to state that they are merely an `observer', thus establishing that they 
are not there to contribute tangible pieces of work or to assist in defining what the 
problems facing a neighbourhood are. The formal environment of a meeting with 
minutes, attendance, and a chair, allows the researcher to be in attendance, hear 
everything that all participants hear, and yet maintain a clear distance from the 
participants when it comes to analyzing their arguments and approaches. The 
researcher is not heard or involved in the meeting itself. 
It is tempting to say that this clear observer status while in attendance at the meeting 
means that there is no impact on the subjects from the observer's presence. However, 
this is not necessarily the case. This can be seen from one instance when observing a 
Joint Tactics and Tasking Committee meeting (sec chapter 7). On balance, it seems 
likely that the impact of the observer on the subject of the observations in this 
research is probably very minimal, it is always worth remembering that all those who 
attended NAGs (except perhaps for late attendees or those who did not show up 
regularly) are aware of the researcher's presence and this can have an impact. This is 
what is known as the `Hawthorne effect' (Scott and Marshall, 2005: 261). It is 
inherently present in any ethnography of the police and indeed, by the very nature of 
the work of police officers, it would be almost unimaginable to be able to create a 
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scenario where this were not the case or where any form of experimental closure 
could be created (Redman, 2005: 11), and certainly any such an experiment is likely 
to raise serious ethical concerns. 
Ethical Concerns 
Any research conducted into the social world will have ethical implications insofar as 
the compilation of knowledge will have some impact on those who are being studied. 
For example an interviewer asking questions about `quality of life' could raise the 
hope in the interviewee that their questioning will result in the implementation of 
some sort of programme to increase or improve the quality of life in some way 
(Rapley, 2003). The same expectation can occur with policing researchers. I spoke to 
an officer during my research who had been working in one of the pilot areas for the 
NRPP. He said that the pilot had been a huge success, but when the pilot ended and 
the process returned to what had previously been `normal' policing, many residents 
felt that they had lost out. Their expectations had been raised. They felt they had been 
receiving what they considered a better style of policing and now, as the research 
study ended, they felt that it was being taken away from them. Any research can raise 
expectations or create suspicions and the researcher has to be careful when conducting 
the research. 
The most important ethical considerations in this research relate to the research 
subject's understanding of the ethnography and interview process as well as the 
question of conducting research that is co-funded by the police. In dealing with the 
former concern, the approach taken was one of maximum trasnsparcncy. Everybody 
that I spoke to or interviewed was told that I was conducting research for the OU and 
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TVP. Before formal interviews it was made clear to the interviewees that their 
identities would be kept anonymous and that they did not need to answer any 
questions that they were uncomfortable with and could point to the recorder if they 
wanted to stop the interview at any time. Police officers were generally unconcerned 
about being anonymized and indeed one officer jokingly said he was `glad to hear I'm 
not being interviewed under caution'. Although another said he felt the police were 
`more used to asking the questions'. During meetings I introduced myself as an OU 
researcher and made it clear that I was not a participant in the meeting. With these 
approaches to interviews and observation it is hoped that all participants in the 
research understood what was happening at all times. The application of these 
approaches has received ethical approval from the OU's Human Participants and 
Materials Ethics Committee. 
The final ethical consideration to be discussed is the question of funding and its 
implications for academic research. Academic research is not a cheap undertaking in 
any discipline and although research projects in the social sciences appear to be less 
expensive than some of the lavish projects of the natural sciences, criminological 
research always comes at a price. Some researchers conduct work of a large scale on 
substantial budgets, and this is particularly the case for some of the classic 
quantitative studies in the history of criminology. Farrington's longitudinal study of 
young men in North London is a good example of such large scale and expensive 
work (Farrington, 2002). Other researchers have produced exceptional work on low 
budgets. A good example is Munro's work on trafficking of women for prostitution 
which looked at police responses to trafficking in the UK, Australia, Holland, Sweden 
and Italy. The research was conducted on a small grant from the Nuffield Foundation 
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(Munro, 2006: 322). Whilst such research is conducted on a small budget, it is 
nonetheless conducted on a budget. Somebody or some entity, somewhere pays 
something for some knowledge. That is an almost inescapable fact when it comes to 
doing research. 
Like virtually all forms of payment, something is demanded in return. In the case of 
foundations or research councils, methodological rigor may allow the researcher a 
wide degree of academic freedom. Researchers may alternatively be able to fit their 
research around their working schedules and be largely free of financial constraints. 
However, for a large body of research there is a benefactor or patron. The motivation 
of that patron in funding the research may range from an altruistic support of 
academic research, to a statutory requirement to conduct an evaluation, to the extreme 
example of research conducted in order to support a particular ideological position. 
Whatever the motivation for funding research, the patron, like the artists' patrons of 
the Renaissance, hope to gain something from the research. This can lead to attempts 
to influence the way findings are published or even efforts to prevent them being 
published at all. This is famously the case in the pharmaceuticals industry where 
research is funded by transnational corporations with a vested interest in the outcomes 
of research (Angell, 2004,2005). However, the influence of patrons extends well into 
the field of criminology. In a sphere as politicized as crime and justice (Cohen, 1996; 
Downes and Morgan, 2002), the accumulation and use of knowledge provides an 
opportunity to strengthen arguments and entrench political positions. For this reason, 
transparency about funding is an important aspect of a report on research. 
This research has been partially funded by the Thames Valley Police which is the 
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constabulary which has jurisdiction over the areas where the research was conducted. 
This funding relationship has advantages and disadvantages. The clear advantage is 
that because the force is funding the research they arc very helpful with access. This 
has been immensely helpful in allowing me to navigate the questions that arise from 
studying neighbourhood policing. The disadvantages have not been as substantial as 
might have been expected. The police have not been interested in seeing any interim 
reports, other than meeting some senior officers and discussing their work. Working 
on a three year research project has meant that I have been chipping away at the 
question of neighbourhood policing when officers have been appointed to work in 
neighbourhoods related to the research and then promoted or moved to other positions 
within the force. This movement of staff within the police allows for variation within 
the careers of officers, but it is the perennial problem of establishing ties between 
police officers and neighbourhood; police officers are not on the ground long enough 
to get to know the area. For the purposes of this research, such constant change seems 
to have provided the opportunity to work away without interference from the police. 
Officers are largely too busy to be concerned with the research, although any that 
were approached were exceptionally helpful. Abstraction and workload have meant 
that although the police part-funded the research, and have an interest in its outcome, 
they have left me to conduct it in a manner of my own choosing. The only thing that I 
was ever asked to do by an officer was give some feedback on community perceptions 
of the force as part of a report prepared for IIMIC. 
Perhaps this is a relatively predictable outcome. A new and untried programme such 
as neighbourhood policing is not a particularly contentious area of research. It is not 
as challenging of police `culture' and norms as research into gender and policing 
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(Westmarland, 2001a), police responses to terrorism (Brodeur, 1983; Mythen and 
Walklate, 2006), public order (Waddington, 2007), domestic violence (Stanko, 1985 
[2002]; Morash and Robinson, 2002), race relations (Bowling and Phillips, 2003), or 
police corruption (Westmarland, 2001b, 2005). Neighbourhood policing is often 
considered a `soft' form of policing. It is an area that the police arc just getting to 
grips with themselves and so have not yet had the chance to develop an entrenched 
interest in how it should be operated. Thus it seems they have less to fear from a 
researcher studying neighbourhood policing than one working on other forms of 
police research. 
Conclusion 
Conducting research on neighbourhood policing is an endeavour fraught with 
difficulties. This is for a number of reasons, which were discussed in greater depth in 
the first two chapters. Firstly, the field or habitus in which neighbourhood policing is 
played out or applied is an exceptionally subjective environment. The policy debates 
around the meanings of notions such as `crime', `community', `anti-social behaviour' 
and `policing' are complicated and illustrate the vast variety of uses to which such 
terms can be put. Yet the practical day-to-day application (as shall be seen in later 
chapters) carries on, assuming that all those who are participants in the 
neighbourhood policing partnership agree on what those concepts mean. This 
subjectivity means that many who come to work on the project will have different 
ideas about what they want from the experience. Some will want a reduction in 
`crime', perhaps from their business or home, or damage to their agency's property. 
Others will want to reduce their own experiences of `fear of crime' and wish to feel 
safe. Others will want to find a parking space or have dog mess cleared up promptly. 
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Police officers may want to gather intelligence on potential terrorists or they may 
simply want to tick the box of `involvement in neighbourhood policing' on their CV. 
There is a veritable potpourri of possibilities for neighbourhood policing, depending 
on one's perspective. This variety inherently means that there is a wide diversity of 
ways in which neighbourhood policing can be researched or evaluated, depending on 
which of the possibilities the evaluator or researcher considers to be most important. 
There is also an equally wide variety of ways in which neighbourhood policing can be 
deemed a success or a failure. 
While there has been some critical and theoretical work on community policing, the 
bulk of the research that has been carried out has been evaluative. Some research was 
involved in the early days of designing community policing as an innovative strategy 
of improvement. Policing was facing problems as research was finding that it was not 
as effective in fighting crime as was traditionally held to be the case. However most 
research on community policing has tended to make efforts to analyse if the 
application of community policing has had any effect, and if so, whether the effect 
was positive or negative. This has usually focused on crime levels, but some studies 
have looked at fear of crime and value for money as well. Evaluative research can be 
a dangerous business if it focuses too much on the intervention and outcome without 
looking into `how' the outcome came about. Many studies, particularly those 
conducted by government agencies and administrative criminologists have focused on 
value for money and attempts to bring about reductions in crime and increases in 
public satisfaction with the police in the cheapest way possible. Yet every crime 
reduction intervention is a victim of its circumstances and in order for `transportable' 
(or `transposable') lessons to be learnt, the context in which the intervention takes 
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place must be understood. Virtually no intervention works in all situations. It is the 
detailed description and understanding of why, where and for whom an intervention 
works that will produce the greatest understanding of how to apply the myriad of 
possible resources used by neighbourhood policing to the equally complicated sct of 
possible environments in which it has to operate. 
This disconnect between the critical or theoretical academic perspective on evaluation 
and the administrative approach begs the question, `how useful is academic research 
in informing policy debates? ' The next question might then be `how often is academic 
research actually used in policy formation? ' The dichotomy between the two 
approaches to research, categorized as part of the contradictory phase of police 
research (discussed earlier in this chapter), is one which police researchers and 
criminologists must grapple with when conducting their work. Who is its audience? Is 
it enough to produce critical works that provide insights into the criminal justice 
system but are completely ignored by the administrators who could `benefit' most 
from them? If not, is the most `worthwhile' research that which has a tangible policy 
impact? Sometimes it may seem to the academic criminologist that they arc speaking 
an almost entirely different language to the formulators of policy. A language which 
appears to belie an unconventional way of thinking in an exotic culture (Canter, 
2004). 
While the current research does not provide concrete answers to these difficult 
questions, it does raise interesting questions about the role of inside outsider and 
outside outsider research in policing. This research has attempted to grapple with the 
problems described in this chapter by taking a mixed method approach to two case 
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study neighbourhoods. By conducting an cthnography of the NAGs in each 
neighbourhood and attempting to triangulate the data found using interviews with a 
wide range of stakeholders and supplementing it with the police's own research on the 
areas, it is hoped that the picture painted can be useful in describing the `how' in 
addition to the `how well' of the neighbourhood policing in the case study areas. This 
is in spite of the fact that conducting research on neighbourhood policing often makes 
the researcher feel like they are trying to build a research project in epistemological 
quicksand. 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study of Neighbhourhood B- Public Consultation and the 
Construction of the NAG 
This is the first of two case-study chapters which describe the data collected in the 
ethnographical component of the research. The NAG at Neighbourhood B was formed 
much later than that at Neighbourhood A, and as a result the observations in 
Neighbourhood A produced data on the later part of the roll-out process. By the time 
observations began there, the priority problems had been established and interventions 
were beginning to be implemented to try to solve or ameliorate them. In Neighbourhood B 
however, the observations date right from the start of the roll-out process. Thus they 
include the initial consultations between the police, agencies and members of the public in 
Neighbourhood B. For that reason, Neighbourhood B is described first, as it was observed 
at a `younger' period in its development, including the initial public meetings, the 
formation of the NAG and some of the early efforts made to apply procedures such as the 
Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) and the Scanning Analysis Response Assessment 
(SARA) method to the problems that were prioritized. 
In the plan produced by the TVP for rolling out the implementation of neighbourhood 
policing in the BCU where this research took place, each neighbourhood was given one of 
three grades: Priority Neighbourhood (P) which needed a higher level of resources; 
Enhanced Neighbourhood (E) whch needed a medium level of resources; and Capable 
Neighbourhoods (C) which needed a lower level of resources. According to the TVP's 
definition; 
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The category of each Neighbourhood is calculated by a formula incorporating 
levels of crimes and incidents, including by head of population, and index of 
deprivation. By use of this formula, a comparative score is resulted, allowing 
for the determination of a score to allocate resources from all agencies 
involved. 
Neighbourhood B was given a score of 10 and a grade of P while Neighbourhood A was 
given a score of 11, which was the second highest score received by any neighbourhood in 
the BCU and was thus given a grade of P. Neighbourhood C, the other pilot area scored 5, 
which made it the second lowest score and gave it a grade of C. 
The pilot rollout of the neighbourhood policing model in Neighbourhoods A and C began 
in April 2005. The next neighbourhood roll out (which included Neighbourhood B) did not 
begin until September 2006 and the rollout of the final neighbourhood was completed in 
February 2008. 
The chapter shows concrete examples of police, residents and other partners working 
within the complex subjectivities which have been discussed in chapters 1 and 2. The 
subjectivitics of definitions of `crime', `neighbourhood', 'anti-social behaviour' and 
`community' form the lived experience in which the NAG must operate and work on its 
priority problems. Deciding to prioritize a set of problems is an inherently political process 
which can lead to decisions being made on how to utilize scarce police and partner 
resources within the neighbourhood. How to include the views of those who arc less vocal, 
yet equally interested or affected by the problems in the neighbourhood is a difficult 
balancing act. One that police have largely been doing on their own as `street corner 
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politicians' (Muir, 1977) since time immemorial. The process of balancing it out in a 
formal manner, with public meetings and consultations with other stakeholders opens the 
process up to greater scrutiny and demonstrates the difficulties of getting that balance right 
in providing community safety `services' to the smorgasbord of potential community 
safety `consumers'. 
If one attempts to look at a NAG as a node of security governance, this chapter is useful in 
providing evidence of how the initial aims of the node are constructed and how this affects 
the development of interventions to try and achieve those aims. The process of 
consultation is a political one and the node itself is a political forum for some of its 
members, albeit politics with something of a small `p'. How a node decides on what it is 
about will naturally have a major impact on how it tries to operate. This chapter draws on 
the ethnographic data to describe the development of the NAG in Neighbourhood B as a 
node of security governance, and discusses some of the problems it faces in getting up and 
running. 
Neighbourhood B 
Neighbourhood B is a conglomeration of two distinct areas with two distinct central focal 
points: Omega Town and Gamma Town. The two areas arc separated by a substantial road 
and crossings between the two can be made on foot using a number of subways. 
Omega Town is substantially bigger than Gamma Town and has less housing that was built 
by the local council. It is a Victorian town and still has many buildings from the era, and 
the accompanying small streets. There is a central square with a small modern shopping 
centre and a number of shops and pubs within the central area. Gamma Town on the other 
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hand has substantially more council built housing and a much smaller central focal point, 
which comprises of a small number of shops, a school and a family centre. 
The two areas have a separate and distinct local identity and this has sometimes led to a 
situation where the work of the NAGs has felt separated in its focus. In the process of 
rolling out neighbourhood policing, the police have had to consider where to draw the 
boundaries of any individual neighbourhood. As discussed in chapter 1, the division of any 
urban area into neighbourhoods and finding appropriate areas of `commonality' can be 
fraught with difficulty. In the case of Neighbourhood B, the problem, if it is sufficiently 
serious to be called a `problem', is that the designation of the area into a neighbourhood 
has included two distinct and different areas of commonality. Thus it is not a case of a 
disparate community being broken up, or a neighbourhood being contrived artificially 
from within a wider pluralist whole. In the case of Neighbourhood B the difficulty is that 
within the boundaries of the neighbourhood, lie two distinct neighbourhoods with different 
problems and different needs. These differences became clear when the process of 
problem-defining begins in earnest. It became clear at the first public meeting that the 
problems selected by residents in each section of Neighbourhood B were specific to their 
local needs. For example those in Gamma Town identified anti-social behaviour around 
their local shops as being the most significant problems, while those in Omega Town felt 
that issues relating to traffic, such as speeding and parking were more of a problem. By 
virtue of this divide in how local priorities arose, the police arc somewhat hamstrung by 
the aspirations of neighbourhood policing to provide a local service to local 
neighbourhoods. At some stage on the road to providing a bespoke policing service at a 
neighbourhood level, there comes a point where the police have to say, `that is too small an 
area to be practially considered a neighbourhood'. Thus, due to the practicalities of police 
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resourcing issues, Omega Town and Gamma Town are merged into one neighbourhood, 
when they could easily be considered to be two distinct neighbourhoods in their own right. 
This is a good example of a situation where the police have to work with what they arc 
given. They are not `making-up' neighbourhoods, but working with what they find on the 
ground, difficult as that may be. 
The discussions that follow in this chapter are based on the process of rolling out the 
problem-solving process and establishing the NAG in the neighbourhood. This is the early 
phase of the development of problem solving in any neighbourhood. In contrast to 
Neighbourhood A, which was one of two pilot neighbourhoods for the establishment of 
NAGs, when this research was conducted, the NAG was not yet established. Thus, 
problems had not yet been defined and the tools of problem-solving were only being taken 
from the metaphorical toolbox during the research period. The focus of the research in 
Neighbourhood B is therefore on the earlier part of the process of developing a NAG and a 
problem-solving agenda. Whereas the research on Neighbourhood A is on the work of an 
older, more established NAG and how it works towards problem-solving. 
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The process of problem-defining in Neighbourhood 13 
One advantage of studying Neighbourhood I3 was that neighbourhood policing had not yet 
been rolled out when the research began, unlike in Neighbourhood A which had been a 
pilot neighbourhood for the force and had an established NAG when the research started. 
Thus the two neighbourhoods are at different stages in their development of the problem- 
solving process. 
1. First Public Mecting 
The first formal engagement with the `community' in Neighbourhood B took place with a 
public meeting in the school in Omega Town, the older part of the neighbourhood. The 
meeting was widely advertised by the TVP, over 500 flyers had been delivered to houses 
in the area and a local radio station mentioned the event throughout the day. Despite this 
effort on the part of the organizers, the public turnout for the event was poor. When the 
panel, police officers and PCSOs, organizers and observers were factored out, there were 
nine local residents in attendance, including only one person of a visible ethnic minority. 
Residents were outnumbered by organizers as there were 4 PCs, 2 PCSOs, a councillor, a 
representative of the community safety partnership, a council officer and two observers. 
When I spoke to the organizers at the event, they said they felt a sense of disappointment 
that such a small group of people had shown up. There was also a scnsc of resignation as 
they had, they felt, done all they could to try to drum up attendance at the meeting. 
As people arrived at the venue, they were given some small circular stickers to place on a 
map of Neighbourhood B to indicate where they saw the problems appearing in their area. 
This map was later to be used by the NAG as a point of reference and also in the faciliation 
process that took place later in the public meeting itself. 
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The meeting began with an introduction from the neighbourhood inspector who described 
what neighbourhood policing was and what it was supposed to do. 'We arc not here to 
provide each community with a "Dixon of Dock Green"' he said. This was followed by a 
set of short talks from representatives of the local community safety partnership, an officer 
from the council and a councillor. Each explained their roles and their commitment to the 
process. The local ward councillor (one of three for the area) began by saying that she did 
not understand the process of neighbourhood policing or problem solving. She then went 
on to state that solving these problems was a long road and that everyone had to work 
together to do it. She finished by pointing out that 'the police cannot be everywhere at all 
times'. 
After the panelists had spoken, a facilitator from TVP Headquarters began a group session 
on what problems affect the quality of life of residents in Neighbourhood B. The first part 
of this session was a form of brainstorming whereby residents called out the issues that 
caused them concern. With the assistance of the facilitator, they began with a broad brush 
description of what their problem was or is and then worked down to a more detailed 
description of what it is, where it is, and when it is. The facilitator worked on large white 
sheets which could be removed from the board and hung on the walls of the room at the 
end of the brainstorming session. Then residents would be given three stickers to prioritise 
their problems, in a form of voting. According to the slides from the presentation given by 
the representative of the community safety partnership, a red sticker would mean `Top 
priority -3 points', an orange sticker means `2nd priority -2 points' and a green sticker 
means `3rd priority -1 point'. The problems which accrued the most points were to 
develop into the priority problems for the nascent NAG to deal with. As a result of the 
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brainstorming process, three issues that were raised as the main problems by those in 
attendance were: parking, vandalism and `anti-social behaviour and young people hanging 
around'. 
Parking 
The first issue raised was that of parking. The man who raised it was deeply concerned 
with the problem of parking in the area. I met him as I was coming to the meeting and had 
stopped to ask him directions to the venue. We struck up a conversation about the meeting 
and what he hoped to gain from it as we walked to the venue. It was clear that his only 
concern was with parking in the area and that he felt nothing was being done about it 
despite his opinion that this was a serious problem and a great impingement on his quality 
of life. Upon arrival he took as many circular stickers that corresponded with parking 
problems and stuck them all over the map of the area where he thought there were parking 
problems. During the brainstorming, he raised the problem of parking. When asked to be 
more specific, he said `on double yellow lines and on corners. When further asked where it 
was a problem, he said `the whole of Omega Town', but refused to give any specific 
locations. He appeared disappointed when other residents did not weigh in with him and 
describe their problems with parking. In the final count of priorities, he stuck all three of 
his stickers beside the problem of parking, and paid no attention to any other problems 
raised at the meeting. In a small meeting such as this, the determined attention of one 
concerned citizen may have the effect of skewing a vote for priorities. (His six points are 
over 10% of the total points available at a poorly attended meeting. ) It was apparent that 
manipulating the outcome of the process to favour his pet problem was what he hoped to 
achieve from the meeting. 
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Vandalism 
After the question of parking had been addressed, the next problem was vandalism. 
Residents said that thousands of pounds of damage was done in the area. In one particular 
block of flats lights were smashed, ceilings were damaged, wiring was pulled out of 
buildings, walls were soiled with urine and windows inside and outside the block were 
broken. In contrast to the problem of parking, the residents were able to give details of the 
exact location of where this had happened. When questioned by the police facilitator, they 
were able to say that the damage is generally caused at about 2000-2230 on Fridays, but is 
also bad on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays as well. 
Similarly, other areas in Omega Town were singled out as suffering from vandalism. The 
sports club suffered damage to outdoor furniture after dark and at weekends. The main 
street also suffered from vandalism at similar times. People leaving one of the public 
houses in Omega Town and walking out of town were reported to be scratching cars and 
bouncing on the bonnets of the cars. Finally, a piece of parkland near the town was 
described as the site of vandalism, fires and damage to property, although no specific time 
could be given. 
Anti-Social Behaviour and Young People Hanging Around 
The next issue that was raised by the participants at the public meeting concerned the 
interrelated problems of anti-social behaviour and `young people hanging around'. Anti- 
social behaviour was described as including teenagers damaging cars, and `name calling' 
as well as the use of mini-motos and mopeds, which residents felt were frightening for 
children. No times or specific locations were given to describe these activities and to a 
large extent the concept of anti-social behaviour appeared to encompass problems 
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associated with young people in general rather than any specific instances of problems, 
problem locations or problem people. 
The problem of young people hanging around was a concern to some of the participants. 
Young people hang around outside shops and in the parkland, drinking alcohol. However, 
one resident did point out that she felt somewhat conflicted when she was intimidated by 
the young people, as they were in fact doing nothing wrong and there was nothing for them 
to do. Their actual behaviour was not meant to intimidate people who were passing or also 
using the public spaces. For this problem, residents were able to give specific locations and 
times which the young people congregated. 
Speeding and Abandoned Cars 
The next two problems defined by residents were both related to the (mis)use of cars in the 
neighbourhood. Speeding was identified as a problem. Three streets in particular were 
mentioned. Residents also mentioned cars being abandoned on the parkland and speculated 
that they may be there as a result of joy-riding. 
Police Feedback 
An interesting issue that was raised as a problem by the residents at the meeting related to 
the lack of response complainants received from the police when they made a complaint. 
After giving information to the police some residents felt forgotten when they never found 
out if the perpetrator had been caught, convicted, cautioned, charged or ignored. This 
problem is unique among the set of problems defined by those in attendance in that it is a 
problem with police service provision rather than a problem with crime, anti-social 
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behaviour or quality of life issues, which are normally the remit of the problem-solving 
process. 
When the brainstorming component of the evening was completed, the residents in 
attendance were allowed vote by placing stickers against the problems listed. The 
organizers were not entitled to a vote, or as the facilitator lightheartedly put it, `nobody on 
the dark side gets a vote'. The result of the vote was: 
1. Vandalism; 
2. Anti-social behaviour - particularly teenagers and young people; and 
3. Police feedback. 
The NAG process had been explained to the gathering by the representative of the 
community safety partnership and it was announced that they hoped to get the NAG up 
and running within a month. This would begin with a pre-NAG meeting to introduce 
interested parties to the process and then be followed up with a full formal 
NAG meeting soon thereafter. 
The public meeting had decided its priority issues, but as the representative of the 
community safety partnership had pointed out in her talk, prioritizing one set of issues 
does not mean ignoring other issues and so the target problems to be set for the NAG 
would not come solely from this public consultation meeting. A questionnaire had been 
sent to other stakeholders such as local businesses and other organizations, whose views 
were also to be taken into consideration. The vote at the public meeting was not in itself a 
final determination of what problems the public wanted solved. 
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Before the meeting drew to a close one resident had a question for the police. `Do the 
police actually know how to solve vandalism, or is this just simply a brainstorming 
exercise? ' To which the facilitator responded that the answer was `both'. There arc, he 
said, things that can be done, particularly in working with partners to reduce vandalism. 
Anti-social behaviour on the other hand can be more of a seasonal issue and can have 
different responses at different times of year. The answer was vague, and did not give 
specific examples of what can or should be done to combat vandalism. This may have been 
to prevent committing the police to taking actions which may not be warranted by the 
actual situation in Neighbourhood B, or simply because the officer felt that there was a 
certain inevitability to many of the problems and a certain futility to many of the 
responses. 
2. The Pre-NAG Meeting in Neighbourhood B 
At the end of the public meeting in Omega Town in Neighbourhood B, the date was set for 
the next phase, the pre-NAG meeting. This meeting is for people who may be interested in 
joining the NAG to come along and see what is involved and decide if they wish to 
become a member. The meeting was to be held 10 days later, again in Omega Town, at a 
local Christian centre. The meeting was to outline the purpose of the NAG and to describe 
how the problem-solving process itself was supposed to work. 
The meeting began with a presentation on problem-solving delivered by the Safer 
Neighbourhood Project Manager from the local community safety parthership. This 
presentation used the standard problem-solving approaches (discussed above, Chapter 2) 
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of Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment (SARA) and the Problem Analysis Triangle 
(PAT). 
The meeting did not engage with the question of how to solve the problems particular to 
Neighbourhood B, but worked more on setting out the process. In essence, the presentation 
was more procedural than substantive. Each problem according to the logic of the PAT 
needs a location, an offender and a victim. According to materials on the PAT provided to 
the pre-NAG meeting; `If one or more of these elements do not occur, then a crime cannot 
be committed. ' This is a contentious proposition as there are numerous victimless crimes 
such as recreational drug use which would only require the latter two comers of the 
triangle for an offence to be committed. However, this simple analysis of victimhood has 
been criticised and there is some debate as to the extent to which such crimes can be 
considered `victimless' (Hoyle and Zedner, 2007). Although the literature is wide and 
detailed, it is perhaps only necessary to outline some of the ideas briefly here and explain 
why the notion of the `victimless' crime is not entirely relevant in this context. In the case 
of the problems defined within the framework of neighbourhood policing, the notion of 
victimhood has been broadly conceived. The definitional looseness of concepts such as 
community, neighbourhood, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, makes it possible for 
virtuallly anybody to consider themselves a victim of many of the problems described in a 
neighbourhood. The victimization associated with littering, vandalism, graffitti and dog- 
mess is spread across all users of any area (including the perpetrator). Thus, if one takes a 
broad conception of who the victim is, there are few crimes that can be considered 
victimless, and those that are will probably be unlikely to be reported to the police or 
raised at a NAG. 
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When one of the corners of the triangle is removed, the problem should evaporate or 
change substantially. During the presentation, the three corners were provided with a word 
associated with the type of intervention that could work to help eliminate that corner. 
Diversion might remove offenders, protection may prevent a location being used and 
support could help victims or potential victims to avoid future victimization. Each of these 
concepts resonates with a tricky body of criminological debate. The concept of diversion 
of potential offenders (especially young people) brings into light the debates around early 
intervention and the problems of socialization of young people in society generally and the 
question of how youths, for example, can be diverted from criminal or anti-social 
behaviour has been debated substantially (Muncie, 1999 [2002]). The other two 
approaches to removing a corner of the triangle invoke concepts of responsibilization 
(discussed above, Chapter 1) with its implicit admission that the state has failed to provide 
the security that it has promised. Thus it is up to the individual (or corporate body, 
including agents of the state such as local councils) to eliminate the corners of the PAT 
which they have control over. They should do this by being less likely to become a victim 
(albeit doing so perhaps with the support of the state through the NAG) or by protecting 
the location from being used for committing crimes or partaking in anti-social behaviour. 
The protection of the location invokes an attempt at `target-hardening' (Hughes, 2006b: 
18) and other forms of `situational crime prevention' (Clarke, 1980). One could take each 
response to each corner of the PAT and interrogate its evidential base in great detail. 
However for the practical purposes of the NAG, no such interrogation takes place. The 
PAT is used as a conceptual device for analysing problems and attempting to draw out the 
constituent parts of a given problem. 
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The second technique used is the SARA technique. The four parts of the technique were 
outlined to the attendees. The scanning process includes environmental visual audits 
(EVAs), which the TVP had already begun to carry out. It also includes gathering other 
evidence of problems, such as reports to police about occurrances of the problem or 
residents' keeping a log of such occurrances to provide a more evidence based description 
of the problem with which to work. Each NAG is given its own digital camera for use on 
EVAs and gathering other evidence about the existence of problems. The analysis 
component means that the NAG needs to gather evidence in order to respond to problems. 
The responses that the NAG then decides upon will then be based on what can be elicited 
from a `Board Blast'. This is a form of facilitated brainstorming session that will provide a 
set of options for action, which can then be applied once the NAG has evaluated their 
options and chosen the most appropriate response for the problem and for their 
neighbourhood. The NAG needs to record the response it implements before it carries out 
the final part of the project, assessment. The final phase is a form of evaluation of the 
process. The materials provided with the presentation describe it thus: `The assessment is a 
crucial part of the process and may be used for future profiles on this problem or other 
similar problems. The method of measuring success should have been considered and 
recorded at the response ... stage. ' 
It is important to see the internal checks and procedures contained within the SARA 
system as proposed here. The two major procedural steps are; (a) evidence must be 
gathered to establish that there is a problem, and (b) the description of what is a successful 
outcome, or at least how to evaluate an outcome, must be decided when the NAG is 
deciding the response. These two steps may not sound like much, but they are the essential 
backbone of the SARA process. Both provide a mechanism to guard against subjective 
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perception clouding the problem-solving process and hindering any progress. If you allow 
a problem to be defined without evidence, you run the risk of at best wasting police and 
agency resources, and at worst targetting groups who are not causing any problems at all, 
solely because somebody has decided that they perceive a problem. In the assessment 
stage, there is also the possibility that if the NAG does not decide beforehand what is a 
successful outcome, but merely looks back on the state of the problem at some point in the 
future, there is the risk of either feeling that no progress has been made or of looking at it 
again with rose-tinted glasses. Realistic targets and measurable outcomes arc thus a useful 
way to prevent people saying at the end of the process that no progress has been made or 
that the NAG has done nothing. However, there is also the risk with such an approach that 
only quantitative evidence such as crime reported to the police will be considered the 
benchmark. Although there is no obligation on the NAG to use such measures and it is free 
to use any measure it wishes to evaluate its progress. 
The presenter was unambiguous in pointing out that the NAG has to be clear about what 
success is. Can a reduction in the impact of the problem suffice, or perhaps a re-alignment 
of the perception of the problem on behalf of those who are concerned about it? Few 
problems can be entirely eradicated. The question of evaluation is one that must be decided 
carefully and realistically before the response is initiated. `There will not', the presenter 
pointed out, `always be quick wins. Some issues are much more complex and long term. ' 
The next issue for the pre-NAG meeting was the question of forming a constitution for the 
NAG. There is a model constitution provided, but each NAG is entitled to formulate its 
own version of the constitution to suit its own needs which may be peculiar to a particular 
neighbourhood or member. The constitution is signed by each member who agrees to abide 
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by its principles. It is put in place to try to prevent people coming along to a NAG meeting 
with their own agenda and to try to increase the accountability of the members for the 
actions of the NAG. The constitution did not have to be agreed at the pre-NAG meeting 
but it was felt that it was important to flag up the existence of the constitution to potential 
NAG members, who would be expected to abide by the conditions within the constitution. 
When running a meeting which is meant to give a flavour of the work of the NAG to 
potential members, it is important to discuss what is the ideal composition of the group. 
The issue of representativeness immediately arose. As the representative of the community 
safety partnership said, `we need a good representative sample of [Neighbourhood B]. If 
there were 30 people trying to get on the NAG and 6 were from a particular street, we 
would need to say no due to representativeness'. However, no mention was made of 
maximum size of the NAG or the maximum number of residents at the NAG. An attendee 
of the NAG said that the local Muslim community were very upset by dog-mess in the 
area, however nobody from the Muslim community was represented at the pre-NAG 
meeting. Indeed there were no attendees at any of the NAG meetings observed. The 
question of minority representativeness will be discussed further later on, because the 
NAG in Neighbourhood B had a problem engaging with the Muslim community. 
However, at the pre-NAG meeting, the question of representativeness was considered a 
risk in terms of over-representation of certain groups rather than under-representation. 
The meeting finished with a discussion of what was the best time and location to hold the 
first NAG. This mundane administrative question is in fact of more significance than it 
appears at first. The simple choice of evening versus daytime automatically precludes and 
includes a set group of people. Often, evenings better suit residents, while daytimes can 
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suit agency staff. However neither of these proved to be hard and fast rules. Some NAGs 
meet a week before local parish or town council meetings in order to try to effectively feed 
into the council meetings. Some NAGs meet during the daytime one month and in the 
evening the next. Others simply meet at the same time each month. The time is up to the 
NAG itself. The NAG decided on a Monday at fpm but did not agree that it would 
continue to be the same time each month. This was later to cause some headaches as 
agency staff find it easier to block off meetings in their diaries months in advance and 
subsequent NAG meetings at Neighbourhood B all ended with the difficult question of 
rescheduling for next month, and the inevitable loss of somebody present, who was unable 
to attend. When it came to choosing the location, things were a little easier although not 
without their complexities. There are two distinct parts of Neighbourhood B; Omega 
Town, where the public meeting and pre-NAG were held; and Gamma Town which had 
not yet held a meeting related to the NAG process. The next meeting was to be held in 
Gamma Town, with the venue to rotate on a monthly basis, depending on availability. A 
useful settlement for trying to bring both areas into the fold, if somewhat confusing and 
inconsistent for NAG members. The meeting's time was later confused somewhat, when, 
in an attempt to `connect with young people', a further consideration was to try to factor in 
the availability of a GCSE student who was keen to attend the NAG meetings. This raises 
some questions about how `inclusive' a NAG can be. In order to be inclusive and consider 
the input of as many potential stakeholders as possible, there is something of a fine 
balancing act required to gain maximum attendance. However, when it comes to 
scheduling, it seems likely that in many NAGs, as in Neighbourhood B, it may be 
impossible to please all of the people all of the time. 
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Defining Anti-Social Behaviour in Neighbourhood B 
Throughout the development of the NAG and the problem solving process in 
Neighbourhood B, attendances at NAGs have been relatively poor. Although 
Neighbourhood A has a longer established NAG, and indeed the two neighbourhoods were 
chosen to some extent because of their differences, the NAG at Neighbourhood B has had 
trouble sustaining interest among stakeholders. 
The December 2007 NAG was particularly poorly attended. Nine people showed up 
including myself (a non-participating observer), the facilitator from the Community Safety 
Partnership and a minute taker. Of the six remaining attendees, three were from the TVP, 
one was the local neighbourhood police officer, one was a trainee PCSO and the third was 
the most senior, an officer who had served several years with the force and who needed to 
gain neighbourhood policing experience in order to make the next step in his career. Both 
of the latter two officers were coming to the NAG to `see it in action'. The remaining three 
attendees were stakeholders from only one side of the neighbourhood (Omega Town). 
Gamma Town was not represented. 
What is clear from this example is that at this particular NAG meeting, one third of the 
attendees (this researcher and two police officers) were attending for the purposes of 
academic interest or vocational training and not because they had a stake in the 
neighbourhood or could contribute to the NAG's work. It is easy to be critical of a low 
attendance. However it is not the low attendance that is being discussed here, but the 
discussions of the meeting itself on the question of anti-social behaviour. It was, after all, 
two weeks before Christmas and attendances were generally reduced for evening meetings 
at this NAG. What is interesting is what happened at this meeting, one third of which was 
A 
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composed of police staff. Only one of whom was posted to the neighbourhood. For the 
purposes of this discussion the three officers will be called the `senior officer', the `junior 
officer' and the `PCSO' and it is the junior officer who is posted to Neighbourhood B. 
The meeting began with a brief discussion of the problems of moving forward the drive for 
a community clean up in Gamma Town which the council found to be generally tidy and 
the TVP were pleased with as there were no apparent 'crime-sprees'. Although the senior 
officer who pointed this out did mention that he felt the `kids' in Gamma Town `need 
smartening up'. Despite his lack of connection to the particular neighbourhood and his role 
as an observer in the NAG process, it became very clear early on in the meeting that the 
senior officer felt comfortable using the meeting as a forum within which he could be full 
and frank about his opinions of crime and policing. This is an interesting turn of events as 
throughout the police literature and training on the NAG process, it is clearly stated that 
the NAG is not a `talking shop'. There is a real wariness of letting residents or concerned 
groups take over the NAG and use it to highlight their issues or simply to vent. The NAG 
is not a public meeting, but one in which members must `buy-in' by signing the 
constitution and abide by the rules. In this case however, the senior officer, perhaps 
bolstered by the fact that the TVP accounted for one third of the meeting and he was the 
most senior TVP representative (although not a particularly senior police officer by rank), 
felt free to use the meeting in exactly such a fashion. 
The question of anti-social behaviour quickly arose in the meeting as it is one of the 
priority problems that had been decided on for the NAG in Neighbourhood B to work on. 
The junior officer was very quick to ask what was meant by anti-social behaviour and the 
senior officer began a discussion of the differences between crime and anti-social 
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behaviour. These differences made it difficult to use statistics to measure police 
effectiveness. The description of these differences which the police officer undertook was 
particularly trite and anyone remotely familiar with anti-social behaviour and the problems 
associated with it would understand these issues. This caused the facilitator from the 
Community Safety Partnership some understandable distress as the meeting began to get 
bogged down and there was a clash between the two on how relevant this discussion was. 
The facilitator was keen to move the discussion forward from an abstract discussion of 
anti-social behaviour to apply it practically to Neighbourhood B. This, she argued, was 
best done by defining anti-social behaviour and then gathering evidence of where it occurs 
in the neighbourhood. From there locations that suffer badly from anti-social behaviour 
can be found and the particular problems at that location can be solved. What was needed 
was a basic definition of anti-social behaviour as it works within Neighbourhood B. 
The junior officer was not particularly happy with this idea. if we define anti-social 
behaviour now, others will arrive along later and change it'. The problem could not be 
worked upon unless it was agreed what the problem was. This is a relatively insightful 
observation for, as discussed in chapter 2, the definition of anti-social behaviour is 
exceptionally broad. This broadness was quickly exposed by the spontaneous 
announcement on the part of the senior officer that all drinking in the street is always anti- 
social behaviour. This was because of the loudness, the mess and the drunken behaviour. 
This broad, non-sequitur of an interjection caused some controversy and the facilitator, 
approaching the question diplomatically, pointed out that as there was a stronger link 
between drinking and anti-social behaviour at this NAG than at other NAGs. The senior 
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officer immediately announced that the problem was not the fault of the pubs but the fault 
of `outside drinking'. This ambiguous statement appeared to mean that it was the existence 
of outdoor drinking in the country at all, rather than any specific instance of it that was the 
problem. The senior officer's insistence on the issue was clearly noticable in the meeting. 
The field notes collected at the meeting contain a comment that reads; `more than any othe 
NAG, this is being dominated by [the senior officer] and his personal ideas of what is and 
is not proper order. He has very conservative ideas about what is going on and is a hater of 
outside drinking'. 
The discussion moved on when the junior officer asked if the NAG was trying to define 
anti-social behaviour generally and wanted to know if there was any central definition 
published anywhere. The facilitator worked with the group to define anti-social behaviour 
as the NAG sees it. After some discussion, the definition that the NAG came to was; `Any 
behaviour causing intimidation, fear or alarm to another person' which is different to, but 
equally as nebulous as the legal definition of anti-social behaviour in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998: `Acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as (the defendant). ' 
Both definitions bring within the ambit of `unacceptable' or reprehensible activity a broad 
spectrum of human activity. 
It is interesting that this exercise ever had to take place at all. There is little to be gained 
from re-defining a broad open-ended category such as anti-social behaviour under the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. What it does illustrate is that in choosing the problems a 
NAG decides to focus on, it is free to re-define a problem beyond that which is set down 
by central government. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, neighbourhood policing exists 
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within a broad, subjective framework which is short on tight definitions. This discussion of 
anti-social behaviour illustrates the confusion that such broad definitions cause for those 
actually working `on the ground', or `at the coalface' in navigating conceptual terrain that 
is inherently subjective. The efforts of this NAG meeting to re-define anti-social behaviour 
was borne out of a collective confusion about what it is. Their work on re-defining it 
perhaps left them no closer to understanding what exactly the problem they are trying to 
solve is; or indeed what it should be. The junior officer in the meeting was clearly 
disappointed that this was the best definition of anti-social behaviour that could be arrived 
at because it was simply so broad. 
The definition of the problem is a crux in the problem-solving process and this example 
emphasizes that. Before any effort can be made to solve the problem, the NAG cannot 
even agree what it is. However what it also illustrates is that after the consultation process, 
what is being worked on as a problem specified by the `community' can be altered by 
those on the NAG to include or omit certain types of behaviour or problems which those 
who were consulted thought they were asking to be fixed. 
Dealing With or 'Problem-Solving' Anti-Social Behaviour 
General Brain-storming 
The initial evidence gathering process began with a brain-storming approach to the 
question of anti-social behaviour in the area. This involved using a large white-paper board 
upon which was drawn a triangle which formed the basis for the PAT. While the pre-NAG 
meeeting had been about explaining to prospective members what the PAT was to be all 
about, this meeting was about actually applying the PAT to Neighbourhood B. The initial 
brainstorming, being a broad brush use of the PAT to establish a set of potential categories 
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of person, place or thing that could be said to have a place at a corner of the triangle. Each 
of the sides of the triangle were discussed by the NAG who came up with the following 
possibilities: 
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Offender (Villainjsici) Location Victims 
Not just young people Shops Residents 
Adults under the Green areas Elderly 
influence of alcohol or School gates (not much Young people (arc 
drugs ASB) afraid of other young 
Shops/off liccnses/pubs School generally people) 
Visitors to the area perceived as difficult Shopkeepers 
Parents Cycle paths Visitors 
(Facilitator asked Underpasses Police 
`should schools be Cul-de-sacs & car Businesses 
here? ') parks Schools (Staff and 
Residents/tenants/landl Alleyways Students) 
ords Play areas Council 
Government Communal areas in Local Town Council 
flats Registered Social 
Allotments Landlords (Housing 
Cemetery Associations) 
Church Public transport users 
Pubs Uniformed services 
Community spirit 
Ethnic Minorities 
Tax payers 
Fig. 4.1: The Problem Analysis Triangle in Neighbourhood B (Those in italics 
have been changed to protect the specific names of locations) 
It is interesting to note that the police were mentioned and the facilitator found this an 
unusual victim to be raised in the brain-storming part of the problem-solving process. 
Similarly, the NAG was unusual in that it was the first the facilitator had seen that 
raised public transport users as victims. 
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What is also worth noting is that at the beginning of the process, the exercise is almost 
one in broadening the groups' mind to thinking about the possible parameters of the 
problem, rather than specifically working towards defining targetted goals. Aside 
from the facilitator and perhaps one or two of the police or partners who have been to 
NAGs in other neighbourhoods, most members of the NAG had no idea about the 
problem-solving process and were in a sense being led by the hand through the 
brainstorming. The impact and influence of the facilitator cannot be underestimated. 
With a few leading questions, or hints, problems that would not be brought to the fore 
can be elicited, or suggested problems can be `re-categorised' or shrugged off as `well 
that's part of anti-social behaviour' or `that falls under parking'. However, it is clear 
from the efforts that the community safety partnership and the TVP have made to 
increase training among NAG members, and particularly NAG chairs, that it is hoped 
that NAG members would be more aware of what they were doing, as well as having 
some basic understanding of why it is supposed to work. In the meeting described, 
however, members did not seem to be so well informed about how the process 
worked. 
Although there was not much `leading' going on here, if part of the process is 
broadening the conception of perpetrator or victim to include, for example, the police 
or the tax-payer, then it may have a form of educational purpose. On the other hand it 
could also distort the aim of the brain-storming process in bringing out specific 
examples. However, as can be seen from the example above, most of these 
suggestions could be applied to almost any local area where residents are concerned 
about `bad things'. Only those in italics have been altered to protect the specific 
names of locations within Neighbourhood B. 
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Gathering Evidence 
Once the general brain-storming has been completed, the group moved on to trying to 
gather evidence specific to Neighbourhood B. A representative from the council's 
housing department (although not the housing authority responsible for the flats in 
Gamma Town where a lot of the anti-social behaviour was alleged to have occurred) 
suggested that their records on damage could be used, if it was `sanitized' to protect 
individual identities. The representative pointed out that the data was not so good over 
short periods as most anti-social behaviour is in the summer and so she suggested that 
it might be better to look back over one year's worth of of records. There was another 
problem with the statistics because they were being prepared for the housing 
department's anti-social behaviour group and being handed over to the police. This 
meant that there was a risk of double counting some incidences of anti-social 
behaviour. However, with the redaction of certain information to protect anonymity, 
there was little that could be done. 
This `double accounting' problem raises an interesting question about the difficulties 
of making a proportionate response to criminal (or anti-social) behaviour. In essence, 
if you report the damage done to your block to both the police and the housing 
department of the council, your crime becomes logged twice. Whereas, if you are too 
busy, or disaffected with the prospect of a useful outcome from either the police or 
council and report it to neither, your equally serious damage will not be counted at all. 
Your block or street will get no `purple splodges' on it if you don't turn up to public 
consultation meetings. In essence, this information sharing process runs the risk of 
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making problems look bigger where the victim or concerned resident has the skills, 
time and interest to shout louder. If resource allocation is decided, based on double 
accounted statistics, the resulting scenario is one where the police are not fighting 
crime or anti-social behaviour because it is something bad which effects us all evenly, 
but are working to keep a few people, those who complain the most, happy. 
As well as housing data, other forms of data that were suggested were data collected 
by the local Neighbourhood Watch group, although the NAG did not appear to know 
much about this; school records, which were dismissed as being `quite personal and 
subjective' (rather than on the grounds that to use them would be hugely invasive of 
the child's privacy); and residents of the area were encouraged to keep a record of any 
instances of anti-social behaviour that they came across. EVAs were also raised as a 
possible way to evaluate what needed to be done and describe the scope of the 
problem. EVAs involve a NAG member (or possibly two) making their way around 
the neighbourhood and taking photographs of instances of disorder, noting their 
location down and describing the type and extent of the damage. Over the following 
few months, the EVAs were conducted, though it was something of a stop-start 
process. Some were delayed because of bad weather, others were postponed because 
people were too busy. However, after a few months EVAs were produced that gave a 
taste of the damage that had been done in Neighbourhood B. On the basis of the 
EVAs, it was agreed that Omega Town was the area that needed the most attention. 
Who, What, Where, Why and How 
After the discussion of evidence, there was a truncated discussion of anti-social 
behaviour, specifically in Neighbourhood B. This was to take the approach of asking 
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`WWWWH? ' or `Who, What, When, Why and How? ' The theory behind this 
technique is, as I understand it, that by listing things out under each of these headings, 
a better approach to gathering evidence as to the extent of the problem can be devised. 
Thus, if `when' is answered `in the summer, between 1800 and 2200', then there is 
little point trying to record details of the prevalence of the activity during an autumn 
morning. Similarly, when it comes to developing a suitable response, the NAG can 
rule out increasing PCSO patrols during the early afternoon. This sort of information 
gathering by the NAG is crucial to an effective application of any problem-solving 
approach, and it also may have the added `advantage' of feeding information to the 
police and other agencies. 
The discussion was cut short because the NAG meetings are only supposed to run for 
an hour and a half, so the discussion only got as far as `What'. However these were 
indicative of the problems that those at the NAG considered to be the anti-social 
behaviour. The discussion began by asking `who? ' which was instantly answered as 
`young people'. something of a long list of `what' then arose. They can be grouped 
into a few categories. 
Recreational activities, such as ball games and skateboarding. Youths were playing 
inappropriate ball games and some of the youths `should have been somewhere else'. 
Skateboarding was mentioned because NAG members wanted to know if 
skateboarding could ever be appropriate. However, when the facilitator probed a little 
further about where it was a problem it was found that skateboarding was not in fact a 
problem and was crossed from the list. Mini-motos were mentioned briefly as was the 
perennial problem of `hanging around'. It was pointed out that hanging around is not 
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antisocial behaviour per se. Indeed, it is possibly the most social few hours in the 
week for the young people involved in it. Somebody pointed out that it wasn't the 
hanging around that was the problem, people in Neighbourhood B had a problem with 
swearing. 
Recreational drug use, including the consumption of alcohol by the young people. 
Drug use, it was claimed, lead to thefts and underage sex. There were parties. 
Condoms and needles could be found around the neighbourhood. Although it was 
admitted that this did not happen much. There was some fighting taking place and it 
was alleged that at times this involved weapons. 
Criminal activities were alleged to be taking place alongside the aforementioned 
recreational activities. Vandalism and graffitti were mentioned, although only in the 
context of their being used as trace evidence of anti-social behaviour. In this particular 
exercise, it is not actual criminal activity that is being sought, but evidence of anti- 
social behaviour, which may be found in the damage left from crime, which 
presumably occurred because of some non-criminal yet anti-social behaviour. There 
was also the problem of intimidation. Some people who were reporting criminal 
activity or anti-social behaviour were being threatened. This, it was suggested, might 
mean that if the NAG was successful at dealing with the problem of intimidation, 
there might be an increased number of reports to the police. An apparent statistical 
increase in crime could in fact be a measure of success. 
After discussing the various types of `what' there was a brief discussion of `who'. 
Although it had been agreed that it was young people, the facilitator was keen to find 
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out more about them. When asked `what ages arc the young people? the answer was 
`11-24', which was then tightened down to 15-18 year olds. The majority were males, 
although there were some females and the majority were white. however, the NAG 
appeared to be very wary about discussing questions of the race of perpetrators. Only 
one member of the NAG was pushing the question of race. He was a local resident, 
but according to the field notes, `he is also cagey'. He appeared to have an underlying 
point to make, but was afraid of coming out and saying it, because of the reluctance of 
the group to discuss issues of race. 
Despite all the efforts to blame young people for all the anti-social behaviour in the 
area, another view of young people was propounded by an attendee at a NAG meeting 
some months later. This alternate view is perhaps another example of one individual 
driving a personal position on the question of anti-social behaviour. It arose at the 
NAG in Neighbourhood B the month after the incident above with the police officer 
who had his own agenda on outdoor drinking. This NAG was again held in omega 
Town, this time in the police station, and was much better attended than the NAG the 
previous month. This example is in almost direct contrast to the experience at the 
NAG meeting before Christmas where the police officer took the chance to give out 
about the problems of anti-social behaviour as he saw them. In this case, an attendee 
at the NAG spoke up for the young people who were supposed to be the cause of the 
anti-social behaviour in the area. 
The attendee, who seemed to be relatively new to the NAG announced a number of 
times, with great enthusiasm, that the young people of Neighbourhood B were an 
exceptional group of people and were not to be made scapegoats for all the anti-social 
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behaviour in the area. Children, according to this attendee, arc positive and pleasant to 
deal with. `So what if they congregate in some places. They have to congregate 
somewhere and we all had to do it. ' This is a relatively unusual position to hear 
advocated at a NAG, which is an organization that has tended to attract those who are 
concerned about law and order and in some way `dealing with it', whether they arc 
the police or other community stakeholders. Indeed, virtually no attendees at NAGs 
would qualify as `young people' or `youths' themselves, and so it is quite 
straightforward for the discourse of a NAG to become one that `others' `youths' and 
`young people'. The defence of young people mentioned here was unusual at the 
NAGs observed, although it does resonate with some of the comments at the original 
public meeting in Omega Town where one resident mentioned `kids hanging around' 
as a problem, while in the next breath admitting that `they're not actually doing 
anything wrong'. 
This lone voice at the NAG about the lack of malice among the children of the area 
was somewhat sidetracked as the group began to work on problem-solving anti-social 
behaviour in a fashion that focussed almost exclusively on the anti-social behaviour of 
young people. The NAG then began the process of discussing what approaches to 
dealing with young people had been tried before. One participant pointed out that 
anti-social behaviour is worse in good weather and the summer, `we could pray for 
rain all year round' he suggested. Aside from prayers, a wide variety of responses had 
previously been used in the neighbourhood, some of which would be repeated. These 
included family activities at the recreational centre, a `community mobilizer' at the 
recreation centre, a drama and dance summer school that was free to attend and 
universally considered a success, a street football initiative that brought the children 
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to another part of the city, and an intervention by some consultants to specifically 
work with younger people to handle racial issues (there is a significant Muslim 
community in Neighbourhood B and there were concerns about tensions among the 
different youth populations). The final response, the intervention of consultants 
received a mixed response and has since ended. For their part, the police said there 
was some CCTV in the square, their officers conducted weekly off-license checks, 
they had a dedicated schools officer, and PCSOs patrolled the schools. This amounted 
to almost two pages of `responses' on a whiteboard and the facilitator said she had 
never had such an amount of responses at previous NAGs. 
From these discussions, it was felt that certain consistent themes emerged. Young 
people needed to be engaged. The NAG felt it needed `to find out what young people 
want' and `to do a selling job to a lot of older people to build their confidence in what 
is happening'. It was suggested that one way to get a so-called `quick win' was to 
provide bins at one recreational ground where there had been some progress with 
reducing the amount of broken glass. This search for quick wins was constantly re- 
iterated at both the NAGs in Neighbourhoods A and B. There was a sense that some 
of the big problems that they were struggling against were unlikely to be solved 
quickly or easily and in the mean time, to keep up the appearances of progress, small 
intermediate yet tangible goals needed to be sought and delivered on. 
Yet this still leaves the NAG in a position where it is trying to reduce the amount of 
anti-social behaviour conducted by young people. The discussion that ensued 
involved issues and perspectives at the heart of the academic debate on policing. The 
first example of this is the question of the role of the patrolling police officer. As 
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discussed above (chapter 1) there is an almost insatiable demand for police officers to 
be patrolling, yet this is only one component of a varied job, and this lack of 
understanding of the job of a police officer was evident in one resident's question to 
the police. If youth are the problem, the resident asked, `what is the point of PCSOs 
patrolling on a Sunday morning? ' To which the police officer replied, somewhat 
annoyed, that there were many jobs an officer has to do other than patrolling. Police 
officers, and certainly many of the front line officers that were encountered during the 
research found all the divergent demands on their time frustrating, and this seemed to 
be receiving vent in the response provided here. Yet, in a sense the answer was not 
one that entirely addressed the question. The question did not demand that the police 
spend all their time patrolling, but just that the patrolling be targetted to specific needs 
that were set out, either by the community, or by intelligence led use of patrols where 
they are most appropriate. The misunderstanding however, appeared to demonstrate 
the pressure that officers, (or it appeared, at least this officer) felt that they are under 
with this constant demand for ever more patrol. At the end of the discussion, the 
actions from the meeting included a commitment to plan patrols by PCSOs to include 
the recreational ground and the square at around 10pm. 
The second main action from this meeting was the agreement that the NAG needed to 
engage with youths or consult with schools about youth behaviour. The NAG had no 
representation from schools or young people (and lack of representation from 
numerous partners was a problem for the NAG throughout the period of study, as 
discussed in the next section). Yet this provided the NAG with a difficult and 
controversial question, `how do we reach difficult kids? ' On this analysis, those 
young people that turn up to represent `youth' are interested and committed, and thus 
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unrepresentative of the young people who are seen to be causing all the trouble. The 
answer provided by one of the attendees was a paradigm example of a piece of 
responsibilization discourse (see chapter 1 above), `The answer needs to be saying to 
young people "you want it, you do it. "' This is of course something of a poor answer 
to a question which hinges around the problem that those who are `hanging around' 
are doing so because they want to. The activities the NAG appears to want them to do 
such as going to bed early or spending evenings in organized youth clubs is exactly 
what they do not want to do. This argument on dealing with young people by 
`responsibilizing' them seems almost immediately doomed to failure. It seems hard to 
credibly sustain the argument that it is up to young people to sort out the problem of 
`young people hanging around'. The problem of how we socialize our young people, 
and particularly our young males may be a problem too far for a NAG to completely 
eliminate, using responsibilization, PATs, SARA or otherwise. To do so runs the 
great risks of partnership work on community safety, criminalizing `youth' and 
framing policies for working with young people as criminal justice policies rather 
than being motivated by other aims in social policy (this is discussed further in 
chapter 6). 
Involvement 
The final area that needs to be discussed about the initial process of establishing a 
NAG, which was clearly illustrated by the experience of the NAG in Neigbourhood B 
is involvement. Initiating and sustaining the involvement of a wide or at least useful 
variety of partners to work on the problem-solving process was difficult in 
Neighbourhood B. There were four main stakeholders who were noticably absent 
from the NAGs that were studied for this research. First and perhapss the most glaring 
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example of this under-involvement was the lack of representation of members of the 
Muslim community, which has a substantial population in the neighbourhood, 
particularly in Omega Town. Indeed, during the period of the research a 19 year old 
Muslim man was stabbed to death in the convenience store on the main square in 
Omega Town, an incident which was only alluded to by the NAG around the time of 
its occurrence. 
The second notably absent body were the private housing agency responsible for 
some of the blocks of flats, particularly in Gamma Town. Although they were invited 
to numerous NAGs, they consistently failed to attend. The NAG gathered evidence it 
had of anti-social behaviour and forms of environmental degradation and disorder that 
it had recorded in the flats, and brought these to the agency. Yet the agency was still 
unable to send a representative. The third notable absence was the `business 
community'. Although there was some reference to trouble decreasing in Gamma 
Town because the local supermarket chain (operating as an enlarged corner shop) had 
put a security guard on the door, this was not due to any consultation with the NAG. 
The police officer responsible for the NAG had spoken to the manager and asked him 
to come along, but he was never represented. Although, when the problems were 
finally decided at the end of the consultation, there was an allusion to a consultation 
with the business community (and non-resident visitors to the neighbrourhood) about 
their needs, which led to the priorities being somewhat altered from those chosen at 
the public meeting. The final missing set of stakeholders were the schools in the area. 
Although a head teacher did show up to the pre-NAG meeting, he commented on the 
lack of school representation at the meeting. Notwithstanding this, there was little 
representation of the schools in the later parts of the NAG process. Again, these 
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problems of getting stakeholders to become involved raise questions about how 
inclusive NAGs are, and also about how useful or practical they are seen by those in 
the community who are potential stakeholders. Involving as large a group of 
interested parties as possible is key to the NAG's notions of how it can be useful, and 
it is also one of the great challenges of nascent NAGs; how does a NAG get (and 
keep) important stakeholders involved? 
Those who were members also experienced a rocky road in their continued 
involvement. One resident described feeling afraid of being on the NAG because he 
thought he would get threats due to his membership. The original chair who was 
selected for the NAG resigned after six months. There was thus no chair of the group 
for a number of months and this had the effect of making the NAG feel somewhat 
rudderless and lacking a driving force, or a `social or moral entrepreneur'. This role 
falling largely to the facilitator from the community safety partnership. 
The lack of involvement and underrpresentation on the NAG is a difficult thing to 
counter. It is almost impossible to work out what causes it and so one can only 
speculate on the potential reasons for it. One reason that springs to mind is that 
perhaps there is not such a big problem with crime and anti-social behaviour in the 
area, or at least residents have got to the stage where they can tolerate a minimum 
amount of it. Thus the work involved in chasing up the last acts of vandalism or 
disorder arc just not worth it, and certainly not worth joining a NAG for. Perhaps, 
there is, to use Putnam's (2000) term, a lack of `social capital' in the neighbourhood. 
By `social capital' Putnam means the network of connections between people in a 
neighbourhood or community that leads them to interact together and provides, as he 
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sees it, many benefits such as lower crime, better educational attainment and 
decreases in loneliness and so forth. Another possibility is that there is a conflict over 
who should govern security in the neighbourhood (and indeed beyond). Perhaps 
residents and housing associations do not see it as their job. While the police and 
policy makers are trying to `responsiblize' local communities, the communities or 
residents want the problem to be sorted out by someone else. This clash of ideas can 
be seen in the next chapter in the discussion about who is responsible for reducing the 
harms attached to bonfire night in Neigbourhood A. Or can it simply be said that the 
lack of resident motivation and in particular ethnic minority motivation to be part of a 
NAG is another example of a lack of trust in the police due to their reputation for 
dealing with minorities? (Goldsmith, 2005; Henry, 2007b) 
Regardless of the reasons behind it, lack of involvement is a substantial problem and 
will continue to hinder any successful partnership approach to problem-solving in 
Neighbourhood B in the future. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the development of the NAG in Neighbourhood B from its 
initial public consultation phase up to the NAG's efforts to implement interventions to 
try to solve its priority problems. If a NAG can be viewed as a node of security 
governance (and it is posited in this research that this is a useful way of looking at it), 
the formation and early days of the NAG's work have a substantial impact on the 
character, technique and effectiveness of the node. This chapter has discussed some of 
the political implications of consultation. For example the cases of the local man 
whose personal bug bear was parking or the police officer who believed that outdoor 
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drinking was the root cause of virtually all anti-social behaviour. Another interesting 
aspect of the consultation process is that the third priority problem as defined by the 
voting system implemented on the night, that of the lack of police feedback, was 
completely ignored when deciding which problems to focus on. This research never 
got to the bottom of why this was ignored, although it is clear that a NAG organizer 
within the police or other agency decided that the priorities should not include 
remedying problems with police feedback after an incident has been reported. 
Each of these examples demonstrate the political nature of the definition of a NAG's 
priority problems. In order not to find that their problems are skewed towards the 
interests of those who are loudest, best at motivating their political capital, or least 
afraid of the police, those establishing a new NAG have to try to be as inclusive as 
possible. The questions of how to achieve that inclusiveness, is something that each 
new NAG must attempt to deal with. Although no NAG can ever say with certainty, 
`we have been inclusive enough', they do have to try and get on with their tasks even 
if some stakeholders are unwilling, or uninterested in being involved. Sustaining the 
involvement of diverse, useful and motivated partners and stakeholders is perhaps one 
of the greatest challenges for NAGs that hope to be successful nodes of security 
governance. Applying the skills and resources of such NAG members to the priority 
problems that the NAGs are working on will be the next challenge facing a new NAG. 
In the next chapter, that challenge is discussed in light of the observations made in 
Neighbourhood A as it worked on its priority problems. 
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Chapter 5 
Case Study of Neighbourhood A- Problem-solving in an 
`Established' NAG. 
At the beginning of the process of rolling-out neighbourhood policing, the TVP chose 
two neighbourhoods to be `pilot neighbourhoods' within the BCU where the research 
was based. Most neighbourhoods in the BCU are actually comprised of a number of 
beats, but both of the pilot neighbourhoods were built around a single beat within the 
BCU and each beat was a particularly big beat, with a population greater than 6,000 
residents. Indeed the neighbourhood next to Neighbourhood A and within the same 
parish, is composed of ten beats and the other case study neighbourhood in this 
research, Neighbourhood B, is made up of eight beats. 
Neighbourhood A is a housing estate which according to official crime statistics 
suffers from more crime than the other case-study neighbourhood or the other pilot 
neighbourhood. The other pilot neighbourhood, Neighbourhood C, was a small 
community with a low level of crime generally and a level of crime substantially 
lower (approximately half as much monthly reported crime) than that in 
Neighbourhood A. 
This chapter looks at Neighbourhood A and how the NAG has gone about trying to 
solve problems in the neighbourhood. Unlike the previous discussion of 
Neighbourhood B, the research began later in the process of problem solving and as a 
result, the chapter describes a more established or `mature' NAG which has been 
running for a substantially longer period than the NAG in Neighbourhood B. It also 
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does not discuss how the NAG came about deciding on its priority problems, but 
attempts to describe what it has tried to do about them. When discussing problem 
solving and partnership working among the `greater police family' in Neighbourhood 
A, two key problems appear that the NAG has tried to deal with. The first is the 
problem, relatively unique to the estate, of `garages'. More specifically the anti-social 
behaviour that appears to develop around the unused garages on the estate. The 
second is the ongoing discussion that the NAG had over the period of time studied, 
about how to try and reduce the impact of bonfire night in terms of both criminal 
damage and anti-social behaviour. These problems are not in fact the three main 
problems determined by the NAG in public consultation, which were anti-social 
behaviour, fly tipping and vandalism. Clearly the question of garages and bonfire 
night deal directly with anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood, but the other 
problems seemed to be somewhat sidelined at times. The problem of garages and 
bonfire night absorbed more time than any other problems during the period studied. 
Solving the Problem of Garages 
In parallel with the original construction of houses on the estate that makes up 
Neighbourhood A there was also the construction of a substantial number of garages 
for residents to park their cars in. The demand for these garages has dropped off 
considerably and many are now empty, or in the language of the council: `void'. 
Perhaps this is as a result of the fact that the technology involved in preventing auto- 
crime has changed substantially, or because residents would rather park right beside 
their front door, or perhaps the rents charged by the council for their use were seen as 
prohibitive. Regardless of the reason, the garages have fallen somewhat out of favour 
and many have fallen into a state of disrepair. Young people have been known to 
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climb on top of the garages, rip the doors from them, congregate in or near damaged 
garages and to use them as a focal point for anti-social behaviour. flow to solve the 
problems of disorder and anti-social behaviour associated with the garages has 
exercised the attention of the NAG for a substantial part of the research period. 
There are, according to data presented by the council to the NAG in October 2007, 
781 garages in Neighbourhood A and of these, 393 are in use, while the rest are `void' 
or being repaired. However, as a representative of the council pointed out, there may 
be other garages, listed as void, that are being used `informally'. This is of course a 
euphemism for trespass and illegal occupation, however, it appears to be an accepted 
form of illegality and not something that the council or the NAG seemed to concern 
themselves about. 
Each neighbourhood in the TVP produces a Neighbourhood Priority Profile (NPP) on 
any particular issue. This is built on the SARA model outlined in the last chapter. It 
provides the NAG with a template to assist it in formally applying the methodologies 
of the SARA system. It does so by `asking' the NAG to fill out what their problem is 
and answer questions regarding each of the S-A-R-A steps. This is different to the 
process of determining problems for SARA by brainstorming, as described in Chapter 
4. Such brainstorming is essentially the `scanning' part of the SARA system. The 
NPP is a bureaucratic exercise which is intended to assist NAGs in consistently 
applying the entire of the SARA system, by obliging them to complete set questions 
and descriptions. 
! 
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Thus, within the scanning section there is a box into which a description of the 
problem must be entered. After all, if a NAG cannot define the problem, one could 
ask if there is in fact a problem. The first box asks; `What is the problem that has been 
identified and what evidence is there? ' In the context of Neighbourhood A which has 
selected anti-social behaviour particularly related to garages as one of its main priority 
problems, it is useful to include here the definition of the problem as set out in the 
NPP. 
The problem of garages, or as it is formally referred to on the front of the NPP, 
`Garage Blocks', was selected uniquely within the BCU by Neighbourhood A. Other 
neighbourhoods had chosen anti-social behaviour as a problem, and this involved 
some concern over garages, but only Neighbourhood A had selected the problem of 
garages as being a priority problem. The problem is described in the following terms 
in the NPP; 
Local Youths congregate around the garage blocks situated at various 
locations across the estate. This leads to a number of crime types from 
Burglary and Criminal Damage to Drug and Alcohol abuse to Public 
Disorder. 
There are numerous reports from a variety of soures recorded on 
Databases owned by the partner organisations. 
The problem was highlighted when the EVA took place and featured 
heavily at the [Neighbourhood A] Public Meeting. 
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Within the analysis section there is a box to be completed detailing the `underlying 
causes of the problem' having reference to the PAT. This details who, what or where 
has been described as the victim, offender and location. The NPP is essentially a pro- 
forma method of putting to paper the results of the type of brain-storming that were 
visible in the problem definition process in Neighbourhood B (chapter 4) and which 
had taken place before this research began in Neighbourhood A. The victims and 
offenders were relatively obvious (tenants, taxpayers etc for the former and young 
people for the latter) although it is interesting to see a category of offender inserted 
described as `illegal business residents'. However, it is in the description of the 
location of the problem that we get a better description of exactly why garages might 
be a problem in Neighbourhood A; 
Garages throughout the Estate which are detached from houses. In 
particular those in [three named culs-de-sac]. Generally they are not 
overlooked, in blocks with flat roofs. 
The rents are too high, repairs are sub-standard and garages are too small 
for todays' cars as well as there being restrictions on usage. Therefore 
many garages are left empty, fall into disrepair. The current housing 
budget does not allow for maintenance and locks are sub standard. 
Young people arc then attracted to the area, the roofs are easily accessed 
and the garages provide a good `goal' area for football. There are no other 
local areas to play football with a goal and the young people have `fun' 
playing here. 
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From within this description of the underlying causes one can draw out some 
interesting ideas about how the problem came about. The development of a consumer 
economy that has produced and made affordable bigger cars, even in relatively 
deprived housing estates may have been some sort of a root cause of the problem. 
Thus driving down the value of a garage, which is restricted in its use to storing cars 
and certain other goods; their dereliction thus providing a criminogcnic location in 
which young people are able to congregate. However, perhaps `criminogcnic' is too 
strong a word, there is no real suggestion that the behaviour of the young people is in 
fact criminal, but merely anti-social. Playing football is not criminal, even if the gate 
one plays it against is of poor quality. The dereliction of the garage blocks could 
perhaps be better described as `ASI"ogenic'. This distinction is important to 
maintain, even though there is much literature on the criminogenic nature of some 
architecture, applying the word to anti-social behaviour risks raising anti-social 
behaviour to the level of criminal activity, which it is not, although it could be 
suggested that that is how it may be viewed by central government and many 
community safety practitioners, including the police (see discussion in chapter 2). 
Before going on to look at the possible interventions which might help solve or 
ameliorate the problem of garage blocks, it is perhaps worth noting an interesting 
comment that was made by one resident who attended the NAG. She told the group 
`there are no problems on my eight garages, there arc no kids on the roof, yet she 
said she would prefer not to explain why this was the case in front of the police 
officers who were present. What she did to protect her garages is perhaps illegal or 
merely big talk, but it is, at least, intriguing. 
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What are the Possible Responses? 
The NAG discussed a number of possible responses to the problem. The first response 
was to either demolish some of the empty or, as the Council refer to them, 'void' 
garages. Alternatively efforts can be made to construct a favourable economic 
incentive for residents to occupy them, that is to say, reduce the rents and increase the 
state of repair of the blocks. The other responses, which are set out clearly within the 
NPP were, to approach school assemblies and try to raise awareness of the problem, 
to erect signs informing residents how to report damage to garages and an 
enforcement operation what was being conducted regarding the estate, but being 
somewhat refocussed onto the question of anti-social behaviour as it relates to 
garages. 
Demolition or Rent Reduction 
The obvious response to the problem of outdated garage stock on the estate is to 
remove the garages that are causing the problems. In March 2007 a report was given 
to the NAG about one cul-de-sac in Neighbourhood A in which the garage blocks 
were removed. Criminal damage in the cul-de-sac was almost completely eliminated. 
In this cul-de-sac, one attendee proudly announced, `the garages are problem-solved'. 
However, things are not quite as simple as merely removing all the garages. First of 
all, it is probably quite easy to spot that the problem may have simply moved to 
another cul-de-sac or garage block. This appears to have been what happened. Reports 
of criminal damage (one-third of which was to garage blocks) and anti-social 
behaviour in the neighbouring cul-de-sac increased substantially. This appears to be a 
straightforward case of displacement. However the police officers were careful to 
point out that they did not know if these problems were caused by the same young 
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people. Thus, they could not confirm or deny the suggestion that it was a 
displacement of crime and anti-social behaviour from the first cul-de-sac. 
As well as the problem of displacement caused if the garage blocks arc merely 
removed, there is also the obstacle of cost. Even though the garages are only barely 
half full, they provide the council, and in particular the housing section, with not 
inconsiderable revenues. The figures given to the NAG in August 2007 show that it 
costs £1,000 to remove a garage. Although this figure seemed to rise to £1,200 in later 
meetings, for reasons that are unclear. The housing department receive rent of £500 a 
year from a garage that is in use. The costs of repairing a garage are 
disproportionately high, being £500 to replace a door. There is a clear incentive for 
the council to continue to rent those garages which are occupied and producing 
revenue, while holding off on removing the void garages where the problem 
behaviour is reportedly occuring. There is also something of a cyclicality to the 
delapidation process. As rent revenues are reduced due to the delapidation, the 
housing department has less money to spend on repair, making the garages less 
attractive to renters, thus reducing the number of renters and the revenue they 
generate further, producing a cycle of garage delapidation, which cannot fund its own 
demolition or removal. 
In May 2007 a consultant employed by the council attended the NAG. He was 
commissioned to work on the garages and attempting to improve the arrangement for 
garages in four sites in the city. Attending this NAG was, he said, `my exercise in 
democratic engagement'. As part of his pilot scheme, he intended to spend £70,000 on 
demolition. It was the consultant's position that the garages built in Neighbourhood A 
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were built during a period of poor planning and would not be built in such a fashion 
today. In contemporary architecture a garage would only be built within the 
boundaries of a property, thus `designing out crime'. The chair was very keen to 
impress on the consultant the potential for tangible feedback from investment in 
garages (and their demolition) in Neighbourhood A, and the consultant was in full 
agreement. At this point in the roll-out of neighbourhood policing in the I3CU, there 
were only thirteen neighbourhoods operational, and only the two pilot 
neighbourhoods (including Neighbourhood A) had been in operation for over a year. 
Given that this was the only NAG that had made garages a priority problem, and that 
it was one of only two fully established NAGs, it would appear that there was no 
better place to conduct a `democratic engagement' about the problem of garages on 
estates in the city. Having fully discussed the possibilities of the pilot, the logic of 
using Neighbourhood A as one of the four sites and having been assured of the full 
support of the NAG and the councillors in attendance, the consultant left and was 
never seen again. lie was contacted a number of times and asked to attend the NAG 
or provide a report of his progress, but no such information was ever forthcoming to 
the NAG. 
The problem-solving process as applied to garages in Neighbourhood A was further 
hindered by the fact that nobody from the housing department at the Council attended 
any of the NAGs during the period of this research (a period amounting to well over a 
year). At one of the meetings it was decided that the NAG had to gain a greater 
understanding of how the process of housing decisions was made at the council and in 
particular how decisions about garages were made. The NAG felt that the process was 
not transparent and this meant it did not have the capacity to challenge the housing 
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department or in some way create some form of leverage over them in order to oblige 
them to attend. This raises questions (discussed further in chapter 6) about how much 
of a success multi-agency problem-solving can be if there is one player who will not 
play. This is a particular problem in this case where that player is clearly the only one 
who `has the ball'. Towards the end of the process, there was some talk of bringing a 
complaint about the lack of attendance of the housing authority to the Joint Tactics 
and Tasking Committee and trying to gain some sort of leverage through that forum. 
As set out above, in the course of this research, such efforts never succeeded. 
Alongside the discussion of the possiblity of demolishing void garages there was also 
a pilot scheme run by the housing department in a number of culs-de-sac to try to 
increase the number of people using the garages. However, this raised the problem of 
creating a `two-tier payment level' whereby established renters would pay more than 
those who began renting under the pilot scheme. There was also some questions 
within the NAG about how well the scheme was understood by eligible residents, and 
whether this was affecting the uptake of the reduced rent garages. However, as no 
representative of housing ever attended a NAG meeting, these questions remained 
completely unanswered. 
As time went on, the NAG began to develop a growing sense of frustration at the lack 
of progress. The chair was noted as saying that the process felt like `treading water, or 
perhaps even treading mud', as the group tried to navigate a path towards some 
progress on the problem of garages. This was countered somewhat by the efforts of 
the facilitator to collate previous, and possible future, responses to the problem. This 
led to the NAG adopting three further approaches to the problem; raising awareness 
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of the problem at school assemblies, erecting signs detailing how to report damage to 
garages and enforcing the law. 
Raising Awareness of the Problem at School Assemblies 
This is the first response set out in the NPP under the Response component of the 
SARA process. The latter three responses discussed here were chosen at the end of a 
`board blast of options' or `brainstorming' session run by the facilitator from the 
community safety partnership. The list included the demolition of the garages, but this 
was not included in the NPP. As discussed above, it is a solution to the problem that is 
not within the NAG's control. The board blast produced a list of suggestions 
including inter alia; 
9 re-activating youth clubs; 
" running an advertisement campaign on the use of the garages; 
" changing the use of the garages; 
" regularly inspecting the garages; 
" increasing neighbourhood watch; 
" providing alternative parking; 
9 rewarding reporting; 
9 involving youth in the issues; 
" sponsorship of garages; and 
" CCTV. 
The NAG decided to pursue the options of educating young people, erecting 
enforcement signs and enforcing the law. The NPP walks the NAG through the 
application of the potential solution to the problem by asking a set of questions which 
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demand direct answers. In the case of this response option, the questions were 
answered thus: 
Questions 
What response is being suggcstcd? 
What is the objective of this? 
flow will succcss be mcasurcd? 
What resources are needed? 
What are the advantagcs/disadvantagcs 
of this option? 
Who would own this response? 
Answers for Option I 
Educatc young pcoplc through schools 
To incrcasc awarcncss of the issucs 
Numbcrs of asscmblics attcndcd and 
numbcrs of pupils contactcd 
SCU Wardcns / Community Mobiliscr 
(blank) 
[Name Given] 
Figure 5.1: Sample Neighbourhood Priority Profile responses for Option l: 
Educating young people through school visits. 
This framework is considered essential for the successful application of a SARA 
model because it sets out in strict terms what the parameters of the option arc, what is 
expected of it, and perhaps most importantly, who is responsible for implementing it. 
It is this tangibility of objective and quantifiable performance indicators that is central 
to the process because it is supposed to prevent poorly thought out options being 
given unrealistic goals in solving intractable problems. The NPP is the coalface of the 
application of the SARA model to policing problems at a neighbourhood level. It is 
interesting to see that the outcome for measuring success in this case is based on 
numbers of schools visited, a measure which has no tangible bearing on the problem 
which the option sets out to solve. This is perhaps indicative of a longer term trend to 
measure the internal action rather than the effect of police activities and it has been a 
trend throughout the criminal justice system for some years. As Garland puts it; 
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Increasingly these organizations seek to be evaluated by reference to 
internal goals, over which they have near total control, rather than by 
reference to social goals such as reducing crime rates, catching criminals 
or reforming inmates, all of which involve too many contingencies and 
uncertainties. The performance indicators tend to measure `outputs' rather 
than `outcomes', what the organization does, rather than what, if anything, 
it achieves. (1996: 458, original emphasis) 
This inward looking approach to measuring success is perhaps hard to avoid, 
given the almost intractable nature of anti-social behaviour. It is hard to see how 
much of an impact speaking to school children about hanging around outside 
garages and using them as goals will have on their behaviour, short of inspiring 
some children to whom the idea had not occurred, to use the garage doors as 
goals. Yet if it were to be a successful intervention, how could the causal linkages 
between speaking to school assemblies and reducing the problems associated with 
garages ever be traced? The impact of the intervention on the problem is far too 
indirect and subject to the vicissitudes of interpretation and other social influences 
to be tangibly connected to the problem at hand. It is of course possible that such 
an intervention has an impact in terms of police-community relations, or raising 
awareness among children and parents of the work of the NAG and the police. 
However, such awareness-raising is a somewhat different goal to that of reducing 
the anti-social behaviour associated with garage blocks on the estate. 
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Erecting Signs Detailing flow to Report Damage to Garages 
With regard to this problem, the NPP sets out again the reasoning and success- 
measurement-framework for this intervention. In this instance, erecting signs near 
garages is hoped to increase the reporting of damage to the relevant authorities 
and speed up the repair of damage. It is also hoped that the presence of the signs 
will raise awareness of the issue of damage to garages. This apparently simple 
procedure was actually a substantially more complicated undertaking than it might 
first appear. Raising the funding for the provision of signs and prompting those 
who were in a position to erect the signs to do so took a substantial amount of 
time. It was an indication of the problems facing a group which has no resources 
of its own, but must try to work together to motivate and influence those who do 
have control over resources, to use them in a way favourable to the NAG's goals. 
Using a `nodal governance' (Crawford, 2006a; Shearing, 2007; Wood and 
Shearing, 2007) approach can be a useful way to understand the NAG's work in 
this regard. If the NAG is one of a number of interconnected `nodes' in the 
governance of security in Neighbourhood A, yet it has no resources of its own, it 
must use its network of connections and representation to mobilize the resources 
of other nodes to provide the security it aspires to for the neighbourhood. This 
process is central to the partnership process and is discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
Enforcing the Lmv 
The final approach to the problem is built on the classic `law and order' model; 
`the police must enforce the law'. Indeed at the July 2007 NAG when frustration 
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at the problems of dealing with agencies about the garages had driven the group's 
morale to a low ebb, it was a police officer who in trying to motivate the group 
announced that `we have got to go out there and kick some arscs'. Enforcement, it 
seems, is always popular. The NPP states that the aim of this intervention is `[t]o 
enforce the law regarding ASI3 and give warning letters to parents of young 
people caught committing ASII'. Again, the measure of success is the output 
rather than the outcome, in that the intervention will be measured on how many 
`yellow cards' and warning letters are issued by the police. This desire to 
demonstrate actions by showing that an increased number of `yellow cards' have 
been given to the `anti-social' may have the paradoxical effect of creating ASB- 
ogenic scenarios. This could occur by increasing contact between police and 
young people, or by reconsidering youth behaviour as anti-social in order to 
increase the opportunities for `yellow cards'. It is unlikely to have any meaningful 
connection with how much anti-social behaviour there actually is in any given 
neighbourhood. 
The police officer at the July 2007 meeting was keen to point out that there was a 
process of intelligence gathering which assisted them in targetting anti-social 
behaviour. `We've got our spies, for want of a better word. Now we're trying to 
focus it on the garages. ' However there were problems with gathering such 
intelligence. People who were in neighbourhood watch schemes were seen as 
`grassing' on their neighbours and indeed, the word `spy' was often used in a 
negative context by those who were threatening neighbourhood watch members. 
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An `enforcement operation' is almost completely a police centred response and 
one that demands little assistance from partner organizations, although housing 
agencies can be involved in the process of using the removal of tenure as a form 
of punishment should enough evidence of anti-social behaviour accumulate 
(Hughes and Rowe, 2007: 325). However the enforcement operation that the 
police were speaking of attempting to apply in the neighbourhood was in fact 
deployed in a larger area which encompassed Neighbourhood A. This actually had 
the effect of causing some abstraction of police officers from Neighbourhood A. 
To counter this, the facilitator suggested, the NAG would need to provide 
evidence that there was anti-social behaviour that could be successfully targetted 
using the resources and officers which were being used to battle anti-social 
behaviour in the wider area, and attempting to have them focussed on 
Neighbourhood A. Again this fits into a wider picture of the NAG as a node of 
security governance, attempting to use evidence and persuasion to draw resources 
controlled by other nodes into its area, for the benefit of its own public. How 
successfully they manage to do that is largely down to the skills, capacity, 
connections and tenacity of the NAG members. However, what is apparent is that 
as more and more nodes (NAGs in this analysis) become operational and 
competent in the struggle for resources, the resources will naturally become more 
stretched, and the successes of resource allocation will become fewer, or at least 
smaller. How those local political battles play out will be interesting to see. 
Bonfire Nights at Neighbourhood A 
The second problem that is discussed in this chapter is the problem of bonfire night 
and the anti-social behaviour associated with it. It was not set out as a priority 
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problem by the NAG, however it was discussed extensively at the meetings and the 
group gave it extensive consideration and attention. While it may not have been one 
of the three priority problems (in the sense that the number one priority was anti- 
social behaviour relating to garages) it certainly comes under the rubric of a broader 
concept of anti-social behaviour. It was never considered that the NAG was acting 
beyond its remit in dealing with or discussing the partnership approach to bonfire 
night and indeed it seems an appropriate forum in which to attempt to construct a 
multi-agency response to an annual problem. 
Over the course of this research there were three bonfire nights which the NAG dealt 
with in Neighbourhood A. Each night was not dealt with in the same way and the 
NAG has spent a considerable amount of time concerning itself with analysing the 
different responses, discussing how effective they were and trying to learn how to 
improve on them. As an example of problem-oriented policing in practice, a 
discussion of the case of bonfire nights in Neighbourhood A is a useful way to 
illustrate some of the difficulties that can arise. 
Bonfire night is a tradition dating back to the Seventeenth Century and derives from 
the burning of an effigy of Guy Fawkes on a bonfire as a symbol of a village's hatred 
of Fawkes. Fawkes was captured while trying to execute the famous `gunpowder plot' 
in 1605. The plot was the response of radicalised Catholics to a period of repression 
under King James I. Fawkes and his co-conspirators were attempting to blow up the 
newly built Houses of Parliament on their opening day. They hoped that by killing the 
King, his heir and all the protestant bishops and lords, they would throw the country 
into a crisis and allow a Catholic to get onto the throne. The plot was intercepted on 4 
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November and Fawkes was captured and tortured on the rack to elicit a confession. 
The confession was read to the jury and he was duly found guilty. lIe and his co- 
conspirators were sentenced to be hung, drawn and quartered at the end of their trial 
the following January (Clapham, 2007). Since then, throughout England, and in some 
parts of the Commonwealth, an effigy of Guy Fawkes, traditionally known as a `Guy', 
is burnt on bonfires to celebrate the capture of those responsible for the gunpowder 
plot. 
There is a strong tradition of bonfire night events in Neighbourhood A and this has 
lead to the evening becoming considered a problem by some residents and local 
policy makers. Unlike some other problems determined by neighbourhood groups, the 
`harm' that can be caused by bonfire night is clear to be seen. To fuel the fire, some 
bonfire aficionados have torn down fences and ripped apart the sheds of local 
residents. Bonfires themselves can also get out of hand, running the risk of burning 
down local houses or trees. The remains of a bonfire have to be cleared away, often 
leaving unsightly scars on the grass where the fire took place. These scars can be seen 
for a long time after the bonfire and can prevent the space being used at other times of 
the year as a green amenity. The events themselves can lead to children and others 
running the risk of getting burnt in the fire itself, for example while tending or stoking 
it or cooking potatoes in it, a traditional bonfire night food. Similar accidents occur 
each year at fires when the fireworks, which often accompany `Guy Fawkes' Night' 
are released by people who are not familiar with the dangers involved in using 
fireworks. The fire brigade are called out far more on bonfire night than they would 
expect to in the days and weeks before and after the event, thus distracting them from 
their essential role extinguishing fires that would have occurred regardless of the 
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incidence of bonfire night. In short, it is clear why bonfire night might be classified a 
`problem' within the terms of problem-oriented policing. 
Despite these problems, bonfire night continues to be a popular draw and focus for 
numerous communities. Within Neighbourhood A there is significant competition 
between different parts of the neighbourhood to outdo one another by having a bigger 
or more impressive bonfire night celebration. The night's popularity is not swayed by 
the above list of problems that can be associated with the event. 
Each of the potential harms is a risk and none of them are inevitable parts of any 
bonfire. If the site is chosen well, the fuel is legally obtained, children are supervised, 
fireworks are released carefully and the site is tidied up properly afterwards, there is 
no major problem to be associated with the celebrations. In such a case, a local group 
can have a safe bonfire, although accidents can happen to even the most careful. 
However while there is no guarantee that every bonfire will be a `bad' one, every 
bonfire has the potential to be a `bad' one. Every bonfire is a risk. 
The definition of the bonfire night as a problem to be solved by policing is a practical 
example from this research of the obsession with `risk' and risk management that has 
crept into contemporary society and its policy makers, including the police (Beck, 
1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). The problem is not the bonfire itself, but the risk 
of damage associated with the bonfire. Of course when you aggregate a number of 
bonfires across a neighbourhood, city or constabulary, then there will inevitably be a 
certain amount of harm arising from running the risk of holding bonfires, but no 
individual bonfire can be predicted with certainty to produce that harm. 
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As a result of the risks associated with bonfire night, the evening has been targetted in 
Neighbourhood A as a problem for the attention of the NAG. Reducing impromptu 
mismanaged local bonfires will reduce the damage associated with bad bonfires. In 
each of the three years observed, a different approach was taken and in each of the 
three years, a different result occurred. 
Bonfire Night 2005 
Bonfire night 2005 was considered the greatest success of the three approaches taken 
to the problems of bonfire night. At a constabulary wide partnership meeting detailing 
the reasoning behind neighbourhood policing and its potential benefits to partners in 
April 2006 (Thames Valley Partnership, 2006), the local neighbourhood officer from 
Neighbourhood A spoke at some length of the process of working with the 
community and achieving such a successful result. This was, he said, a perfect 
example of how effective partnership problem-solving can be. In 2005 the NAG, the 
fire brigade and local community members worked together to hold an `official' 
bonfire. This involved having a bonfire on a selected site, with a fire brigade vehicle 
there for safety. Fireworks were provided and residents groups produced tables of 
food for the evening. The event passed off safely and by all accounts everyone 
enjoyed themselves. Fire brigade call outs were dramatically reduced with only two 
call outs to Neighbourhood A in 2005 compared to eleven in 2004. 
Bonfire Night 2006 
In 2006 the event was less successful. Although it was still considered a success in 
terms of developing community cohesion, it did not substantially reduce the number 
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of call outs of either the fire brigade or the police. In hindsight members of the NAG 
repeatedly point out that the 2006 event was not as good because it was not in fact 
held on bonfire night, but the proceeding Saturday evening. Although this was only 
the night before the traditional date of bonfire night, and the attraction of holding a 
family event on a weekend is easy to understand, the draw of 5 November as a day to 
be celebrated remained stronger and fires were held in Neighbourhood A that may 
have been avoided had the event been held a day later. The police reported that there 
were forty-three calls to their switchboard from Neighbourhood A on the weekend of 
Friday 3- Monday 6 November 2006 comprising fourteen for anti-social behaviour 
relating to bonfires, a substantial increase on the previous year. 
It is an interesting question, for which an easy answer cannot be provided, why a 
bonfire the night before, with the attractions of central organization and the numerous 
parallel events, would not sate the desire to hold other fires the next night. It would 
appear that some days, imbued as they are with cultural significance, are important for 
their dates as much as for the activity concerned. 
Bonfire Night 2007 
No event was organized the third year, 2007. At the November NAG meeting, nine 
days later, the police reported that there had been a `dramatic improvement over last 
year with half the reported incidents for a slightly longer weekend period' 
(Neighbourhood A NAG meeting minutes, November 2007). For the weekend of 
Friday 2- Tuesday 6 November 2007 there were thirty eight calls to the police from 
Neighbourhood A and these included only six for anti-social behaviour related to 
bonfires. 
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The fire brigade reported to the December NAG meeting a similar drop in bonfire 
activity. In 2007 six streets had bonfires, down from fourteen the previous year. There 
had been twenty-one call-outs of the fire brigade, with nine being in one location 
where there had been intimidation. 
Positive and Negative Approaches: Liberty v Order 
The obvious conclusion from these attempts to problem-solve the bonfire night is that 
community events do not have any impact on whether bonfire night is a damaging 
evening or not. However there are other forces at play in the reaction to bonfire night. 
Parallel to the community event there is also the possibility of running a campaign of 
prevention and the balancing of these two approaches has been the subject of some 
debate within the NAG. One NAG member argued that the two approaches should be 
differentiated into two categories. The first is what was termed the positive approach 
of holding an event to draw the community together and remove the need to hold 
impromptu private bonfires by providing a centrally organized one. The second, or 
negative, approach involves preventive action on the part of the police and the council 
in finding the caches of fuel and removing them, or hosing them with water so as to 
be unusable. 
This negative approach was applied to differing degrees in each year. In 2005 a strong 
preventive approach was taken in tandem with the development of a community 
evening. The police found stores of fuel and had them removed or hosed with water, 
the council removed any excess materials that could be found and it was difficult for 
residents to fuel impromptu private bonfires. In 2006 these prevention techniques 
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were not as aggressively pursued. One resident at the NAG pointed out that the 
council arrived and took away the materials two weeks before bonfire night, leaving 
ample time for the collection of more materials. The 2007 bonfire night, having no 
central community bonfire did receive attention in terms of preventive techniques. 
PCSOs were charged with finding combustibles and removing them. The housing 
authorities wrote letters to people explaining that if materials are burnt it will be 
considered anti-social behaviour. As the chair of the NAG put it; `in 2005 we had a 
positive and negative approach, in 2006 we had just a positive approach and in 2007 
we have had just a negative approach, what sort of message does that send out? ' 
This raised quite a bit of debate amongst NAG members. Some felt that there was an 
understandable community interest in having a bonfire and that some bonfires should 
be allowed and accepted as normal behaviour on bonfire night. Others felt strongly 
that this was a case of wanton vandalism and arson and should be stamped out 
severely. These two sides argued their case in a fashion reminiscent of a classical civil 
liberties versus law and order debate. 
The damage, it was claimed by those on the law and order side, is so extensive that it 
can be seen on Google Earth (an internet application which allows users to view 
satelite photographs of most parts of the UK). The implication appears to be that in 
some way the damage was akin to the Great Wall of China in its bulk and visibility 
from space. However, after spending some time on Google Earth looking at various 
parts of Neighbourhood A, which can be viewed extensively with the program, I was 
unable to find the scars that were supposed to be thus visible. 
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The civil libertarian argument was that the bonfires were going to go on, and that 
people wanted them. Of course the damage from the reckless bonfires should be 
ameliorated or prevented, but responsible residents had every right to celebrate with a 
bonfire. 
Alongside the level of damage, those on the law and order side (and one employee of 
the council in particular) argued that to organize an event in order to reduce bonfires 
effectively amounted to rewarding vandalism. Enforcement alone, he argued, was the 
only way to prevent the community from feeling that they would have a centrally 
organized event laid on to induce them not to conduct spontaneous bonfires. 
In the end the NAG resolved the question of whether it was better to take a positive or 
a negative approach by deciding it best to take both. There was universal consensus 
that the first bonfire night was a success. 
Solving the Problem 
It is hard to see that the problems attached to bonfire night in Neighbourhood A can 
be completely solved. At its best (the 2005 bonfire night), the NAG's problem- 
solving approach reduced the damage that was done by bonfire night substantially, 
but there were still call-outs and there were still private bonfires. The best that can be 
hoped for then is that the problem be managed. There will always be a risk of injury 
and death on bonfire night, bonfires are inherently risky ventures. When defining the 
problem to be solved the problem can only be considered in terms of risk; the risk of 
destruction of property and injury to people. The solution therefore can also only be 
framed in terms of risk management. The solution is a reduction in that risk, but risk 
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can never be completely avoided. The evaluation of success in dealing with the 
problem of bonfire night is a matter of degree. 
As members of the NAG admitted, there is no way to stop fences being ripped down 
and the doors torn from garages unless there were to be `a PC on every fence'. This is 
a typical example of what Morgan and Newbum (1997) call the insatiable desire for 
bobbies on the beat. The idea was only mooted as a statement of how ridiculous such 
a settlement would be. Obviously there would be resource implications to the 
placement of a vast number of constables around the neighbourhood, as well as 
implications for how people would enjoy the night under the eye of hundreds of 
yellow jacketed officers. The risk of some fences going missing is not, it appears, 
worth the investment of a `total enforcement' approach. There is then, a scale of 
possible techniques that could be applied. 
It was never suggested at the NAG that bonfire night be banned. At the height of their 
argument the `law and order' proponents were merely talking about prosecuting 
vandals and attempting to make fires difficult to arrange by confiscating fuel, as well 
as threatening residents with Anti-social Behaviour Contracts if they conducted 
spontaneous fires that caused damage. The possibility of these prosecutions and 
curfews is raised here to show that there are opportunities for the police to use severe 
tactics to clamp down on bonfires in Neighbourhood A. That they do not use these 
`nuclear' approaches shows that despite the availability of heavy-handed techniques, 
such approaches may not always be considered to be the best. Implicit in a decision 
not to use these laws is an acceptance that the repercussions, in terms of abuse of civil 
liberties, police-neighbourhood relations and cost would not be worth the potential 
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achievements in reducing criminal damage or fire-brigade call outs. If the police are 
to maintain policing-by-consent, they will need to be more subtle in their approach. 
As discussed above, the range of options that the NAG had at its disposal includes 
approaches that are more refined than a `total enforcement' approach. The responses 
will come from somewhere within this spectrum and the solution will also fall within 
a spectrum of possible outcomes ranging from a complete ban on bonfires, which may 
eliminate all the criminal damage from the evening, to a laissez-faire approach which 
might allow spontaneous bonfires to spring up wherever there is demand and fuel. 
The temptation with this analysis, is to assume that the further along the spectrum of 
possible interventions you go in the direction of enforcement, the greater the success 
of the solution provided. The different combinations of interventions discussed above 
produced different results, and in 2007 the enforcement approach worked well. 
However the `positive' approach in combination with enforcement worked better in 
2005. While these observations are useful, it is also important to remember that 
bonfire night in Neighbourhood A is not a perfect laboratory location, nor arc the 
interventions perfectly planned social science experiments and this makes comparison 
difficult. Each year, bonfire night falls on different nights of the week and this can 
have an impact on the size of local bonfires, whether centrally planned or 
spontaneous. Similarly, there could be other reasons that bonfires have a less 
damaging effect on the area, for example if those who would normally tear down 
fences or conduct other forms of criminal behaviour have desisted from crime for 
other reasons, such as growing out of it, or being too busy with work or family 
commitments. Conclusions about what is the best tool in the NAG's toolkit to use for 
bonfire night are difficult to come to based on only three years of attempts to solve the 
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problem of bonfire night. 
At the November meeting immediately after the 2007 bonfire night, the NAG began 
planning the implementation of a centrally organized bonfire night. It may not seem 
like much to plan a bonfire, but the job is a substantial one and there is reluctance 
among many people to undertake the responsibility for the task. In 2005 an officer 
from the Fire Brigade took control of the event and organized it completely. The 
intention was that in establishing the precedent of a centrally organized bonfire, the 
hope was that `the community' would then take it over and organize it themselves. 
This approach is a paradigm example of the `responsibilization' process referred to in 
chapter l whereby the body known as the `community' is expected to sort out its own 
security and protection for itself. An interesting exchange occurred at the October 
2007 NAG meeting between a representative of the council (a member of staff, not a 
councilor) and a resident. The council worker felt that residents have a huge role to 
play in organizing an intervention and in informing the police about stashes of fuel 
and planned spontaneous bonfires. The resident on the other hand completely 
disagreed. The responsibility for ensuring the security of bonfire night lay with the 
authorities. In a nodal governance of security analysis, this debate is over which node 
(or nodes) of security provision is responsible. The resident says the authorities (and 
this is clearly a plurality of nodes; inter alia, the police, fire brigade and council) 
while the council worker says that the community is the correct node to provide their 
own security. Either way, neither party thinks that they are the one responsible. This 
raises interesting questions about democracy in local government. The council staff 
are employees of the councillors who are elected by the residents. At some level, in 
simple democratic theory, they should receive the services they desire. As discussed 
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above (chapter 2) the provision of security by governments based on democratic 
desires is a difficult question and one which neighbourhood policing is supposed to 
address. What is clear from this example, and from other discussions at NAG 
meetings, is that there was virtual unanimity that a centrally organized bonfire is a 
good idea and worth pursuing for 2008, but there was a marked lack of people or 
organizations coming forward to offer to organize it. As one member said during a 
NAG meeting, `there is nobody to take ownership of this project'. Regarding bonfire 
night in Neighbourhood A, the problem with the problem is that it is nobody's 
problem. 
It was clear from the Fire Brigade's report read out at the December 2007 NAG 
meeting that the Fire Brigade did not feel they could justify the outlay involved in 
organizing a large event solely for one neighbourhood. This assertion, that the 
intervention was not cost effective, chimes uncomfortably with the claims made by 
many that the reduction in call-outs had made a huge saving for the Fire Brigade. 
Indeed this assertion was made by the neighbourhood officer at the Thames Valley 
Partnership's Neighbourhood Policing -A Joint Agenda conference in April 
2006 
(Thames Valley Partnership, 2006). It was delivered as a sort of rallying cry of how 
successful neighbourhood policing problem-solving can be and indeed it was 
reasonably convincing. lie argued that each call out that a fire engine must make, 
regardless of whether there was an actual fire or not, placed a substantial marginal 
cost on the Fire Brigade and reducing call-outs ipso facto reduces costs by a multiple 
of thousands of pounds. This, the logic goes, is a large saving for a small investment 
in sending one fire engine to Neighbourhood A and even paying for the raw materials 
for a safe bonfire. If this is true, and it is a compelling argument, why would the Fire 
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Brigade be so reluctant to organize a bonfire? It seems to be a type of false economy 
whereby the pain of the preventive outlay seems to have a greater impact on Fire 
Brigade administrators than the pain of the outlay on extra call-outs. 
Alongside the Fire Brigade's reluctance to operate the event, the other potential 
`community' organizations are also reluctant to step in. The NAG itself was slow to 
begin discussing bonfire night in the early part of 2007 and its discussions and 
procrastinations ultimately lead to no intervention taking place in 2007. In the 
immediate aftermath of bonfire night 2007, there was some discussion as to what to 
do the following year. It was agreed that a centrally organized bonfire was the best 
approach, but it was also apparent that nobody wanted to step in. Those who might 
naturally be expected to fill this role, such as youth groups or the council are reluctant 
to take it on. The considerable risks of running a `safe' bonfire appear to produce a 
genuine fear of taking responsibility. The problems of passing health and safety 
standards for an organization's employees appear to be a greater concern even than 
the cost of the operation and indeed there were some volunteers to help organize and 
run the bonfire night intervention but no organization was happy to take ownership. 
The only group with the expertise to do this, it was felt, is the Fire Brigade. 
The Fire Brigade in their report on bonfire night in Neighbourhood A told the NAG 
that they would be willing to support the event but not to hold it under their `banner'. 
They could not book the land with the council or obtain third party insurance, but it 
appeared that they could possibly provide the fire safety aspect, which would be 
essential to the success of any bonfire. The NAG, upon hearing this, debated if it was 
in a position to run the event. The statement; `The NAG has no funds, we need a body 
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to take this forward', was met with a more enthusiastic statement from the 
neighbourhood officer that the NAG could do it. There were bodies who had given 
funds before, the council, the housing agency and the community safety partnership 
for example but things would have to get moving soon. So in December 2007, the 
initial plans were laid to obtain the funding, land, insurance and fire safety support for 
a centrally organized bonfire in Neighbourhood A, a full eleven months in advance of 
the event itself. Funding has to be applied for this far in advance because council and 
other budgets are set early and are not flexible enough to allow for investment in a 
community event that they become aware of closer to the date. If one thing has been 
learnt about solving the problems associated with bonfire night, it is that 
responsibility and action have to be taken early for there to be any chance of a 
successful positive intervention. 
Conclusion 
The NAG at Neighbourhood A has applied a number of different approaches to 
solving some of its priority problems, although it has focused primarily on the 
problems of anti-social behaviour as they apply to the garages on the estate. This 
chapter has looked at those interventions as well as the work of the NAG in 
attempting to reduce the impact of anti-social behaviour deriving from the events of 
bonfire night in the neighbourhood. It is clear from the problem-solving efforts on 
both problems that the NAG has a range of choices about how to deal with its 
problems. Some of these choices may be of a more `law and order' or `enforcement' 
nature, while at the other end of the spectrum there are options which could be more 
libertarian and supportive. This is particularly exemplified by the divergence in 
opinion among NAG members about how to respond to bonfire night, with some 
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members preferring a `law and order' approach while others preferred to have a 
community event which would reduce the number of informal bonfires. The range of 
options open to a NAG can thus expose the differences of opinion among its 
members. These differences may stem from their role, training or perspective (cg as 
an agency representative, police officer or resident) or might simply be a personal 
preference for one particular method, or a conviction that such a method will be more 
successful. Whichever motivation drives the members, it is clear from this research 
that the NAG does not have a unanimous perspective on what ways it should 
intervene. The ongoing process of negotiation which every NAG must deal with is 
typical of all partnership arrangements working on the co-production of community 
safety. It is to these partnership arrangements that the next chapter turns as it looks at 
the NAG as a node of security governance influenced by its construction as a 
partnership of neighbourhood stakeholders. 
203 
Chapter 6 
Neighbourhood Action Groups as Partnership Nodes in the Co- 
Production of Community Safety 
The Neighbourhood Action Group (NAG) is an obvious example of a localized 
partnership arrangement designed to work on solving problems, reducing crime and 
increasing community safety for residents and other stakeholders in a given 
neighbourhood. Chapter 7 discusses some of the issues with partnership working as 
they apply to problem-oriented policing specifically. However partnership working, in 
NAGs and beyond, in order to co-produce community safety is about more than 
merely problem-solving (although that process operates as a central part of the 
partnership process). This chapter looks at the data collected in this research from the 
perspective of broader considerations of partnership working in the co-construction of 
community safety. 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places obligations on local government agencies to 
work together to reduce crime and disorder by operating statutory based Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). As discussed above (chapter 2) these 
central partnerships are obliged to conduct reviews of crime and disorder in their area 
and attempt to respond in a strategic manner. This marks a substantial change in how 
community safety is intended to be co-produced, a process of change that goes back 
to the Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991) which first suggested, at government 
level, that partnership working was the best way to tackle crime. The Crime and 
Disorder Act does diverge somewhat from the Morgan Report in how it places duties 
on agencies to develop community safety strategies (Crawford, 2007: 894). It is 
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within this `new' legislative framework that the co-production of community safety 
envisioned in the process of neighbourhood policing (both in the local 
neighbourhoods studied, and nationally) has to operate. Understanding how these 
processes have developed on the ground has been one of the central inquisitions of 
this research. It is thus important to discuss the experience of partnership working that 
was observed in the case study neighbourhoods. This has to be considered in light of 
the fact that the field of community safety is a fast-moving and quick-changing one. 
The impact and practical outcomes from the partnership efforts arc still not 
completely understood. As Hughes points out; 
It is important to remember that the long-term consequences and policy 
processes resulting from this `watershed' legislation still cannot be 
predicted with any certainty. ... Remember, a decade 
is not a long time in 
the history of managing social problems! (2006b: 80) 
The politics and policies surrounding efforts to produce community safety are 
constantly changing and the police off cer or NAG member on the ground is 
attempting to work within a sometimes confusing environment. Working in 
community safety can sometimes appear to the observer to be devoid of certainty and 
perhaps a little `footloose' in the sense that many of the concepts that NAGs and 
officers work on are so difficult to tic down and success is so hard to measure. These 
problems are the focus of the discussions in this chapter and the following chapter 
(which focusses mainly on problem-solving). 
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In discussing the NAG as a partnership, it is proposed that the NAG be viewed using 
a `nodal governance of security' analysis. This was discussed in chapter 2 and derives 
from the idea that it is best to analyze the complex world of fragmented security 
provision in late-modern society as a web of interconnected `nodes' which can control 
or provide security in any of its different forms. As discussed above (chapter 2), a 
node can be considered to be one of two types. The auspices are those who legitimize 
the security provision, for example the state as a regulator of PSOs, and the provider 
or the body that actually does the work in order to provide the security on the ground 
(Crawford, 2006a). It seems clear that each agency that works together in the 
partnership agenda within which neighbourhood policing operates, is itself a provider 
of security product or commodity. That is, if one includes within the concept of 
`security provision' such a wide variety of activities as those conducted by councils in 
providing lighting and planning `defensible spaces' or private business in providing 
security guards, residents providing police and other agencies with information, or 
housing agencies in challenging anti-social residents. If it is accepted that the 
partnership agenda is the way to approach the co-production of community safety or 
crime reduction, then it is hard to argue that activities such as those mentioned, which 
would not traditionally have been seen as part of the production of security are clearly 
part of the contemporary security-production environment. 
Mapping this environment is central to understanding how security is produced at 
present in order to understand how it might be (or optimistically, how it might best 
be) produced in the future and this work is an attempt to `map' the operations of the 
partnership component of neighbourhood policing as a node of security governance. 
As Wood and Shearing put it: 
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Perhaps one of the biggest challenges in crafting governance designs for 
the future will be the establishment of appropriately deliberative structures 
and processes that allow for competing normative objectives to be 
articulated, weighed and aligned and competing mechanisms to be given 
equal consideration. Before this design phase begins, however, we must 
get our `maps' right of what currently exists, central to which is the 
acceptance that governance is indeed more than a two-actor play. (2007: 
145) 
Partnership working 
Partnership working promises a lot. The discourse of partnership working is based on 
the idea that crime and anti-social behaviour are problems that cannot be resolved, 
mitigated or ameliorated by the police alone, but require the help of a wide variety of 
agencies and indeed the `community' itself (Home Office, 1991,2001). Yet how a 
partnership is constructed, for example, in terms of its legal, financial or support 
structure, or even the regularity of meetings or the relationships between agencies, can 
have a huge affect on the potential or actual success of a given partnership: 
Achieving successful partnerships is by no means straightforward. There is 
a big gulf between the ideals of `partnerships'and the reality of its practice. 
The term `partnership' is often used to cover a multitude of sins. 
Discussion of partnerships generally fails to specify the nature of relations 
between the parties that is envisaged (Crawford and Matassa, 2000: 102). 
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It is therefore important to be entirely clear about what type of partnership model is 
envisaged. This is discussed further in the next section which deals with how NAGs, 
as they operate in the neighbourhood policing context, compare with some of the 
ideal-types of community-safety partnerships. The ideal-types used arc those that 
Crawford and Matassa (2000) divined when they conducted an international literature 
review of community-safety structures for the Criminal Justice Review Group in 
March 2000. The discussions in this chapter will refer to many of the typologies and 
classifications in that review. Although the work may be nine years old, the problems 
it highlights and the analytical approach it provides remain as relevant today as when 
first published. The review thus provides a useful set of analytical tools for setting the 
NAG and other partnership components of neighbourhood policing into context. 
Partnership promises a lot, but like many political promises, it begs the question `does 
it deliver? ' Which itself begs the question, `how would we know if we were 
delivering? ' or `how do we measure successful delivery? ' The discussion here is 
focussed on the tensions as observed during this study and as described by some of 
the stakeholders who were interviewed. It is not meant to provide a systematic method 
for measuring how successful the partnerships have been, but to discuss some of the 
difficulties (and successes) that were observed and attempt to place them within the 
framework of existing theoretical analyses of partnership working, insofar as this is 
possible. 
Partnership and 'Community' 
If any node of security governance intends to work with a `community' in order to 
provide or produce community safety, this co-operation will always contain some 
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form of philosophical underpinning, regardless of how unofficial or uncnunciatcd that 
philosophy is. Each node which invokes the community as a partner does so for a 
specific purpose. It may be to create legitimacy for the node itself, or out of an 
altruistic commitment to ensuring that everyone within a community becomes safer or 
it may simply be because central government targets have obliged the node to work 
with the community and thus they arc doing so. Each and every node will have its 
own collective understanding of what the philosophy behind invoking the notion of 
community is and within each node, each individual member (either individually or as 
a corporate entity, or indeed both) may have their own distinct understanding of what 
that philosophy is or should be. Divining what those different perspectives are is 
virtually impossible in that each individual involved in partnership working at any one 
node is likely to have a slightly different perspective to any other member of their 
own node, and probably more substantially different perspectives from those working 
within other nodes. So while individual agencies may have policy documents stating 
their perspectives on how a partnership should work, there is always substantial 
latitude on the ground for individual representatives or members of a node to work in 
their own way. This can provide individuals within a node the opportunity to make a 
substantial impact on the process of co-producing community safety in their 
neighbourhood. 
There are a number of good examples of these differences in perspective that can be 
seen in the observations of the NAGs in the two case study neighbourhoods. In 
Neighbourhood A there was a substantial debate within the context of the NAG's 
response to bonfire night about who was to be responsible for the production of safety 
and security when it came to the problems of anti-social behaviour related to the 
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bonfires. One resident firmly felt that it was the job of the police and other authorities 
to ensure that things went off smoothly, while an agency representative was adamant 
that the responsibility lay with the community. This is a clear example of the 
inconsistent philosophical perspectives of members of the NAG as to what is the 
exact nature of the relationship when agencies are working in partnership with the 
community. Government White Papers regularly talk about involving the community 
in its own co-production of its own security (see notably `Building Communites, 
Beating Crime', Home Office, 2001) but this raises substantial questions about the 
nature of the state and its role in producing security for its citizens. One of the central 
features of the nation-state as we have known it since the Treaty of Westphalia was 
signed in 1648 is that it provides (or at least strives to provide) security, both external 
miltary security and internal personal security to its citizens and its economic 
interests. In return for this security, the nation state expects some form of loyalty or 
commitment from the citizenry and an acceptance that the use of force is to be 
reserved to the nation-state to apply externally (militarily) and internally through 
prescribed agents of the state, most notably for the purposes of this research, the 
police (although including others such as prison officers and general citizens under 
certain circumstances). 
This is a simplified interpretation of how the relationship works. However it is useful 
in this analysis because it allows us to see, at the level of a small neighbourood- 
focussed node of security governance, that there is a clear articulation on the part of 
agents of the state that the responsibility for security lies with the citizen not the state. 
This `responsibilization' discourse (discussed above in chapter 1) is part of an implicit 
admission that the state as we now know it cannot protect its citizens using its 
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traditional powers, such as the reserved use of force (ic policing) or the containment 
and punishment of its non-conforming citizens (or other people present in the state). If 
citizens must be called upon to provide their own security, this must be because the 
methods which are used by the state on its own arc clearly insufficient to produce that 
security. The question then is; `who is responsible for the production of security? ' Is it 
the state as a Hobbesian Leviathan, or the individual as an economic, social and 
political actor in a constantly shifting, competitive and globalized world? Or is it the 
`community' as a grouping of people or interests best positioned to enable the 
creation of its own security, tailored to best suit its needs? This is not a question that 
is easily answered. It is clear that the mere fact that it needs to be asked suggests that 
the previous models of centrally controlled methods of applying force and punishment 
to induce conformity are no longer (implicitly at least) considered sufficient. 
The most interesting debate in this context at the NAG at Neighbourhood B was about 
a more fundamental or definitional issue. Although it too clearly symbolized the lack 
of coherent conceptualization of what is the philosophy behind a community/agency 
partnership. It focussed on the classic question of `what is a community'. Some 
members of the NAG were unsure why they should be concerned about the interests 
of those who did not live in the neighbourhood but only came into it for temporary 
and largely economic reasons (cg to work or shop). However the facilitator from the 
community safety partnership was adamant that they were indeed part of the 
`community' of Neighbourhood B. The argument put forth was clearly persuasive as 
the members of the NAG appeared to be completely satisfied that in fact such 
temporary visitors to the neighbourhood were indeed stakeholders in the community, 
with a view that should be considered. This discussion, while short, is illustrative of 
211 
the variety of perspectives that individuals working in partnership can have on the 
question of `partnership' and `community'. While the debate in Neighbourhood A 
goes to the heart of great debates on the nature of the state and the role of social 
policy, it does so on a very local level. The discussion in Neighbourhood B 
demonstrates that there can be substantial differences in perspective as to who is to be 
included in the notion of community. 
Both discussions demonstrate, on different levels, the struggle within partnerships to 
find a pragmatic working understanding of terms which are slippery and hard to tic 
down. To work within the node effectively, partners need to have ideas about the 
meanings of terms which are broadly congruent with one another. Regardless of how 
`practical' one considers their approach to the co-production of community safety, at 
some point there must be at least a form of philosophical or at least thought-out 
reasoning for what the node is attempting to do and how it will attempt to do it. This 
need not invoke grand theories or philosophy, but there has to be some sort of 
reasoning behind an intervention and an understanding of a problem or the definition 
of a NAG's security `goals'. 
The Spectrum of Ideal-Types of Partnership Working 
Each individual node of security governance, including any NAG, that operates as a 
venue for collaborative working will have its own sets of resources, problems, 
opportunities and connections. Even within a BCU each NAG might have different 
problems to work on and a set of members with varying levels of commitment and 
know-how which can be utilized to construct effective partnership work on those 
problems. Crawford and Matassa (2000: 102) have found seven models of 
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partnership. Five are based on the typology of partnership in the Morgan Report 
(Home Office, 1991), one is based on academic commentary and the seventh comes 
from their own review of the community-safety structures in place in other 
jurisdictions, notably New Zealand. The seven models arc: 
" The `independent' model, with an independent co-ordinator; 
" The `local authority based' model; 
" The `police centred local' model; 
" The `police centred headquarters'model; 
" The `indeterminate' model, with no clear leader, co-ordinator or strategy; 
" The `corporate'model, with no lead agency; 
" The `sponsored, corporate' model. 
The last model perhaps applies in the case of the Crime and Disorder Act's 
application in that CDRPs are at least formed by a collective group of agencies, 
particularly in initiating the partnerships (Crawford and Matassa, 2000: 102). It is 
clear that a NAG could be described as fitting into a number of different models of 
partnership as outlined above. In its initiation it is clearly a police-centred model, 
which perhaps aspires to be a `police-centred local' model in operation, but was 
certainly `police centred headquarters' model in its initial implementation. Yet NAGS 
also bring about the involvement of local authorities, especially for some NAGs 
starting out, they can appear to have no clear leader, co-ordinator or strategy (ic the 
`indeterminate' model). Although it is clear that no member of such a NAG would 
consider themselves as aspiring to such a lack of direction. It is thus argued here that 
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the NAG as a partnership organization best conforms to the notion of a 'police centred 
local' model of partnership working. 
The evidence gathered for this thesis suggests that the police are the central agency 
behind the NAG and that the NAG is a fundamental part of the business of 
neighbourhood policing. While all of these models come from IIQ, or perhaps more 
strictly, from central government itself, each NAG has a substantial amount of latitude 
in how it operates. The problems are determined at local level and the NAG is 
supposed to operate as a node of security governance in its own right by trying to 
apply the working skills and resources that arc brought to the table by NAG members 
to try and achieve results in the local neighbourhood. However having argued that the 
NAG is best seen as a `police centred local' model of partnership working, it is also 
possible that the partners themselves or even the police might disagree with such a 
classification. 
Yet it is clear from Crawford and Matassa's discussions and indeed from this 
research, that what a partnership node aspires to be and what it actually is on the 
ground are not necessarily the same thing; 
[T]he claims of partnership often hide a very different reality (Crawford, 
1997; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1998; Audit Commission, 1999). 
Many existing partnerships are better described as `talking shops' or 
`paper partnerships' which exist merely for the purposes of satisfying 
funding requirements. In constructing genuine partnerships, local 
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stratcgics nccd to avoid bccoming papcr cxcrciscs which simply rc"labcl 
existing activity as community safety. (2000: 103) 
This risk of becoming a paper-exercise or 'talking shop' was taken seriously in the 
NAGs studied. In fact, the chair of the NAG in Neighbourhood A was noted 
repeatedly cutting off conversations that were not directly related to the problems at 
hand and reminding attendees (and particularly residents) that the NAG was `not a 
talking shop'. However, the success of a NAG in avoiding these pitfalls depends to a 
large degree on how well managed it is, both by the members themselves, their chair 
and the support agencies and facilitators who assist it. In Neighbourhood i3 for 
example, a number of members (again residents) resigned for the specific reason that 
they felt nothing was being done at all and the entire operation was, according to their 
resignation letter, `all talk and no action'. 
Above the conceptual level of the models, Crawford (1998) sets out two `ideal types' 
of partnership working which form the opposing ends of a continuum. These he 
entitles 'multi-agency' partnerships and `inter-agency' partnerships. The former 
representing simple partnerships and the latter embodying `ever-greater levels of 
collaboration'. It is clear that virtually all partnerships operate somewhere between 
the two. Crawford and Matassa suggest that neither is inherently better than the other 
(2000: 103-104). Hughes, argues that `[t]he challenge now for such partnership 
workings may be to move from being multi-agency in character to becoming 
genuinely `inter-agency' in orientation, reflecting an expanded notion of community 
safety as addressing a range of social harms' (2000b: 83). 
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On the face of it, the temptations to aspire towards an intcr-agcncy approach arc 
substantial. If partncrship truly movcs from 'multi-agcncy co-opcration' to 'intcr- 
agency collaboration' there is the potential for a substantial change (or indeed reform) 
of how public services as they relate to the provision of community safety arc 
provided. Crawford and Matassa provide a sketch figure of the two types of 
partnership as one might conceive of them visually (Fig 6.1). It is clear that the inter- 
agency approach is considered to be substantially more dynamic in both its operations 
and outcomes. This sort of collaboration is what it seems police officers and other 
agencies mean when they speak of the application of `joined-up thinking', an oft- 
repeated phrase amongst the police officers spoken to in this research. Ilowcver, on 
the other hand there is a risk with greater collaboration that individual agencies will 
come into greater, and more intractable conflict by conducting inter-agency 
operations (2000: 104). 
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Two Ideal Types of Partnerships 
Multi-Agency Partnerships - Co-opf+r;? rrnn 
Inter-Agency Partnerships - Gollabowlion 
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Figure 6.1: Inter-agency versus multi-agency partnerships 
Notwithstanding the potential for such inter-agenc\ collaboration, the operation of' 
neighbourhood policing in the neighbourhoods studied fell firmly into the category of 
`multi-agency partnership'. The discourse about partnership never once mentioned the 
notion of `inter-agency' working or the potential benefits of such collaborations. Yet 
at times there were discussions about difficulties in getting agencies to work together 
or fulfil the commitments they had made at a NAG (consider the problems of getting 
an agency to provide signs about the problems of garages in Neighbourhood A). It 
appears from this research that NAGs and the partnership process in neighbourhood 
policing are built on a `police-centred local' model and firmly fall into the category of 
`multi-agency partnerships'. It is hard to see how neighbourhood policing with its 
present structures, could move towards a truly inter-agency collaborative approach 
without something of a seachange in the operation of local government. it is also 
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difficult to predict if such a reform would pay off in terms of increasing community 
safety. Finally, it is also interesting to consider if such a change is desirable given the 
very real risks (discussed below) of criminalizing social policy. 
Problems of DI Brent Motivations 
Perhaps a substantial obstacle in the way of moving towards greater inter-agency 
collaboration is the simple fact that a plurality of agencies will inevitably have at least 
an equal number of different agendas. Unless all agencies are to sit at the table and, 
somewhat meaninglessly, say `all our agendas arc the same; we want what is good for 
people and society', or some similarly vague aspiration, then they would be denying 
the essential differences in their skills, resources and approaches which makes them 
useful contributors. Differences in motivations and modi operandi are essential to 
partnership working. After all, if all agencies aimed for the same thing and worked the 
same way, why have more than one? Yet it is posited here that despite this potential 
for different contributions, this difference is also a great challenge to partnership 
working. 
In the context of neighbourhood policing the police are involved in partnership 
working through NAGs because it is the central core of what their corporate agenda 
has become in recent years (Clarke et al., 2007: 55-59). It is from the police that the 
motivation and drive to initiate the partnership process of neighbourhood policing has 
come, although stepping back, it could be argued that the motivation comes from 
central government. Other agencies have come on board more slowly and their 
apparent reluctance is a useful indicator of the differences in motivations between the 
police and partners. As one senior officer put it: 
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It would be fair to say that it startcd with the dircction to conduct 
neighbourhood policing was initially given to the police. So initially the 
police started doing it. To engage partners then wasn't particularly 
difficult, because most of them existed. But there was a reluctance to get 
involved. As the various edicts of central government required partners 
involvement as well, it's become better, but there has been a real, voyage 
of discovery, in the different working methods of all the various 
organizations (Senior police officer, Thames Valley Police I Ieadquarters). 
This perhaps shows that initially most partners wcrc becoming involved in 
neighbourhood policing because of central government directives to work together 
rather than through a decision on their own part that their own corporate objectives 
were best achieved through participation in such partnerships. This is understandable 
given the pressure on resources that arc faced by all agencies attempting to provide 
public services. All agencies arc, or at least consider themselves to be, under- 
resourced and this can have a substantial impact on how motivated they arc to conduct 
the work of consultation and attending NAGs. This was identified by one agency 
representative as perhaps one of the key problems: 
I would say that all the partners are committed but inevitably there arc 
some resourcing issues I think from all the key agencies, the police, the 
parishes and [the] Council arc trying to identify ways to overcome that. 
Inevitably from the police point of view, one of the issues is the regular 
turnover of staff, particularly PCSOs that arc thcn moving on to join the 
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regulars etc. So it's always a resourcing issue about how to plug and 
backfill those posts. I don't think there is any doubt that all the key 
agencies arc committed. Similarly with [the] Council going through a 
process to identify a key dedicated officer to support each NAG to 
overcome those resourcing issues. 
The resources required to attend and support partnership meetings (notably the thirty- 
two NAGs in the BCU) place substantial strain on partner agencies and clearly make 
it difficult for them to commit fully to the process. This was evidenced in the poor 
attendance of some agencies in both case study neighbourhoods, for example the 
difficulties experienced in getting a representative of the Council's housing 
department to attend the NAG at Neighbourhood A and the similar problems of 
getting a representative of the private housing authority to attend the NAG at 
Neighbourhood B. 
The example of the private housing authority raises an important point about 
differences in motivation, which arc particularly acute in the case of the private, 
profit-making corporate body, such as local businesses and private housing 
authorities. Private housing authorities arc, in many cases, profit-making entities who 
create financial surpluses by providing a public service on behalf of the government 
who have devolved the power to do so to the body. Like all corporations, their central 
aim is the production of profit (Bakan, 2005). I lowever, they remain legally a public 
body for the purposes of judicial review (Manning, 2004) and for review of their 
operations under the Hunian Rights Act 1998 (Wadham el al., 2007: 74). Yet it is easy 
for such private bodies, whose central aim is to make a profit, to focus more on this 
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aim than the provision of adequate public scrviccs. Parallels can be drawn in the 
criminal justice system with the difficulties in terms of accountability surrounding 
private provision of prison (Cavadino and Dignan, 2002: 249) and sccurity patrols 
(Button, 2007). What is clear in all these examples, is that there can be conflicting 
motivations. 
These conflicting motivations are even more acutely visible in the case of corporate 
entities which are not legally accountable as public bodies with public functions, but 
which have a substantial impact on the possibilities for producing community safety. 
The two classic examples, seen clearly in this research are of course the pub landlord 
and the large national supermarket chain. In one NAG that was observed (although 
not a case study NAG) there were serious problems getting a local pub landlord to 
attend, despite the attendance of PCSOs at the pub inviting the landlord to attend. 
Similarly, in Neighbourhood B, there was substantial difficulty getting a 
representative of a large national supermarket chain, which had a small franchise in 
Gamma Town, to attend. This difficulty is perhaps a teething problem and an agency 
representative who was interviewed pointed out that some NAGs, albeit after the 
fieldwork for this research was carried out, have made progress with the chain and 
this has led to other NAGs beginning to gain access to the chain and convincing it to 
send representatives to the meeting. The supermarket chain's franchise in 
Neighbourhood B was repeatedly identified as a site of anti-social behaviour both in 
the NAG's `board-blasts' and in the initial consultation phase when stickers were 
placed on a map of Neighbourhood ß at the public mccting. however, as Button 
(2007) observed in his research on PSOs in a large shopping mall, reducing anti-social 
behaviour (or increasing security generally) is only a concern of commercial 
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enterprises while it is increasing profits or in some way adding to that profit-making 
process. Convincing a corporation to bccomc involved in partnership work on 
community safety by sending representatives to NAGS (at tangible cost to the 
corporation) will only be possible while it can be shown that this is worthwhile to the 
corporation in terms of financial advantage, or at the very least has tangible payoff in 
terms of goodwill. Initiating, and sustaining these relationships through difficult times 
may prove challenging for partnership working. 
Corporations, like many of the partners in neighbourhood policing are motivated by 
commitments to other areas of social policy or proft"making. Understanding these 
differences is key to understanding how to obtain the co-operation of partner agencies 
in the neighbourhood policing process. However it has to be remembered that partners 
have different roles to play in society and it is something of a risk to become 
completely obsessed with their efforts on the issue of community safety over their 
other tasks. 
The Criminalization and 'ASB-icizatlon' of Social Policy and 'Youth' 
As has just been discussed, many partners have an important role to play in the 
provision of social (and private) services to a wide section of society. There is 
however, a real concern that the focus on crime prevention or community safety could 
become all pervasive in the area of providing social services at the expense of other 
equally, or perhaps more, important and legitimate concerns in the field of social 
policy such as poverty prevention, reduction of social exclusion or the provision of 
high standards of health, housing and education. As Crawford and Matassa put it: 
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A potential conscqucncc of according to crime a central place in the 
construction of social ordcr, is that fundamcntal public issucs may becomc 
marginalised, except in so far as they are defined in terms of their 
crimogenic qualities. The danger is that, as a consequence, we may come 
to view poor housing, unemployment, poor schooling, the lack of youth 
leisure opportunities, and so on, as no longer important public issues in 
themselves. Rather, their importance may become increasingly seen to 
derive from the belief that they lead to crime and disorder. The fact that 
they may do so is no reason not to assert their importance in their own 
right. After all, there are other things which arc more important than crime 
prevention. (2000: 96) 
There are other ways of viewing the problems of contemporary society which do not 
need to be so crime-focussed. For example, one could take a 'harm-centred' (Tifn, 
1995) or `zemiological' approach to the work of agencies in social policy (Ilillyard, 
2005). It is clear that the work of partner agencies beyond the field of community 
safety makes an equal, or arguably greater, contribution to human well-being than one 
that is constrained within the relatively narrow concepts of `crime' and `anti-social 
behaviour'. Alternatively one could consider the question of whether there can be 
`enough' crime, or `too much' crime control. This point, and indeed the point that 
there may be social policy aspirations greater than crime prevention, is echoed by the 
writings of Durkheim (1895 [1996]: 49; scc also Morrison, 1997: 57) who argucd that 
there was a `normal' amount of crime which a society must accept as part of its proper 
functioning. If crime is such a fluid, contested and difficult to quantify concept (sec 
discussion in chapters 1 and 2), how useful is it to become obsessed with crime as the 
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central focus around which to build a late-modern pluralist society? Tlic notion of 
undefined `anti-social behaviour' (see chapter 2) is an example of the widening net of 
social control (Cohen, 1979) where such a potentially broad use of the concept of 
`crime' to label almost any social problem has made antisocial behaviour one of the 
buzz-words of contemporary discourse. Anti-social behaviour thus becomes a notion 
that allows former `crime control agencies' such as the police to become involved in 
broader social policy issues such as litter, and in parallel allows agencies traditionally 
not involved in social control, for example housing authorities, to become central to 
the control agenda in issuing threats of eviction to anti-social tenants. It seems that the 
anxieties expressed by Crawford and Matassa may be justified in that the focus on 
reducing crime and anti-social behaviour are affecting the implementation of other 
social policy concerns. 
A useful example is the problem of the garages in Neighbourhood B. The NAG is 
putting pressure on the council's housing department to remove `void' garages and 
put up signs to make residents aware of the problem, yet the housing department is 
not attending the meetings and the council arc slow to provide signs. Thcy clearly, as 
discussed above, have their own motivations in working on the garages (resources, 
revenue stream from the garages, other concerns within their department) and their 
own view of how to best discharge their public duty to provide and maintain housing 
within their district. Why should a NAG be able to influence them to alter their view 
of how their service should be provided, solely because the NAG's concern is anti- 
social behaviour? Why should there be an 1Sß-icization of the council's work in 
providing an essential, and difficult to facilitate, social service such as housing? This 
question goes to the heart of the discussion above on the difference between inulti- 
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and inter-agency partnership working. While it seems wonderful to aspirc to 
collaboration of an inter-agency nature, with incrcascd syncrgics and cohcrcncics in 
responses and strategies, it is clear from the contexts of these discussions (the instant 
thesis on neighbourhood policing, and a government commissioncd literature review 
on community safety), that this discussion is itself risking making the very mistakes 
which it is criticising. The evidence from this research suggests that the aspiration to 
increase collaboration is in the context of the `struggle' with crime and antisocial 
behaviour and that the synergies are to assist in that struggle rather than concern the 
collaborative effort with the aims and aspirations of those agencies and their 
contributions to social policy. There can be no doubt that a police-ccntrcd partnership 
model risks criminalizing or ASB-icizing social policy. 
The police are, after all the lead players in the operation and instigation of NAGs and 
(at the risk of stating the obvious) neighbourhood policing itself. Other partners, as 
has been observed in this chapter, have been slower to come to the table and become 
involved in the project. It is simply not obvious what arc the benefits to them of 
involvement in the partnership process. While there is some `bigger picture' or 
longer-term thinking involved in the problcm-solving process (discussed below, 
chapter 7), there is a consistent search for `quick wins' which are expected to be 
facilitated by partners in order to make an impression on local residents and 
stakeholders, to increase the NAG's reputation and help draw in other partners to the 
process. Focussing agency resources on crime and anti-social behaviour to bolster the 
image of the NAG is a good example of `the creeping criminalisation of social policy 
that community safety may herald' (Crawford and Matassa, 2000: 96). 
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Parallel with the risk of criminalizing social policy is the equally grave risk of 
criminalizing or ASI3-icizing `youth' or 'young people'. 'T'his was clearly apparent in 
the two case-study neighbourhoods in this research. The consultation process in 
Neighbourhood B is a good example of `young people hanging around' being 
determined as a problem by local residents, who in the next breath admitted that they 
were not in fact doing anything wrong. These young people were merely socializing 
together in a public location, yet there is the risk of casting them as a problem or a 
risk of anti-social behaviour, when there is no evidence that they arc doing anything 
wrong. When it came to the problem-solving process in Neighbourhood i3, the 
neighbourhood police officer pointed out that anti-social behaviour decreased when 
the weather was bad, so to solve or ameliorate the priority problems in the 
neighbourhood, the best thing the NAG could do was `pray for rain'. In 
Neighbourhood Aa similar youth-focussed argument was made for how to solve the 
problem of anti-social behaviour. The NAG's chair spoke at some length about the 
fact that if children were sitting in front of computer screens at the youth club or the 
local drop in centre anti-social behaviour would decrease. Thus the best way to reduce 
the risk of anti-social behaviour caused by young people playing outside during the 
summer was to increase the opening hours and capacity of these centres so that young 
people could spend more time on computers. 
This is a disturbing description of how to manage young people as they navigate some 
of the trickiest parts of their lives. Instead of engaging them it is suggested that it is 
best to corral them into computer rooms to be entertained by and interact with 
software so as to reduce the problems they cause to adults. Blaming young people for 
all the crime and anti-social behaviour and problcmatizing their existence, not only 
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risks increasing the scale of the problem (for cxnmplc by 'labelling' young people 
criminal, they may act up to the role), but also avoids the uncomfortable reality that it 
is they who are in fact most vulnerable and in need of society's support. 'Othcring' 
them in order to create the normal order of the law-abiding, productive adult is not the 
way to resolve such problems, no matter how many computer screens the NAG can 
gain access to. 
Tension Between Central Government Targets and Local Priorities 
One of the great conflicts in the movement towards a community-policing, 
neighbourhood policing or citizen-focuscd local policing model, is that it is instigated 
by those in central government (in a UK context, but it could just as easily be 
instigated at the level of a state or regional government in another political context) 
and has to be implemented by officers at a local level. The interests of the two are not 
necessarily the same. As Neyroud puts it, `this dichotomy between central targets and 
local engagement sits at the heart of the dilemma for police managers wrestling with 
the agendas set out in successive consultation papers' (2007: 215). 
Surprisingly, this tension does not appear to be as much of a problem for the other 
agencies who are involved in neighbourhood policing. As one agency representative 
said: 
The particular agency where that has been a problem has been the police 
because there obviously arc national targets that say 'sanctioned 
detections' and, you know, `you've got to hit this target', but priority is 
beginning to take place. Again this is also about how their internal 
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understanding fits within that. The police have now put into place 
abstraction policies which arc beginning to take effect. Whereas before the 
core reactive teams might have been pulling people out of neighbourhoods 
to cover this, then obviously that was going to have an impact on the 
service at a local level. I don't think that the NAGs necessarily have seen 
it. All they've seen is, well you know, `that police officer's not been 
there'. They've not really understood at the NAG what the issue was. 
Whereas obviously the agencies, that's where it's impacted. I think that's 
been a major issue within the police but not necessarily had an effect with 
the other agencies around the table. The problem with local government 
has probably been political influence. But that's more been about tensions 
amongst people's own objectives and egos rather than what was happening 
(emphasis added). 
This is an interesting observation because not only does it get to the heart of the 
conflict between the central governmental aspirations for the neighbourhood policing 
policy, but it also directly connects the conflict to the ideological conflict between the 
`response' and `community' police officer or `hard' versus `son' policing. This is a 
divide that co-incides with Kclling and Moore's (1988) notions of the phases of 
policing moving from `reform era' or professionalized policing to 'community 
problem-solving era' policing. In the former `era' the police officer was monitored to 
ensure fast response times and other quantifiable targets were being met efficiently. 
In the latter, the police officer attempts to connect to the community, and provide a 
bespoke service fitting to their security needs. What the current model of 
neighbourhood policing requires is that the police provide both types of service and 
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this is an obvious locus of tension as demands increase or decrease on each section. It 
is clear that central efforts to strictly control or 'managcrializc' policing cannot allow 
for the freedom of decision-making required of an officer committed to long term 
community-connection, relationship-building and problcm-solving. One officer who 
was interviewed was seconded to the National Policing Improvement Agency. She 
flagged up the same problem of a commitment to quantitative evaluation, whereby the 
police remain wedded to central targets around detection, when neighbourhood targets 
need to be evaluated by some other means: 
ACPO leads and BCU commanders arc currently held to account for their 
sanctioned detection rates in terms of crime detections. And we really need 
to get to a point, and I think it's coming, certainly from government, in 
terms of some indicators around confidence and satisfaction. So until BCU 
commanders are held to account for that locally, you know, they tend to 
concentrate on what's measured. ... [S]ome of the BCU commanders we 
speak to, when they go up to their performance meetings, they don't get 
asked, `how many neighbourhood priorities have you solved this month? ' 
They get asked `what's your sanctioned detection rate? ' and `why is it 
this? ' or `why is it that? '. 
This, she argued could be considered in terms of a need for a change in police 
culture, something that policing academics have been debating for some years 
(Chan, 1996,1997; Waddington, 1999). 
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It's a bit of a cultural changc therc. And that is required before that gcts 
filtered down to a neighbourhood officer level. Sometimes, you ask them 
`what's your priorities? ' and they still think it's around sanctioned 
detections, which it's not, You know, it nccds to be vcry much more 
around the sort of qualitative stuff as opposed to the quantitative stuff. 
Moving to this sort of qualitative evaluation is cxccptionally difficult for the police, 
and indeed for many agencies in public service (Clarke et at, 2007). It demands a 
fundamental re-think of what is `success', which, as has been discussed throughout 
this work, is a difficult and inherently political debate in itsclf. 
As well as the problem of quantitative central targets overwhelming qualitative 
neighbourhood objectives, they also cause substantial problems in the construction of 
solid and stable police-neighbourhood relationships. This is particularly evident with 
the abstraction of officers from neighbourhood duties to response duties. If there is to 
be any chance of a neighbourhood police officer making progress on connecting with 
the stakeholders in his neighbourhood, which may be as big as 6,000 people (plus 
short term visitors), it is only going to be through repeatedly meeting people and re- 
inforcing the notion that they know the area and arc committed to it. Tliis is a very real 
problem and one that was observed in both Neighbourhoods A and B where three 
different neighbourhood officers were rotated through the former neighbourhood and 
two through the latter in the course of the research. While there is no implication that 
these officers were not committed to their neighbourhood work, the fact that they were 
transferred without even working for a year makes it difficult for them to be able to 
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fully get to grips with a neighbourhood, its politics (both small and large 't"), 
dynamics and perhaps even its geography. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the concept of `nodal governance of security' is a useful 
way to view the operation of neighbourhood policing. This is particularly the case if 
the NAG is considered to be a node of security governance, which interacts with other 
nodes in a greater `security quilt'. The node interacts with other nodes through, for 
example, the implementation of agreed actions by partner agencies who arc in 
attendance, or by lobbying stakeholders or other resource controllers to act in a way 
that impacts on the outcome which favours the NAG's objectives, or efforts to solve 
priority problems. In discussing this work, it is just as important to consider the nature 
of the internal operations of the NAG as it is to consider its interaction with other 
nodes. These internal interactions are not always clear. Partner agencies often operate 
towards different goals, by different means and with different timetables. These 
differences have to be considered carefully when analysing the operation of a node. 
There arc other problems with partnership working in neighbourhood policing. There 
is a real risk that by operating in a partnership arrangement which focusses on crime 
reduction, that the aims of other providers of social services will become focussed on 
reducing crime, rather than the provision of valuable and useful social services for 
their own sake. This criminalization of social policy risks viewing all social service 
provision as a part of the fight against crime and may in fact hinder the development 
of effective provision of other services. The problem of viewing `problems' as 
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criminal is also evident in the way 'youth' and young people are often perceived to be 
a criminal problem, something to be dealt with by a policing or NAG intervention. lt 
is clear that partnership agencies need to avoid the pitfalls of 'criminalizing' things 
that are not best dealt with by notions of criminal justice. 
Another problem is the tension between the desired central government control over 
the process, which manifests itself in targets, guidelines and standards, and the 
overarching aim of neighbourhood policing that it should provide a local policing 
service to suit local conditions and local demands. Ilow does a police manager juggle 
the competing demands on police resources? Interestingly, it appears from this 
research that, although some partner agencies may have been obliged to initially enter 
partnership working due to edicts from central government, it is the police who suffer 
most from this conflict between national targcts and local dcmands. 
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Chapter 7 
The Relationship Between Neighbourhood Action Groups, 
Neighbourhood Policing, Problem-oriental Policing and Intelligence- 
led Policing 
`[P]roblem-oriented policing is a state of mind, and not a program, 
technique or procedure' (Eck and Spelman, 1988). 
One of the aims of the NAG as a node of security governance is that it will attempt to 
reduce the recurrence of perennial problems of a type that is often described as 
criminal activity or anti-social behaviour. In order to achieve this, a NAG uses the 
Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment (or SARA) approach and the skills at its 
disposal to try to eliminate components of the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT), that 
is to say, remove a problem victim, location or offender from contact with the other 
two, and thus eliminate the problem. This problem"oricntcd policing (POP) will, it is 
hoped, reduce the problems before they manifest themselves as incidents which 
demand police or other agency intervention. POP in many ways aspires to be a useful 
approach to policing because `a stitch in time, saves nine' and thus solving problems 
reduces the drain on police resources which attaches to repeated call outs for the same 
problem (Goldstein, 1979). The theory behind these approaches (POP, ILP, SARA 
and PAT) have been discussed above (chapters 2 and 5) and it is not intended to 
return in depth to those debates here, instead this chapter discusses some of the 
practical issues and difficulties with applying POP and IL1' techniques in 
neighbourhood policing, particularly by NAGs. 
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A parallel aim of neighbourhood policing is that it should have a role in producing 
information which may in time become 'intelligence' to assist the police in 
conducting intelligence-lcd policing operations (Association of Chief Police Officers, 
2006: section 4). This, it is hoped, would be achieved by building trust in the 
community or neighbourhood, which allowed members of that community to fccl that 
they could engage with the police in providing information which may be of use to 
them. This trust could perhaps be built by solving a perennial problem in a 
neighbourhood and showing a community that the police were serious about their 
problems. Alternately it could be merely by trying to increase visibility and 
accessibility in the hope that the reassurance produced by such action would enable 
those with useful information to come forward. Both ILP and POP arc interconnected 
and neighbourhood policing is intended to involve aspects of both approaches (sec 
discussion in chapter 1). One senior police officer at the TVP explained how the ILP 
and POP approach are intricately bound up in the process of neighbourhood policing 
when each neighbourhood is rolled out: 
I actually check to make sure that all the neighbourhoods have got three 
things in place before I sort of give them the green light to go ahead. In 
neighbourhood policing that means they have got to have dedicated 
resources onto the neighbourhood, they've got to work jointly with their 
partners and problem-solving and be actually intelligence-lcd. 
It is clear from this that from the police manager's perspective the two approaches arc 
bound up in the practice of neighbourhood policing. In this chapter each approach is 
discussed with regard to the implementation of neighbourhood policing generally, but 
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particularly with regard to their rclationship with the Ncighbourhood Action Group. 
The NAGs visited in the process of this research relied heavily on a traditional POP 
approach, but also fed information up into the intelligence hierarchy, and thus had at 
least some connection with ILI'. However, the role of the NAGs observed in this 
study was focussed more on solving neighbourhood problems and only peripherally in 
gathering information to feed intelligence-lcd policing and as a result this chapter will 
focus more on POP than ILP. 
Neighbourhood Action Groups and Problem-Oriented Policing 
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the NAGs studied in this research conducted 
problem oriented policing using the traditional SARA method. This section will 
discuss some of the different perceptions of that process between the police managers 
on the one hand and the experience on the ground on the other. It will then discuss the 
problems with the problem-solving process as encountered at the two case-study 
NAGs. 
Police managers are eager to follow the SARA process and seemed keen that it should 
be used in practice in the NAGs themselves. The SARA process, according to one 
police manager interviewed, is `a tried and tested method'. This particular manager 
felt that the process of compiling Neighbourhood Priority Profiles in order to move 
smoothly through the SARA process was a helpful way for officers on the ground, 
and their partners, to apply the methodology. ilowever, some officers working at a 
neighbourhood level were not interested in it because they found it too bureaucratic; 
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So they more or less basically tend not to fill it out. But if they did rill it 
out ... But if you actually follow the form through, it actually leads you 
through the process. You've got to do your scanning before you move on 
to your analysis and do your analysis before you movc on to responsc. The 
process is there. It's just actually giving the officers the training in the 
process to actually deliver on the model. 
Other managers who were interviewed agreed that the model was valuable when they 
came to discussing the process of finding out what the actual 'facts on the ground' 
were. This occurred when the problems raised in community or neighbourhood 
consultations were actually put to the test. The example given is of a problem that was 
written off by explaining to neighbourhood residents and stakeholders what the nature 
of the problem actually was. Thus it was an exercise in managing pcrccptions. 
Well actually, when the initial scanning was done, on a more accurate than 
anecdotal basis, we discovered that actually there wasn't speeding. What 
the problem was, was people driving at twentycight miles an hour, loudly. 
So actually there's a need to tell people that the speed of that vehicle was 
actually twenty-eight miles an hour, not forty-two. So the problem then 
became, perception of speed, which was addressed through a variety of 
measures. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, one of the great difticultics attached to I'01' is that 
defining problems can be so difficult. Defining crime itself is the subject of huge and 
ongoing debate (Simcstcr and Sullivan, 2007), while the notion of anti-social 
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behaviour is under constant scrutiny (Case, 2007; Liberty, 2007; Morgan and 
Newburn, 2007). So when a group within a neighbourhood is in the position to raise 
an issue of crime or antisocial behaviour, such a complaint has to be properly 
`scanned' or assessed before a response can be decided upon. In the speeding case, 
operating an intervention to solve the problem would have in fact been a great waste 
of resources because there was in fact no such problem, other than a perception of a 
problem. 
This perception of a crime taking place and a demand for the police to do something 
about it is interesting. It is in effect a demand on the police to do something about 
how people perceive crime in their area rather than actually to control the activity 
labelled `criminal' by the residents (although not the criminal law). The greater local 
engagement which the police conduct, the greater the risk of putting in place 
interventions which may act not to impede crime or anti-social behaviour, but merely 
to impede perfectly legal activities. In cases such as the example of speeding given 
above, the police - when acting as the `catch-all social service' - are being asked to 
deal with problems which simply do not exist, or exist merely within the perception of 
an individual or group of individuals, based on a misconstruction of what is actually 
happening. 
Of course, in the post- or late-modern world, the concept of 'actually happening' or 
any other form of 'reality' is hotly contested (Milovanovic, 2001). The speeding 
example is one in which some sort of objective analysis can be applied to how 'bad' 
the problem is. This is unlike the problem of any form of anti-social behaviour which 
is only a problem if there is a person present to feel 'harassment, alarm or distress', 
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which is far more open to interpretation. No commentators that i am aware of arc 
seriously contesting that the police's measurement of vehicle speed as a method of 
establishing if there is a speeding problem, is in some way subjective. Thus, when it 
comes to traffic problems, it seems that the police can actually use the scanning 
process to decide if there is a problem worth intervening. If there is not a speeding 
problem, as in this case, their answer is to attempt to educate those who have the 
grievance about the extent of the `problem-activity' and why it was that the police 
were not in a position to intervene in it. While such an exercise in `winning hearts and 
minds' may seem to be completely different to response policing, in fact it can be read 
as merely another facet of it. That is to say that in the speeding example, as in the 
example of almost any `traditional' or `fire-brigade' policing, the police officer is 
resolving a conflict, in this case, between the driver and the resident. As in any other 
case of police intervention, there is no guarantee that the resident (who is essentially 
the `loser' in the conflict) will be pleased with or even accepting of the outcome. 
This conflict resolution role is at the core of what it is that the public police do, 
whether this is by breaking up fights or by assuaging the concerns of the resident 
about the motorist who is driving loudly. Applying the techniques of problcm- 
oriented policing can thus be seen as an extension of that conflict resolution role, or at 
least a different strategy for approaching conflict in the social world. 
The Attraction of SARA: Controlling Local Police Discretion and UcMand 
Management 
While the problem of'speeding' outlined above may be relatively easy to quantify or 
`scan', serious challenges remain for problems that arc less mechanically quantifiable 
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than breaches of traffic regulations. While managers may prefer to see officers und 
NAGs on the ground implementing a strict SARA approach because it appears to be 
an entirely rigourous activity, built as it is within a step by step methodological 
framework, it is important to note that each and every step risks the imposition of 
individual prejudices or preferences. To the police manager SARA provides a way to 
reduce the discretion of the lower ranking neighbourhood police officer, by hemming 
them in with bureaucratic targets. Thus it can be a tool in controlling how the police 
manager achieves their service or responsiveness goals. The SARA approach, while 
attempting to force those on the ground to take a scrupulous approach to a problem, 
does not look at the actual steps that occurred in defining that problem as something 
to which the SARA process can be applied. So while scanning may 'no-crime' a 
problem, it says little about the politics of the social construction of a problem. 
Similarly it cannot predict if the problem's eradication is a worthwhile use of police 
time, or a worthwhile end in itself. Take for example the question of parking in 
Omega Town in Neighbourhood B. This problem was a particular issue for one 
individual resident, although it was not selected by the police and community safety 
officials as the right problem for the NAG to analyse. However, in a world of infinite 
police resources, there is no reason that the SARA technique could not be applied to 
the parking problem. SARA cannot help define the problems which a NAG or police 
force attempts to tackle, in essence it can only process them. I lowever, occasionally at 
the scanning phase SARA will discover the 'problem' is not in fact a 'problem'. For 
example residents complained in Neighbourhood B of drug taking being a problem, 
however, at the scanning stage, the NAG found that there was not a big problem of 
drug taking in the neighbourhood. 
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One of the attractions of the SARA model it appears, is that it is a formal structure 
which police managers can use to direct the rank and file police officer in their 
operations. It has been said that the police is an unusual organization bccausc the real 
power of the police force resides in the discretion of the most junior members of the 
force. They arc the ones who make the most crucial dccsions, the decisions which get 
closest to the use of force. That is to say, following the analysis of Bittncr (1990), if 
the police are distinguished as an entity in society by their legal capacity to use force, 
and it is the decision to do so or not to which is at the core of every 'coal-face' 
policing decision (Junior and Muniz, 2006), it is those who make these decisions who 
have the greatest individual power and the majority of the time this is outside the 
supervision of superiors. That reversal of power from the top brass to the 'bobby on 
the beat' is only exacerbated by providing greater police autonomy to the community 
police officer. Controlling that power is one of the great challenges of police reform 
and central to long standing efforts to increase scrutiny of police powers going back 
as far as the Police and Criminal Evidence 4 cl 1984 and beyond (1 lenry, 2007a). 
SARA can be seen as providing a method for controlling the rank and file police 
officer who may be considered to be risking the possibility of using the notion of 
problem-solving to justify practices that either do not solve problems or aim to solve 
problems in ways that arc beyond what is acceptable. 
Officers spoken to during this research, particularly those who were being trained at 
the beginning of the implementation of the neighbourhood policing, found the 
guidelines involved somewhat overwhelming. Guidelines, they felt, were coming at 
them thick and fast from central government and head office and it was hard to keep 
up with the demands made on them. This is perhaps one of the great ironies of the 
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localization of policing priorities, they must be solved using methodologies prescribed 
by central government. At its heart neighbourhood policing's potential legitimacy is 
built on an aspiration towards a byegone era with a bobby on the beat in every village, 
deciding what was most appropriate for his area, yet the policy is imposed in a top- 
down and structured fashion by Headquarters and Home Office. Those pushing the 
guidelines from `HQ and HO' are part of an `MBA culture' and this tension between 
the centralized audit-driven New-managerialist bureaucrat and the neighbourhood 
sergeant looks set to be one of the ideological battlegrounds of policing in the near 
future (Neyroud, 2007: 218-220; Westmarland, 2008: 275-276). 
The tension between strict technique and a more intuitive approach to problcm- 
solving was noted by one NAG chair who described the problems that partners had 
with the police's strict problem-solving approach. Having been told how to problem- 
solve using the SARA and PAT techniques, the NAG decided to do the job its own 
way: 
We jettisoned that process of problem-solving after we had gone through 
the whole process and found our three priority areas for work. For a 
number of reasons, it was partly to do with the speed of it. We did find, 
given that the make up of the NAG was people who were used to problem 
solving in their own way anyway, had their own networks and had a much 
speedier way of getting the smaller aspects of the project sorted out, rather 
than going through, what we thought to be a rather cumbersome process 
of, you know, of the identifying the victim and the whole triangular 
structure of problem-solving. 
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SARA is not, after all, the only way of solving a problem. The dependence on 
rigorous procedures may appeal to the police manager, but (as discussed in chapter 6) 
what works for the police or appeals to the police manager may not feel intuitively 
correct to every partner agency or individual. The neatly delineated sections of SARA 
are not as neat in practical terms, As Tillcy puts it; 'In practice there is a good deal of 
feedback and overlap between stages, making the process messier than this tidy 
reconstruction might suggest' (Tilley, 2003). For these reasons, it is easy to see why a 
neighbourhood policing officer or other NAG member would prefer to take a more 
pragmatic approach than work within the strictures of SARA. This is borne out by the 
experiences observed in the two case study neighbourhoods (chapters 4 and 5) where 
the Neighbourhood Priority Profile for local problems were only rarely used as the 
focal point for debate at NAGs. SARA may be well thought out, and provide 
managers with tangible evidence of performance but its use on the ground at NAGS 
does not seem to have taken hold. 
Difficulties with Problem-Solving in Neighbourhood Policing 
As with partnership-working, problem-solving within the context of the NAG 
produces its own problems. From the observations of problem-solving work at the 
NAGs which was conducted for this research, it is clear that these problems can be 
categorized under six headings as follows: 
1. Problems of definition (both political and administrative); 
2. `Teething problems' or problems associated with initiating a new programme; 
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3. `Timeframe problems' which relate to the pressures of achieving something 
quickly; 
4. Problems of ownership; 
5. Problems of evaluation; and 
6. Problems of sustainability. 
Some of these problems can be observed clearly in the descriptions of NAG meetings 
already set out in the two preceding chapters. However, there is also other data from 
the case-study NAGs, other NAGs, interviews and discussions which can help to 
illustrate these difficulties and how they hinder the resolution of particular problems. 
The problem of definition is two-fold. On the one hand there is the problem of 
selecting a problem (political definition). The second problem with definition arises 
when it comes to applying the processes of the problem-solving to the problem 
(administrative definition). These two problems are different and raise their own 
issues. The decision-making process that produces the political definition of a 
problem takes place in a temporally distinct location in the problcm-solving process to 
the process that produces the administrative definition of the problem. 
The process of political definition is perhaps best exemplified in the process of 
consultation with the community, which was discussed extensively in the context of 
how Neighbourhood B chose its problems (chapter 4). Chosing between the many 
competing possible applications of police resources (which, like all resources, and 
despite the claims of many politicians, arc scarce), is an inherently political decision. 
Indeed Reiner argues that policing is `inherently and inescapably political' because, 
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`their specific role in the enforcement of laws and the maintenance of order is as 
specialists in coercion. The craft of successful policing is to minimize the use of force 
but it remains the specialist resource of the police, their distinctive role in the political 
order' (2000a: 8). Policing of all forms, even so-called 'soft' forms such as 
neighbourhood policing arc political in their very nature. No matter how broadly you 
consult, no matter how much you weigh it up, unless there were a world with no 
crime and no disputes (in which case, why consult with or indeed have a police 
force? ), somebody has to be made the subject of police actions, somebody has to be 
`othered'. The problems about deciding who it is that should be othcrcd arc somewhat 
obvious in a world that ostensibly aspires to respect the human dignity of all. Yet all 
policing, including neighbourhood policing and POP, must of its nature involve 
political decisions. However, after all the engagement of police with communities, 
neighbourhoods and stakeholders, it appears that the same sorts of problems arise, at 
least as far as the police arc concerned. As one police manager put it; `So in a 
nutshell, it's basically vehicle stuff, speeding, mini-motos, environmental issues, 
graffitti stroke vandalism, groups of young people, anti-social behaviour. That's it 
isn't it? ' Although some neighbourhoods in the constabulary he pointed out, raised 
their own unique problems, perhaps related to locality-specific environmental 
considerations such as a motorway on-ramp or, as seen in this research, the garages in 
Neighbourhood A. 
Beyond the problem of political definition, and once the consultation has produced 
the basic priorities, the problems of administrative definition begin to appear. 
Administrative definition in this instance is the process by which the problem-solver, 
in this case the NAG, actually defines the problem for practical purposes. So the 
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administrative definition of speeding should, as discussed above, be relatively easy to 
construct. `Are cars going above thirty miles per hour in our neighbourhood? ' At the 
other end of the spectrum, the administrative definition of anti-social behaviour is 
naturally far more complicated. The police officer in Neighbourhood I3 who had fixed 
ideas about anti-social behaviour being linked closely to outdoor drinking is clearly at 
odds in his concept of what anti-social behaviour is with the woman who showed up 
at the same NAG a few months later outlining to the group why young people 
hanging around was completely normal and nothing to be afraid of. f low does such a 
NAG construct an administrative definition of anti-social behaviour in such a broad 
conceptual environment? To many practitioners the political definition may not 
necessarily be a problem, but the administrative definition is likely to be of great 
import. Without a proper administrative definition, a realistic, functioning 
intervention can be almost impossible to construct. Any possibility of evaluation 
almost entirely evaporates if the problem is too loosely defined. This feeds into how a 
NAG (or any other problem-solver) can relate to the `public' who they purport to be 
solving the problem for. (This is discussed further under `timcframc problems' 
below). While the problems of political definition may feel more metaphysical in their 
import, the question of producing an administrative definition can feed directly into 
how successful the NAG feels it is and how successful it can be at solving or 
ameliorating the problems before it. 
`Teething problems' for the purposes of this work are the problems associated with 
the initiation of a new programme. Neighbourhood policing is itself a new concept 
and a new central government policy which has only been rolled out to include the 
entire of England and Wales on l April 2008. Within that new programme, the NAG 
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is a central element. According to a police manager intcrviewcd for this research; 
`The problem solvers are our Neighbourhood Action Groups. ' Particularly in 
Neighbourhood A, which was a pilot for NAGs in the I3CU, but also in the other 
NAGs studied in this research, there was a sense of ncw. ncss, and `learning the ropes' 
to the process. Although Neighbourhood A, by virtue of its pilot status, was more 
developed in its approach to problem solving, there were still instances when the 
NAG did not fully understand its capacity. An illustrative example was given in 
chapter S. In this case the NAG was uncertain about how the process of making 
housing decisions worked. In attempting to solve the problem, some increases had to 
be made in the NAG's skill base or capacity to approach the problem. 
Similar problems were observed in another NAG attended for the research. This was a 
newly established NAG in a different BCU, which was having trouble getting going. 
A facilitator was brought in from Headquarters to try and inspire the group into 
action. He went through the `boardblast' procedure for finding out what the problems 
were in the particular neighbourhood. The SARA and PAT processes were introduced 
and he then discussed some of the possible solutions that the NAG could enact. The 
chair of the NAG was quite surprised at some of the suggestions, asking `So is that 
the sort of thing that a NAG like us could be doing? ' Aside from this inexperience, 
the new NAG was having substantial problems getting stakeholders to attend. The 
NAG wanted to engage with a licensee in the area and despite I'CSOs visiting the 
premises and asking for a representative to attend, nobody showed up. Similar 
teething problems were observed in Neighbourhood i3 where the NAG wanted a 
representative of a large supermarket chain to attend. The chain had a small branch in 
the centre of Gamma Town and the congregation of young people outside the branch 
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was, it was felt, a cause of anti-social behaviour. Attendance of important and 
influential stakeholders can have an impact on the success of problem-solving 
throughout the length of the process, but in the initial stages it can have a substantial 
impact on the morale of a NAG. In tandem with the problem of attendance, the other 
great teething problem is finding a time which the NAG can agree to meet regularly. 
This has been a difficulty in all the NAGs which were observed, although the NAG in 
Neighbourhood A (chapter 5) seemed to be the most settled in so far as it met at the 
same time each month and in the same venue, a local school. Neighbourhood B 
(chapter 4) had a constant battle with individual diaries and timings and consequently 
lost certain partners from month to month, something which naturally hinders 
problem-solving or any form of multi-agency working. Teething problems allen 
overlap or have a similar character to sustainability problems (discussed below) 
although the two are at different stages in the development of the NAG. 
`Timeframe problems' relate to the sense of urgency felt by some members of NAGS 
to demonstrate results. It is clear that the problems typically selected by NAGs to 
work on are long term problems which repeatedly draw on police resources. Indeed 
one of the advantages of resolving a problem or even mitigating it, is that it would 
reduce the number of police call outs, or even tire-brigade call outs as in the case of 
bonfires in Neighbourhood A. Thus in the long run, POP should be good `value for 
money' and pass muster in any `cost"bcnefit analysis'. Ilowevcr care must be taken 
with expectations. Problems can be long-term and seemingly intractable and any 
intervention may take a substantial length of time, not only to implement, but to take 
effect. For example in Neighbourhood A, the problems associated with the garages 
could not be solved with simple interventions but required long term efforts to sort 
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out the environment which was deemed to be AS13"ogcnic (ic the garages 
themselves). After more than a year of NAG meetings, little progress could be seen on 
the ground. Some problems need long term solutions. 
This focus on long-term work can be something of a conceptual challenge, especially 
to front line police officers who arc more used to response focussed policing, where 
resolution is achieved quickly, or perhaps immediately. Working on a long term goal 
can be frustrating. In tandem with the `teething problems' discussed above, this can 
be a substantial challenge for a nascent NAG. Residents who join NAGs may find the 
slow pace of problem-solving and the seemingly incessant boardblasts and evidence 
gathering to be a disheartening experience. Indeed in Neighbourhood Ba number of 
members resigned early in their period of involvement in the NAG because nothing 
was being done, or they perceived that to be the case. This has driven the thirst for 
`quick wins' that was observed in all the NAGs attended. Each NAG hoped to achieve 
something tangible in the short term in order to display their success. 
Quick wins are also about momentum and morale for the members as well as an 
outward display of success. From observing the meetings, it appears that the desire to 
achieve quick wins is driven by the idea that if the NAG can produce a quick win 
while it is working on a long term problem, members will be buoyed by their 
achievement and conduct work consistently on the longer tcrm goal. Similarly, an 
increase in confidence from small successes may help increase the NAG's or 
individual members' capacity to conduct work on longer term problem-solving. The 
thirst for quick wins is all pervasive and referred to by managers, residents, 
facilitators and agency partners alike. In a sense it relates to some members' feelings 
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of obligation to the community. This is particularly the case with residents in the two 
case-study neighbourhoods who reported back to the NAGs that there was a sense 
among fellow residents that the NAG was doing nothing and achieving even less. This 
is perhaps an unfortunate side-effect to the fact that the police, as the twcnty-four hour 
social-service of last resort, is the body charged with dealing with `something-that- 
ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-somconc-had. bcttcr-do"somcthing- 
now! ' (Bittner, 1990). The police are associated with immediacy, both internally (in 
their own individual and collective consciousnesscs and expectations) and externally 
(by their various `publics'). It is the obvious tension between that immediacy and the 
process of problem-solving in the long-term which is at the heart of the concept of 
`timeframe problems' and it is that same tension that drives the thirst for `quick wins'. 
Problems of ownership are perhaps recognisable to anybody who has worked within a 
committee, be it professionally, for a sports club or for some other voluntary venture. 
When something has to be done, somebody has to do it. It has been apparent a number 
of times within both case-study NAGs that thcrc is often a reluctance to take on a 
task, and there can also be a sense that tasks are not chased up. It is easy to understand 
the reluctance. As discussed in the previous chapter most people at NAGs arc there on 
top of their normal day to day workload or arc volunteers. The only people who are 
truly there `on the meter' are the police. Thus taking on almost any task for the NAG 
occurs out of a sense of voluntarism. A good example of this problem is the work in 
Neighbourhood A on signs about damage to garages. The idea was to place signs up 
near garages that were known to attract anti-social behaviour in order to try to raise 
awareness of the problem, and increase confidcnce in reporting problems to the 
police. This may appear to be a relatively straightforward intervention, however 
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getting such signs into place was a struggle for the NAG. There was substantial toeing 
and fro-ing about who was to put up the signs. Similarly, the question of who was to 
pay for the signs was something of a problem, as NAGs have no independent funding 
and thus rely on the goodwill of other agencies to fund any of their initiatives, or 
direct the funding towards issues which arc of relevance to the problems the NAG is 
working on. To motivate the resources of time and co-ordination involved in 
implementing even a simple intervention such as signage near garages takes a 
significant amount of individual effort and skill. This is something that may not be so 
simple to generate in a disparate group such as a NAG. 
Many attendees, particularly those representing partners, and especially the Council 
and community safety partnership, attend numerous NAGs each month. For those 
partners, where any one NAG is merely one of many, there can be a reluctance to take 
on tasks which go beyond the operation of their current (often already overstretched) 
role. One council officer interviewed for this research pointed out the whiteboard in 
his office which detailed the location of his staff each day. In so doing he was 
illustrating the number of NAGs which staff had to attend. Each NAG means 
substantial time out of the office, and some NAGs arc in the evenings, which cats into 
the employee's personal time and necessitates that they be provided with time off in 
lieu'. These time pressures on partners, with no parallel increase in resources, make it 
difficult for some partners to operate to their full capacity. This drain on time can 
make it challenging for a partner employee to take ownership of even a small project, 
or at the least create a reluctance to do so. Similarly, if they arc double booked and a 
colleague has to attend a NAG for them (which was a common occurrence in the 
case-study neighbourhoods), there is no consistency of ownership over any project 
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that they do take on. If somebody who has taken on a task misses a meeting outright, 
the task can become completely lost from the perspective of the NAG quite quickly. It 
is easy for a NAG to discuss something, but it is more difficult for the group to tic 
down what exactly the `actions' that arise from the end of any discussion are. 'T'his 
problem is well known to anyone who has worked in a committee. It is difficult for a 
NAG chair to strike the balance between being productive (by chasing up actions) and 
being pushy and this skill is central to the success of any NAG. The chair's role in 
tying down actions, finding an owner for the actions, and chasing them up the 
following month is essential to successfully moving forward the NAG's objectives. It 
is also crucial to the group's morale that it feels like it is ticking some of its boxes, no 
matter how small those boxes may at first appear to be. 
Problems of evaluation are apparent across the entire criminal justice system (Logan, 
1990; Pawson and Tilley, 1994; Sherman et al., 1998; Crow, 2000; Tillcy, 2000, 
2001; Miethe and McCorklc, 2002; Williams et al., 2006; Smithson and Rogerson, 
2007). As discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, the search for a way of quantifying 
crime is beset with problems. So how can a NAG tell if it is doing well or not? The 
problem of evaluation is inextricably linked up with the problem of definition. If the 
administrative definition of the problem is not carefully constructed, it will be almost 
impossible to assess how well the problem has been addressed. Without this 
knowledge the problem-solving process cannot be properly honed down or improved 
upon. This is perhaps why there is a second `A' in SARA. The problem-solving 
methodology provided by headquarters mandates that the problem-solver (the NAG) 
assess how successful it has been in attempting to solve its problems. The 
Neighbourhood Priority Profile (NPP) contains a section for the assessment. 
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However, during this research, the most developed NPP seen, which was on garages 
in Neighbourhood A, had not yet reached a position where any assessment had taken 
place. So it is impossible (and perhaps pointless or even unethical) to draw 
conclusions on something that has not yet happened. What it is possible to discuss 
briefly is the significance of the evaluation problem. The assessment component of 
the NPP asks two questions: 
1. Was the response a success and what evidence is there of this? 
2. What lessons can be learned from this response? 
It is clear from this that the problem-solver is supposed to use the assessment to learn 
from the process. This learning, one imagines, will assist the NAG in being a better 
problem-solver in the future, which goes to assist the NAG in becoming a sustainable 
node of security governance over time (sec below, problems of sustainability). It may 
also help the NAG to increase morale and create incentive for people to take 
ownership of future projects which arc deemed to have been successful. '11he question 
of evidence however, raises some difficult questions. What is 'good' evaluative 
evidence? Academically rigorous evaluation is unlikely to take place in all thirty-two 
NAGs in the BCU, so what is the bar for 'evidence'? It is unclear from the NI'I' what 
exactly counts as 'evidence' for the 'Assessment' stage of SARA. The closest thing 
any NAG studied came to evaluating their responses was the collection of discussions 
about bonfire night in Neighbourhood A. A wide range of data, from members' 
personal experiences to official police statistics were drawn upon to assess the merits 
of each of the responses. Although no NPP assessment was filled out, it seems that 
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these are the types of evidence that will be uscd in cvaluating other interventions by 
the case-study NAGs and other NAGs in future NI'Ps. 
Problems of sustainability loom large on the horizon for new NAGs. Neighbourhood 
A was a pilot NAG and as such it benclitted from a degree of novelty and interest as 
well as a special degree of effort to get it going. Yet as the roll-out of NAGs 
continues, the pressure on resources of all partners increases. I low likely arc NAGs to 
be able to maintain a consistent level of work on problem-solving in the face of these 
increasing pressures? The answer may depend largely on how motivated individual 
NAG members are to keep things moving along and to maintain morale. Initial pilot 
NAGs have obtained substantial support from police and community safety 
partnership facilitators, who attend many, if not all of the meetings, but at some point, 
the NAGs are going to need to operate substantially on their own. They will need to 
conduct their own evaluations and move on with their own learnings for each of their 
problems. In the two case-study NAGs in this research the facilitator drove much of 
the boardblast work and assisted in trying to move discussions on constitutions 
forward as well as trying to keep the NAG focussed on local community safety 
business. Towards the end of the research period there was some agreement that the 
local neighbourhood sergeant would begin to take on some responsibility for some of 
the support and administrative work attached to the running of a NAG. This seems 
like a natural thing to do, draw on the officer who is at the NAG most consistently and 
supposed to be closest to the neighbourhood. However, there arc a number of 
problems with this from the point of sustainability. The first is that the on"repcatcd 
problem of abstraction of police officers. Throughout the period of research, the 
police staff who were working on neighbourhood policing in the I3CU changed 
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relatively regularly. In both case study neighbourhoods, the officer in charge of 
neighbourhood policing moved to another location or role within the force, and in one 
case an officer emigrated. If they arc in charge of the administration of the NAG's 
business, then the possibility for lost information, knowledge and momentum is 
substantial. The second problem is that if the police officer is responsible for keeping 
the NAG moving, focussed on its priorities and running smoothly, this runs the risk or 
the initiative becoming merely a police"lcd talking shop. It scnds a clear message to 
those who do attend that NAGs arc not about working together but about following a 
police agenda. This is in fact something that the police themselves do not sccm to 
want, yet it is an almost inevitable message if the neighbourhood police officer is 
driving the NAG. The problems of staff turnover were also visible in other partner 
agencies during this research. Similarly, maintaining the interest of local residents can 
be difficult. While problems of definition and teething problems may appear to be the 
most problematic at the start, it is clear that the question of sustainability will be a real 
challenge to NAGs in the near future and the problems of sustainability were already 
evident in this research. 
The six problems outlined above arc clearly intertwined and a NAG will face each 
problem to varying degrees at each step in its development. I iowcvcr, they arc not 
strictly chronological in their impact, nor are they necessarily obviously problematic 
when they do apply (for example the problems of political definition may not appear 
to be problems at all to a NAG that is certain of the moral rectitude of its priorities). 
However many of the problems feed each other. If a problem receives a poor 
administrative de inition this will have a huge impact on how an intervention is 
selected and implemented (which can manifest in teething problems). This can in turn 
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create unrealistic expectations which can feed timcframc problcros and evaluation 
problems. Evaluation, as the feedback on how well the NAG is doing is central to the 
effectiveness of the group. If there are evaluation problems, caused by a poor 
administrative definition or the use of inappropriate evaluation techniques, this can 
make it difficult to inspire members to take ownership of tasks within the project, or 
create a feeling of uncertainty and lack of morale in the group. Finally, it is clear that 
each of the first five problems create obstacles to the long term sustainability or the 
NAG as a node of security govcmance. Sustainability is of course central to the 
success of the NAG as a problem-solver and producer of community safety. 
Neighbourhood Action Groups and Intelligence-Led Policing 
We have already discussed how central the notion of 'intelligence-led policing' is to 
the TVP's management in signing off a new neighbourhood as ready to operate. 
However the concept of intelligence-lcd policing can be somewhat slippery and 
difficult to see in action, particularly at NAGs. Undoubtedly there is some sort of 
intelligence being used by NAGs as they conduct their partnership and problem- 
solving roles, but unlike POP, it is a little harder to sec the formal workings of ILP in 
a NAG's day to day, or meeting to meeting, operations. For this reason this section of 
the chapter is necessarily brief and tries to connect the debate and discussion on ILP 
with the realities of how the NAGs studied have behaved in terms of using 
intelligence in their operations. 
ILP is essentially `forward-looking' in its approach, in that it attcmpts to rcducc futurc 
crimes. It is thus different to traditional response policing, which is obviously more 
retrospective and responsive (Maguire and John, 2006). This forward-looking 
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approach is why ILP and POP arc often considered together, and arguably why they 
are central to notions of community policing (see discussion in chapter 1). Both 
strategies are attempting to prevent crime either by solving perennial problems (POP), 
or by finding out in advance where crime is likely to take place, or where it is being 
planned, and to intervene to prevent such actions (ILP). So it would seem that a small 
locallyfocussed node of security governance such as a NAG would have an interest 
in reaping the benefits from successfully operated ILP. However, it is hard to detect 
the formal usage of ILP in the NAGs studied. There arc a number of reasons for this. 
`Intelligence' itself is a nebulous concept and its use can involve substantial risks, as 
discussed above (chapter 1). For this reason it can be hard for the NAG to feel as if it 
is formally using an ILP approach. There were allusions made by police officers and 
facilitators to bringing information to the attention of the local Joint Tactics and 
Tasking Committee meeting, but it did not seem entirely clear what this would do for 
the NAG and there was no response of marked enthusiasm from the group when this 
type of approach was suggested. 
In the course of this research, there was no explicit explanation of the concepts 
involved in ILP given to NAG members (other than police statt) and no explanation 
of what they could do to have an impact on the ILI' process, or at least to help it 
along. ILP appeared to remain almost entirely the `property' of the police. Yet within 
the police there was also some difficulty observed with gathering information. As part 
of the research, a neighbourhood policing training day was observed at the Force's 
training centre. There were numerous speakers dealing with many areas of 
neighbourhood policing, but it was the police manager who spoke about making 
entries into the NIM that was most relevant here. He spoke about the process of 
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making entries into the NIM and how important this is. However, unlike the other 
speakers who were very positive and upbeat about their respective areas of 
neighbourhood policing, the NIM speaker was downbeat. The volume of entries to 
NIM was not as substantial as they could be and as a result the power of the system 
was being reduced. The speaker was exceedingly concerned about this, not least 
because HMIC had said that the TVP was not good at gathering information from the 
community. He thus exhorted all the officers new to neighbourhood policing to make 
entries in the NIM, regardless of how insignificant they may seem, so the force could 
begin to develop a picture of what was going on. At the end of the presentation, it did 
not seem that the NIM contained a huge amount of valuable information. 
Interestingly, a TVP report published at around the same time (Bowes, 2005) showed 
that PCSOs in the TVP were providing more data to the NIM than police officers. 
This may be because they are closer to the community and better at gathering the data 
or they are more diligent about entering what they do find, although the report could 
not say which was the case. 
Apart from the slipperiness of definition and the problems of motivating police staff 
to enter data they do find, there were other problems encountered with regard to 
NAGs, neighbourhood policing and ILP. Police managers seemed to be aware of the 
debate about what exactly `intelligence' is and had to make their own decisions on 
how to conceptualize what ILP meant in the context of that, as yet unresolved, debate: 
[T]here's a whole argument about what's information and what's 
intelligence and we've developed a model for recording community 
information, which then needs to be assessed and the argument goes, well 
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one of the arguments goes; 'intelligence is any information that has been 
evaluated for policing purposes'. So it is presented at a neighbourhood 
level and it is recorded and stored at a neighbourhood level. It is then 
reviewed and if it is identified as significant for purpose, then it will be 
lifted into the intelligence sphere. None the less that information is still 
valid and still useful for the policing of that particular neighbourhood. And 
that's been a learning because it's quite a new thing. 
Its `new-ness' is perhaps because ILP and neighbourhood policing arc not quite as 
good partners as they might at first appear. ILP can certainly benefit from the 
information that can be drawn from the local neighbourhood, but what can 
neighbourhood policing really get back in return? If neighbourhood policing is all 
about reassuring the neighbourhood and increasing their trust in the police, how 
useful is it to go about trying to squeeze information from individuals about others in 
their neighbourhood? Striking the right balance is exceptionally difficult. It is also 
something that, in the present research, did not appear to have been conducted in 
terms of a partnership. ILP appeared at all times to be something that the police 
`owned' and `did' and not something that the NAG was itself involved in. A good 
example was given in chapter 5 of the police saying they had their 'spies' who could 
give them information about anti-social behaviour relating to garages and this could 
be used in an enforcement drive. However the veracity of the information or what it 
might reveal were not discussed with the NAG. The partner agencies must always 
take it on trust from the police that the intelligence is worth relying on. ILP in 
operation lacks transparency and perhaps that is the vicious circle of 'intelligence'. To 
get it one must not say who gave it to you, which means it can never be corroborated, 
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which allows it to be interpreted without scrutiny, and such intcrprcttcd intelligence 
can itself become intelligence, whose source cannot be revealed or scrutinised. And so 
on, ad infinitum. Any work on building a hey Individual Network, which is the 
formal name of the police's network of informants, is conducted by the police and the 
police alone. So while the police are keen to piggy back on any information or 
intelligence that is brought forth by partners at a NAG, there was no reciprocity of 
information, access to intelligence, or scrutiny of that intelligence. This was borne out 
in the NAGs observed, where the police gave little or no information away to NAGs. 
Indeed they are often in a legal bind with regard to such information as, for example, 
when in one NAG meeting in Neighbourhood B the police officer could not tell the 
group anything about an ongoing investigation in the area. For the purposes of ILP, 
information or intelligence was in this research observed to be a one way flow. 
On the other hand, NAGs were observed generating substantial amounts of what the 
police manager quoted above would refer to as 'information' (in so far as that it has 
yet to be evaluated for policing purposes). EVAs arc a perfect example of information 
which could be evaluated for policing purposes. The EVAs in both case study NAGS 
were conducted by a combination of local residents and PCSOs and provided the 
groups with information, and evidence on where their priority problems were 
primarily located. This information was largely collected to assist with POP, 
particularly for the `scanning' part of SARA. So while the NAG may have been 
gathering information, it may not have strictly been being used as 'intelligence'. The 
NAGs however were observed using the information for other ends in their role as a 
locally focussed node of security governance. They used information about anti-social 
behaviour in some housing blocks in Neighbourhood I3 as evidence that there was a 
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problem which merited the appropriate housing association to send a representative to 
the NAG. Although not formally an entry in the NIM, or an example of ILI' strirto 
sensu, it is an illustration of the group using intelligence, as it interprets it (although it 
would probably be merely `information' as the police interpret it), to attempt to 
achieve its own ends. These ends, to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour in the 
neighbourhood, are in fact relatively congruent with the ends of the police force itself. 
In a world where concepts such as `intelligence', `information', 'policing', 'crime' 
and `anti-social behaviour' are so difficult to grasp firmly and control, it is suggested 
that such use of evidence gathered by the NAG could be considered to be part of a 
larger concept of ILP. This is notwithstanding, of course, the fact that the NAG's use 
of information and intelligence does not fit neatly within the formal structures of ILI' 
or the NIM. 
Some of the risks of the use of intelligence arc inherent in any NAG's use of 
intelligence. These include individual prejudices or preferences influencing what gets 
fed into any evidence gathering, particularly from local residents. Indeed, as discussed 
above, the police and some chairs are well aware of this risk as they often make the 
statement `the NAG is not a talking shop'. } lowever, unlike the other forms of covert 
intelligence gathering, the information the NAG gathers itself is gathered in a far 
more transparent fashion. The NAG information (be it EVAs, or `boardblasts') is 
gathered and discussed by all the members of the group. Ofen it can be shot down as 
being exaggerated, for example claims that there was a lot of drug paraphernalia in 
Neighbourhood B was removed from the list of evidence when it was challenged by a 
number of members. This sort of information, which is a collection of lived 
experiences of people with a stake in the locality, is arguably more reliable than 
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intelligence which is collected `behind closed doors'. I towever, perhaps the greater 
questions for the police are 'how useful is this information? ' or 'how much of this 
information is "noise"? T 'Noise' is one of the organizational pathologies which 
Sheptycki (2004) outlines as being a substantial obstacle to ILI'. Essentially the 
difficulties derived from `noise' are that the police can get far too much information, 
and sifting through it all and knowing which is uscful is a difficult (and one must 
imagine, rather dreary) process. From the perspective of formal ILP and the NIM, 
there may be some valuable intelligence derived from NAGs, but it is likely that it 
will be hard to root out from the noise. For this formal approach, the important factor 
is how the information is sorted, graded or assessed. However, individual NAGs will 
use their own information in their own ways to construct their partnership agendas 
and while not strictly 'intelligence-lcd policing' could be considered 'information-lcd 
partnership'. 
ILP may benefit from NAGs as they become more sustainable, however it was not 
clear in this research how much of an impact NAGs actually had in terms of providing 
useful and workable information for the NIM and ILI'. Further research on ILI' and its 
practical workings, both within a neighbourhood context and more broadly, will help 
to gain a greater understanding of the process. I tow ever, it is likely to be hampered by 
the confidential and secret nature of intelligence and the lack of transparency in how 
intelligence is gathered and used. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that neighbourhood policing entails elements of numerous policing 
strategics including community policing, problcm-oricntcd policing and intclligcncc- 
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led policing. This chapter has looked at the relationship between neighbourhood 
policing and POP and ILP, particularly as they rclatc to the NAG. The NAG is 
considered to be both the main focus of problcm-solving in neighbourhood policing 
and a useful potential source of `community information' which could be interpreted 
into `intelligence' for policing purposes. This chaptcr has looked at the relationship 
between these two policing strategies and neighbourhood policing. Particular attention 
was paid to the problem-solving process. 
Problem-solving policing has come to involve the use of the twin techniques known 
as SARA, and PAT. These neat techniques belie a much messier approach when they 
are applied on the ground and indeed the process of problem-solving may not be as 
rigorous and methodical as police managers might prefer. These techniques, which 
are imposed into the bureaucratic process of neighbourhood policing by means of 
documents such as Neighbourhood Priority Profiles (which walks a NAG step by step 
through the SARA process as it applies to a priority problem) can also be seen as a 
method of controlling the use of police discretion among lower ranking 
neighbourhood officers. Indeed this research found evidence that some NAGs and 
neighbourhood police officers preferred to ignore the strictures of the SARA and PAT 
and work on solving problems using other techniques that they felt more appropriate 
to their neighbourhood. Problem-solving to them does not need to be so rigorous. 
There are a number of difficulties with a problem-solving approach. Some of them 
hinge on the problems of partnership discussed in the previous chapter. This research 
identified six problems which hinder the application of problem-solving techniques by 
NAGs as part of neighbourhood policing. These were named; problems of definition 
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(both political and administrativc) of the problcm itsclf; ': ectliing problems' or 
problems associated with initiating a new programme; 'tlmeframe problems' which 
relate to the pressures of achieving something quickly; problems of ownership of 
different tasks agreed in the construction of interventions; problems of evaluation; and 
problems of sustainabiliry. Each of these problems may appear at different stages in 
the NAG's work on problcm"solving. Some of the problems may fccd into each other, 
for example a poorly defined problem may cause the NAG difficultics later in 
evaluating their intervention. Perhaps the greatest challenge for the NAG as a node of 
security governance using a problem-solving approach is the last one; sustainability. 
How well a NAG survives as an effective node will depend on how wcll it overcomes 
the difficulties of problem solving outlined here. 
The chapter also looked at the relationship between ILP and neighbourhood policing. 
Although there is much talk of the role of ILP in neighbourhood policing, it is argued 
here that they are not such good bedfcllows. WVhilc a NAG may be an invaluable mine 
of local `community information' which can feed into national or regional 
intelligence-led policing agendas, it is hard to see what the NAG itself will bet in 
return for this. NAGs gather evidence of crime and anti-social behaviour as part of 
their problem-solving work which could feed into ILI, databases such as the NIM, but 
what is the NAG's incentive to do this? It is argued here that NAGs are more likely to 
be interested in using their `information' for the purposes of their own lobbying or 
campaigning, as was cvidenccd in the efforts to collcct cvidcncc of anti-social 
behaviour in Neighbourhood II to try to convince a local housing authority that they 
needed to be involved. NAGs may use their `information' for their own means, but it 
is unclear how likely they arc to be of real use to the national ILI' agenda. 
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Chanter 8: Conclusion 
Neighbourhood policing is a new programme for policing set out by central 
government to bring a bespoke policing service to each neighbourhood in England 
and Wales. Whether it marks a new `cra' in policing is hard to tell. However, using 
Wood and Shearing's (2007: Chapter 2) concept of `wavcs' of public policing (sec 
chapter 1) it is possible that neighbourhood policing is an example of one such wave 
of public policing in Britain. Given that `[a] "waves-bascd" view rccognizcs multiple, 
and often overlapping, mentalities that have emerged across times and places' (ibid: 
35), it is possible to view neighbourhood policing as a `wave' which has drawn on 
numerous mentalities which have influenced its formation, without it necessarily 
being a complete scachangc in how policing is conducted. Those mentalities may 
include a variety of diverse influences. This may include the impact of substantial 
changes in the way late modern life in Britain is lived, for example, the increasing 
social and cultural diversity of the population, the proliferation of travel opportunities 
which allow for the wide geographical spread of an individual's lived cxpcricncc, 
increased commercialism and reduced deference, to choose just a few (Ilunt, 1991 
[1996]; Garland, 2002: Chaptcr 4) Similarly, the prolifcration of privatc mcans of 
security provision that has gonc hand in hand with this has forccd the policc to 
consider what role they have in the provision of security in a diverse marketplace. 
Finally, at a time when crime was falling, and fear of crime rising (Crawford, 2006b: 
148) the police were facing a challenge in the form of a 'reassurance gap' bctwccn 
how well they were performing against measures of crime (however fraught with 
difficulties such measures arc, sec chapter 2) and how people viewed their own risk of 
victimization. These inilucnccs, amongst othcrs, arc bchind the formation of a 
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neighbourhood policing strategy. These arc among the 'overlapping mentalities that 
have emerged across times and places' to combine to form this wave of public 
policing. 
These mentalities however are a minefield of indeterminate and slippery 
subjectivities. The language of neighbourhood policing is awash with words and 
concepts we all think we understand, yet have a vast plurality of meanings, depending 
on the context and the political perspective of the person or entity invoking nebulous 
notions such as 'community', 'anti-social behaviour', 'policing' or 'consumer' 
(chapters 1 and 2). The contestable nature of so many of the conccpts that underpin 
neighbourhood policing undoubtedly provides a challenge for the practitioner on the 
ground; What is a workable neighbourhood? Who arc my public? Arc they a 
community? How do I consult with them? Is thcrc a problem I can get sufficient 
consensus on to verify its existence and is it `worth' working on? I low should we go 
about trying to solve it? How do we measure the success of our work? I low do we 
convince people of our legitimacy in doing this work? The ncighbourhood police 
officer or other concerned community safety worker will have to grapple with these 
tricky concepts and create their own working definitions of them, along with notions 
of how to use them, in order to implement neighbourhood policing and problem- 
solving interventions. Ilowever pragmatic the responses, it must be remembered that 
almost every notion underpinning neighbourhood policing can be, and has been, 
contested. 
As well as the contestable nature of its conceptual foundations, neighbourhood 
policing is also under pressure from the weight of cxpcctations about what it can 
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deliver. In connecting to local ncighbourhoods and responding to local needs, 
neighbourhood policing is variously cxpcctcd to; incrcasc police accountability, 
increase police legitimacy, assist in the gathering of intelligence, solve local policing 
problems, reduce crime and provide reassurance so as to reduce fear of crime. ills is 
quite an agenda for one policing programme to concern itself with and it is hard to sec 
how one programme can achieve all of thcsc policy goals simultancously. Yct 
neighbourhood policing exists in a late modern world where security provision is 
available from an exceptionally wide collection of providers. Many providers from 
outside the `public police' are proliferating within this `plural policing' and may be 
able to provide security to those who seek it. The resulting provision of private 
security could conceivably have the effect of making the public police an 
anachronistic irrelevance. If people want to fccl safer, even when they arc objectively 
at a low risk of victimization, why not try to provide that publicly before those who 
are able to afford to do so, `go private' for their security needs? Thus creating a 
`security divide' similar to the 'digital divide', whereby those who have least access 
to resources are unable to access security provision adequate to their needs. 
This `security divide' is perhaps the greatest challenge for neighbourhood policing. In 
bridging that divide neighbourhood policing can provide an egalitarian bridge 
between those with the influence to provide their own security and those without it. In 
conceptualizing the role of neighbourhood policing within this plural body of security 
providers, it can be helpful if all the plural or fragmented security providers arc 
considered to be `nodes of security governance'. That is to say thay can be thought of 
as locations (nodes) of individual or corporate interests attempting to supply, 
purchase, control, access or influence the various methods of security provision. Each 
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node is linked to others by means of influence, geography, contract, statutory 
provision or other connection, this complex 'security quilt' of interacting nodes 
provides a useful way to consider the provision of security in contemporary society. It 
is clear from this commodification process, that providing security is no longer a task 
reserved to the public police (if it ever were actually so reserved). Where that leaves 
the public police is an interesting question. Ilowevcr it is undoubtedly true that they 
still have a role, if only in trying to address the imbalances inherent in leaving the 
market to resolve something as fundamental as the security of the public to go about 
their lives in relative safety. Can neighbourhood policing and its NAGs, working as 
nodes of security governance, provide a bridge over that security divide? If so, how 
would they go about doing so and how do they provide services that arc appropriate to 
those who are most vulnerable while at the same time providing an inclusive and 
relevant service to all of the police's public? That is the challenge of the future of 
policing and it is yet to be seen if neighbourhood policing can be an effective part of 
meeting that challenge. 
how successful is Neighbourhood Policing? 
This research began by trying to 'measure outcomes in citizen focussed local 
policing' and has become a study of the roll-out of neighbourhood policing, 
particularly in two case study neighbourhoods in the Thames Valley. llowever the 
question remains, how successful is neighbourhood policing, and if it is too early to 
tell, how successful can it be? These arc difficult questions because of the problems of 
evaluating policing generally, and neighbourhood policing in particular. Policing 
generally is difficult to evaluate because of the problems of quantifying hard to define 
concepts such as 'crime' and 'anti-social behaviour'. It is also difficult to measure 
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how successful the police are at maintaining, (or at (east not losing any further) 
legitimacy among certain sections of the public. In the case study ncighbourhoods in 
this research participants were observed saying that although the interventions to 
reduce anti-social behaviour on bonfire night had not reduced call outs to the fire 
service and police, they had increased neighbourhood cohesion and community spirit 
and were thus a success. Similarly it was pointed out that an increase in calls reporting 
crime to the police might in fact be a sign that the NAG was successful because it 
indicated that local residents were becoming more confident in the police. In short, 
one of the things they had achieved was to make people come to consider it 
worthwhile to call the police. What is clear is that in either of these interpretations, the 
police are in fact in a win-win situation, because regardless of what happens to 
recorded crime or reports to the police of anti-social behaviour, they have a method of 
interpretation of that change as being an achievement in terms of one of the goals of 
neighbourhood policing (crime up: the people trust us more so call us more. Crime 
down: we have reduced crime). It is not argued that this is some sort of well thought 
out conspiracy on the part of police and Home Office planners to create a win-win 
environment for themselves. This is a description of diffcrcnt responses made by on- 
the-ground practitioners. They are responding to different quantification data in this 
way. This malleable response is indicative of the difficulties associated with creating 
a programme that has such loose conceptual basis. 
This fluidity, and lack of `certainty' or `objectivity' nccd not be a bad thing howcvcr. 
It might be used productively to allow NAGs to view short term changes in crime data 
in a positive light. This can be good for moralc in a NAG and could help a NAG to 
avoid bccoming hung up on short tcrm results and `quick wins' and focus on more 
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long term interventions. This fluidity could be used perhaps to solve the timcframc 
problems discussed in chapter 7. These are the problems associated with a NAG's 
desire to be seen to have achieved something as it establishes itsclf hic NAG can feel 
like it needs to develop some momentum. Such immediate effects arc obviously 
difficult to achieve when working on long standing local problems. Any help that the 
fluidity of definition provides to a NAG in smoothing over these problems may be 
useful to its long term success. Similarly, the fluidity potentially allows for NAGs to 
be more creative in how they construct interventions to try to solve their priority 
problems. If NAGs are only concerned with driving down police or BCS crime data, 
they may only focus on interventions that arc perceived to have an immediate effect 
on those data-sets. However, if the NAG is able to work on problems in a more 
holistic manner, it may be able to increase public satisfaction with the response and 
thus create a tolerance or understanding of a problem (cg young people hanging 
around or people driving at 28 mph in a 30 mph zone) which might be a far better 
result than a reduced number of calls to the police. 
The fluidity of definition potentially allows space for the individual NAG to apply the 
skills of their members to a problem rather than be constrained by a set of skills or 
type of behaviour prescribed by police or central govcrnmcnt. This is particularly 
useful because it means that a committed NAG member, with wide local knowledge 
and commitment to their area can use their personal networks and connections to 
create bespoke responses. Responses that might suit a neighbourhood in the Thames 
Valley far better than anything that could be created in Whitehall. The flexibility of 
loose definitions and aims allows for a greater personalized response when 
Fx 
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implementing neighbourhood policing and harnessing the skills and resources brought 
to the NAG by its constituent members. 
On the other hand, this fluidity of definition, and the concomitant problems of 
gauging success provides the opportunity for something more insidious to occur. It is 
entirely possible for one group or individual to use a NAG as a personal fiefdom to 
work on their pct problem. This could be to use the NAG's access to various 
resources for the benefit of interests which are either not priority problems as decided 
in consultation, or are some sort of response which is wholly inappropriate to the role 
of the public police in providing a 'public policing service'. The extreme form of this 
personal use of a NAG was not observed in this research, yet more nuanced forms 
were. The debates over anti-social behaviour and its definition in Neighbourhood i3 
for example are indicative of how easy it would be for a charismatic resident, chair, 
police officer or other attendee to manipulate the administrative definitions of what 
`anti-social behaviour' the NAG is to work on, towards issues of personal concern to 
themselves. There is no easy way to patrol this type of behaviour especially as NAGs 
become more self sustaining. A constitution cannot prevent small scale politicking, 
however malignant, if it is draped in the cover of loosely defined terms and has the 
consent (tacit or otherwise) of a majority of the members of the NAG. If providing 
policing solutions to the most pressing problems affecting a neighbourhood, as 
determined by residents, is one of the aims of neighbourhood policing, care needs to 
be taken that the project is not hijacked for personal (albeit plausibly local and 
laudable) agendas. 
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The flexibility inherent in the subjcctivities discussed in chapters 1 and 2 is perhaps 
the great strength of neighbourhood policing. Flexibility allows for the local 
neighbourhood public to decide what it wants and how it wants to get it. I iowcvcr it 
also risks the manipulation of policing for personal or other reasons, This flexibility 
also causes problems in judging how successful neighbourhood policing is. It is 
completely conceivable that a neighbourhood might be constituted of a public with 
consistent ideas of what it wants a NAG to work on, and how it should do so. 
Meanwhile the adjacent neighbourhood might be completely divided about what its 
priority problems are and have no local support for police interventions. It is clear that 
the former has an easy road to success. The latter may ncvcr be successful, unicss we 
use a carefully chosen measure of success which can show improvement, for example 
one based on `outputs' rather than `outcomes' (Garland, 1996: 458). In this 'choose 
your own adventure' approach to measuring success, both NAGs can be judged to be 
successful. Perhaps the beauty of neighbourhood policing is that it can always be a 
success. This may be the beauty of the programme in one sense, but it is suggested 
here, as argued above, that the real test of success for neighbourhood policing will be 
different. The test of its success will be its ability to sustain within the complex 
fragmented world of security governance a public-policing presence which can look 
after those with no `buy-in' to the commercial security marketplace. Furthermore, it 
must do so without alicnating thosc who do have such 'buy-in'. If ncighbourhood 
policing fails to do that, then it cannot be considered a success. Ilow one would 
measure that success or failure, is almost impossible to say. 
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Findings of this research 
This research has observed the early stages of the implementation of a 'new' form of 
policing as it is applied in England and Wales. Ilowcvcr, thcrc may be something in 
the argument that neighbourhood policing is not as new as it is made out to be. It may 
be argued that neighbourhood policing is simply 'old policing wine in new policing 
bottles'. In this analysis neighbourhood policing is merely a return to 'community 
policing' or a move to try to bring back the `bobby on the beat'. However it is argued 
here that neighbourhood policing is different. Neighbourhood policing is distinct from 
these local projects in that it is nationwide, and driven by central government, unlike 
many previous forms of community policing. It is also unique in that it is the first 
time so many different policing strategies (ILP, POP, multi-agency partnership 
working, and community policing) have been combincd to work on cvcry 
neighbourhood in the jurisdiction. The nexus of these locallyfocusscd policing 
strategies in each neighbourhood is the NAG and this research provides a useful 
analysis of how neighbourhood policing has worked in its early days in the case study 
areas. There are three main findings from this research and each is discussed below. 
First, in a 'plural policing' cnvironmcnt as cxpcricnccd in many latc modern 
democracies, a `nodal governance of security' theory is a useful analytical tool for 
understanding the experience of the NAG as it implements neighbourhood policing. 
Second, working in partnership to solve problems which have traditionally been the 
preserve of the police produces some substantial problems, including the 
`criminalization of social policy' and `youth' as well as other more mundane obstacles 
to success. Finally, the application of new policing strategies, particularly POP, but 
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including ILP, to the process of partnership working and a community-oricntcd 
policing approach produces its own set of difficulties. 
Applying a 'nodal governance of security' analysis to Neighbourhood Policing and 
NAGs 
The central argument made by this work is that the application of the theory of `nodal 
governance' of security is a useful and insightful way to conceive of neighbourhood 
policing. In particular it is useful in understanding the NAG itself as a node of 
security governance which is part of a large network of other nodes, each attempting 
to provide, permit, control or obtain some form of security for its constituents, 
members or other interests. In an environment or cra of so-culled 'plural policing' the 
police are only one organization involved in the provision of a divcrsc smorgasboard 
of security products ranging from CCTV and safes to bodyguard, bouncers and 
security dogs. There is a massive market for security products in the UK. Crawford 
(2008) cites research suggesting that there are as many as 150,000 private security 
officers in the UK, while Jones and Newburn (2006a) used census data to come to a 
similar conclusion. While the exact figure may be tricky to pin down, it is certainly a 
substantial number. Within this marketplace, those with the most resources can obtain 
the `most' security. If `policing' in this broad interpretation of the conccpt is to be 
made sense of, the researcher must look beyond merely the public police as a provider 
of `security' or the products which go towards creating whatever it is that 'security' 
is. Each gated community, school, campus, industrial cstatc or apartmcnt block has its 
own security interests and its own security providers and each of these fits neatly into 
the definition of a node of security governance. Describing and understanding how 
they interact is central to understanding this new security environment (see chapter 6). 
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This work has looked at one such node, the NAG, and described how it operates and 
interacts with other nodes and with its public and partners. The NAG is one local node 
driven perhaps by the police, but which is distinct from, and may come into tension 
with, the greater node of the police force itself. 
Is the nodal governance approach a useful way of understanding how neighbourhood 
policing works, or could work? There arc a number of reasons why a nodal 
governance approach is a useful way to conceptualize neighbourhood policing. Such 
an approach allows for a description of the NAG as the central focus of locally 
inspired policing. This description is one that can accommodate the many, sometimes 
competing, demands and expectations at play in the roll-out of neighbourhood 
policing. Each of these demands places pressures on the node which hold it (the node) 
in place and influence the methods it employs and its motivations for employing 
them. More than any other theoretical framework, the nodal governance analysis 
allows for a description of the NAG and its influences which is helpful in that it 
allows the observer to understand the experience of the NAG within the greater latc- 
modern world of `plural policing'. 
Conceiving of the NAG as one such node with hundreds of such interactions allows 
the observer to begin to chart the relationships between nodes and to begin to 
understand what it is that is helping them or hindering them in achieving their security 
provision goals. Locating any individual NAG within such a web may also have 
advantages for the practitioner who can begin to break down the NAG's relationship 
with partner organizations and to understand how their interests coincide or conflict. 
Using this nodal governance approach has allowed the second set of findings of this 
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research to be brought into light, the problems faced by NAGs in partnership working 
and problem solving. 
The problems faced by NAGs In partnership working 
Once the problems which are most important to an area arc dccidcd upon, a NAG 
must work as a partnership of its members in an effort to try to solve those problems. 
The next section will discuss the findings of this research which specifically relate to 
problem-solving, this section discusses the contribution that this research has made to 
the discourse of partnership working. Chapter 6 discusses this interaction and 
describes it using a nodal governance of security approach. The chapter also goes on 
to describe some of the problems associated with partnership working and to describe 
how they manifest themselves within a NAG as a local node of security govcmance. 
Three main problems were identified. The first is that each of the members of any 
NAG will have a different corporate or individual raison d'eire and thus will be 
motivated by, and geared towards achieving, different policy, profit or personal goals. 
Not everyone who is mandated to attend a Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership 
is in fact solely motivated towards reducing crime. This is the same with a NAG. A 
partner, such as a council, with a mandate for a whole city or county may aspire to 
provide a bespoke service to each NAG, but often will not have the resources or 
motivation to make such a service happen. Indeed it may clash with their overall 
structures and planning for providing services across the whole region. At the other 
end of the spectrum, a local resident may have only one problem that they want to 
forge ahead with solving and this may not completely dovetail with the priority 
problems the NAG is working on. Both of these situations were obscrvcd in the case 
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study neighbourhoods and it is clear that many attendees at the NAGs were coming at 
the meetings with very different perspectives. 
The second problem with partnership identified in the research was the process of 
criminalization or `ASB"icization' of social policy and 'youth'. If crimc and anti- 
social behaviour become the central reason for interventions in a neighbourhood, 
there is the risk that other social service provisions (such as housing, strcct care, youth 
services, lighting, education) be viewed solely as a mechanism for reducing crime and 
anti-social behaviour, rather than as an end in themselves. This problem is linked to 
the problem of different motivations discussed above in that it is indicative of social 
service providers being asked to redirect their work to take into account its 
criminogenic and ASB"ogenic effects. A process that may not align neatly, or at all, 
with the policy aims of those agencies. 
Alongside the criminalization and ASB"icization of social policy, the same process is 
occurring to the notion of `youth'. Young people arc repeatedly dcscribcd by NAG 
members and members of the public as a 'problem', and the source of anti-social 
behaviour and crime. At one point a NAG chair even went so far as to say that if 
children can be kept in front of a computcr screen for longcr, they have less time to 
spend out on the estate breaking things. Providing longer hours of access to intcrnct 
facilities reduced anti-social behaviour was the essence of the argument. 
This attack on the difficulties and delights of growing up, is somewhat unfortunate. It 
is a confusingly mixed message that the discourse of anti-social behaviour sends to 
young people. They are torn between the problems of growing up and the difficulties 
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associated with being blamed for anti-social behaviour and other social ills. It is 
difficult to work out what a young person is to do? Ilanging around with their friends 
outside is anti-social behaviour even when no harn is being done, other than the 
occasional pedestrian misinterpretting their risk of being mugged. Kicking footballs 
about breaks things, and thus is classed as anti-social behaviour. When the young 
person finally emerges from the youth club computer room at the age of eighteen, 
having no experience of playing sport or socializing with friends, they will be 
attacked by the state for being obese, not getting enough exercise and not having the 
people skills which are so desired by employers. One thing certainly emerges from 
this research and that is that `youth' and `young people' are still described as the 
major cause of local neighbourhood problems, from vandalism to anti-social 
behaviour, to destruction of garages and out of control bonfires. The question 
remains, is neighbourhood policing the best way to help young people navigate thcir 
first steps into a confused, footloose and uncertain late-modem world? This research 
suggests that it is not. The `problems' of youth will never be succcssfully solved by 
neighbourhood policing or partnership working, until somcthing more fundamental 
occurs in the way we approach the socialization of young pcoplc, particularly young 
males. Using the police to do so, by applying neighbourhood policing or some other 
technique, is merely leaving the police to try to solve the problcms society cannot, or 
will not sort out itsclf. As such, the partncrship work of ncighbourhood policing 
`young people' is bound to have little or no impact. 
Problemalizing problem-solving 
The challenge of defining problems which arc close to 'what people want' is a 
difficult and political one. The newly forming NAG, or the more cstablishcd NAG 
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which is re-consulting its public, must try to be inclusive and consider the nccds of as 
many different sectors of the neighbourhood as possible and not merely listen to those 
who are best politically motivated and empowered or those who speak with the 
loudest voice. This is an important difference between a NAG and a private node of 
security governance. A NAG is still trying to deliver a `public' security function. Its 
interventions are intended to be for a form of public good rather than for the security 
of a particular interest group. This is inherently different to other nodes of security 
governance such as private security companies, banks, shopping malls, university 
campuses or other forms of what Shearing and Stcnning (1981) call 'mass private 
property'. 
Understanding this basic process for deciding what the NAG will focus on, and the 
democratic aspirations inherent in public consultation which are used to justify the 
focus on these particular problems rather than any other, is csscntial to understanding 
the motivations of many of the NAG's members. The democratic aspiration may be 
central to the reasoning behind neighbourhood policing itself. llowcvcr, the 
democratic consultation process (observations of which are dcscribcd mors fully in 
chapter 4) is only the beginning of the problem-solving process. Once the NAG has 
established itself, it then has to work on `solving' or ameliorating the problem(s). This 
process brings with it its own set of problems. 
This research also looked at a more established NAG (Neighbourhood A in chapter 
5). Again, if one looks at the NAG in that neighbourhood as a `node', it is clear that it 
operates by interacting with other nodes in the area in order to attempt to achieve its 
security targets of solving the problems it has set for itself. Problcm"solving 
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techniques, as envisaged by the police and central government may not be so simple 
for a NAG to put into action. The research found six main problems (set out in 
chapter 7) that were observed in the case studies. These problems include initial 
`teething problems' as well as more long term challenges such as the problem of 
sustainability in the face of particularly obstinate problems and increased 
competitioon for resources. This problem of sustainability applies to all NAGs 
whether pilots or not. How is a chair or committed NAG member to deal with low 
morale from poor performances, or lack of results? I low much damage is done by the 
movement of a neighbourhood police officcr to another post in the force? These 
difficulties were emerging as the substantial challenges to the NAG as a successful 
problem-solving node. 
All three of these findings are discussed more fully in the chapters above. 
Neighbourhood Action Groups as a component of the 'mixed cconomy of policing' or 
`plural policing' may be best understood using a nodal governance analysis. Ilaving 
used such an approach, it is clear from this research that the NAG faces substantial 
challenges as a node involving partners' co-operation and as a node which aspires to 
apply problem-solving techniques. The next two sections will briefly outline the 
possible areas for further research in the area and discuss the possible future outlook 
for neighbourhood policing generally. 
Where will future research go frone here? 
It is clear that there is much scope for further research on how neighbourhood 
policing continues to operate now that all the neighbourhoods in England and Walcs 
are up and running. The problems of sustainability and evaluation in problcm"solving 
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will not go away easily and are likely to provide future researchers with ample 
difficult questions. As the `pilot' nature of NAGs has worn off, how will those 
neighbourhoods which are rolled out last, and arguably with the least support (see 
problems of sustainablity in chapter 7), survive as they try to establish themselves as 
successful nodes? Once these nodes become established, or at least some way along 
the road towards being established, it will be useful to know how well they operate in 
an environment where there are such a large number of NAGs competing for what 
would appear to be a finite amount of resources, whether that is time spent by 
councils on street care or private funding for PCSOs or local wardens. Will NAGs 
create new ways of gaining leverage over such resources or encourage partner 
agencies to better use resources to assist in the co-production of community safety? 
Could the proliferation of NAGs thus almost `create' more resources or will each 
have a smaller slice of pie? If it is the latter, how will NAGs operate in relation to 
each other, particularly in relation to neighbouring NAGs, which may have very 
similar interests (for example reducing the risk of simply displacing a problem from 
one neighbourhood to the next)? Will NAGs compete or cooperate? 
Another substantial question is how will NAGs relate to the intelligence-led policing 
(ILP) agenda? This is likely to be a challenging area to research given the secrecy that 
shrouds intelligence gathering and processing. However, it is an important one, as the 
use of covert intelligence and Key Individual Networks (the police euphemism for 
informants) to create an intelligence picture of varying sizes, from neighbourhood to 
nation, is poorly understood and potentially open to a lot of abuse. How can proper, 
credible protections be put in place to prevent such abuses? The other question raised, 
but unanswered by this research is about how much ILP can provide to the NAG and 
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neighbourhood police officer. There is a definite appearance from this research that 
the intelligence flow is upwards from NAG to NIM, with little tangible return. What 
is in it for the NAG? Will they see returns in the long run or are they simply being 
used as snoops for the police? These arc important questions for future researchers. 
Perhaps the most important question for the researcher working on neighbourhood 
policing in the future is about how well the neighbourhood policing agenda and the 
NAG as a node of security governance provides a `public security good' in an 
increasingly private security marketplace. As members of late modern society spend 
more of their business and leisure time in spaces of `mass private property' (Jones, 
2007c: 848), and those with existing access to resources are able to protect themselves 
within such private properties using private security provision, there is a real risk that 
a rump of leftover public space will be abandoned to the police to look after. This 
space is likely to contain those without access to resources sufficient to assuage their 
own security concerns privately. These groups in society arc likely to be the poorest, 
the most vulnerable, and in all likelihood, those most at risk of criminal victimization. 
It is in looking after those who cannot afford to `go private' for their security that 
poses the greatest challenge to neighbourhood policing. Engaging with this question 
is an important area for future research as neighbourhood policing begins to become 
more established alongside increases in private security provision. 
What is the future for Neighbourhood Policing? 
Finally, it is worth mentioning briefly the future prospects for neighbourhood 
policing. Predicting the future is a dangerous business. The pace of social change 
makes such predictions exceptionally uncertain (Ncwburn, 2008). In discussing 
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(much less predicting) the future of policing, scholars have been similarly wary of 
what can be said with any certainty. The future is Uncertain and its prediction is 
something of a flight of fancy. 
Discussing the future of policing is both an entertaining and difficult task. 
Difficult, because the future is by definition unknown. Entertaining, 
because its speculative nature allows for greater flights of imagination than 
is normally possible in social scientific writing (Ncwbum, 2007: 225). 
However, there are some consistencies in how policing has developed. Similarly there 
are some ways in which late-modern society has begun to shape the govcrnance of 
security and these influences are evidently of import to the future of neighbourhood 
policing. The past forty years have clearly demonstrated that the public police have 
faced `the end of a monopoly' in security provision in most 'developed' democracies 
(Bayley and Shearing, 1996: 586). Thcre is no denying the increased dcmand for 
security products alongside the insatiable demand for more bobbies on the beat which 
characterises the contemporary field of security governance. It is perhaps fair to 
predict that this desire for increased security will not go away. It is also fair to predict 
that the commodification of security provision and 'policing' functions broadly 
construed will not lead to a completely private policing environment with no publicly 
operated police force. Although the structure (local versus central) and questions of 
role and function will of course continue to be the subject of academic, political and 
public debate. 
282 
If the police survive, it is posited that there will be a place for neighbourhood policing 
within their remit. While pressures of managcrialism, streamlining and 
commodification may have the potential to strip away some functions of the police to 
be provided by private contractors (McLaughlin and Murji, 1995: 125), it is clear that 
there will remain a public-policing role. If it is managed correctly, neighbourhood 
policing could remain central to that role. It has two advantages of flexibility. First it 
is capable of being able to be described as a success in almost all neighbourhoods at 
almost all times, on some measure. Secondly, its flexibility allows it to be aimcd at 
almost any problem which is the `moral panic' (Cohen, 1972) of the day. There is no 
reason a NAG cannot work on the `war on terror' for example (Innes and Thiel, 2008: 
558). Indeed when police managers describe how useful NAGs can be to ILP, they 
tend to use examples of how locally garnered information can help prevent terrorism 
or give the security services a `heads up' about garages acting as chemical stockpiles 
or local youths becoming `extremists'. It is also perfectly conceivable that local 
NAGs could become involved in the fight against knife crime, which appears to be 
the current moral panic in London. From global to local, neighbourhood policing can 
be applied. That is the sort of flexible tool that any police force would want in its 
toolbox. 
There are of course challenges to this cosy notion about the future of neighbourhood 
policing. The notion of community focussed policing can be seen as part of a cycle 
which can rotate back to a form of enforcement orientated policing if it becomes 
publicly perceived that policing has become 'too soft' (chapter 1). This could happen 
for example if local publics became convinced that they were being `spun' success 
stories when in fact it was felt locally that neighbourhood policing and their NAG 
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were not serving their neighbourhood well at all. Resistance to the cyclical shift back 
to enforcement may be created by the dichotomy between neighbourhood policing 
and `fire-brigade' policing within forces. In essence, if the former can do the `small 
stuff that comes up constantly in consultations (litter, young people hanging around, 
speeding, graffiti etc) and the latter can deal with the `big stuff which people appear 
almost completely unconcerned about at a local level (such as murder, serious assault, 
hate crime etc) but which is undoubtedly of central import to the public police, then 
perhaps the police can provide both poles of the policing cycle simultaneously. In 
such a scenario, the cycle could be reduced to an oscillation of relative resource 
outlay rather than a periodic paradigm shift in a force's approach to its work. 
The future for neighbourhood policing appears to be one whereby it stays central to 
the public policing response to the problems of the day. It appears to be one method 
of fitting the public police into the late-modem `security network' by establishing a 
strong node of security governance within every neighbourhood in the jurisdiction. In 
so doing it has the potential to influence the texture of the network as it affects local 
security governance. It is hoped that this influence can be used to prevent the 
development of a large `security divide' whereby those with access to resources can 
increase their security (and social isolation) at the expense of those without such 
access. If it can do this, work on the small problems of policing and maintain its 
relevance to the bogeymen, folk devils and moral panics of the day, neighbourhood 
policing will have a long, challenging and relevant future. 
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